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Abstract
My doctorate thesis investigates a particularly controversial issue in both philosophy of 
economics and philosophy of mind, namely, the problem of interpersonal utility 
comparisons (IUCs henceforth).
As I take utility to be a numerical representation of the intensity of individual 
preferences, IUCs are judgments about how different people’s preferences compare in' 
terms of strength. As factual judgments, IUCs appear to be either underdetermined by the 
empirical evidence or indeterminate. This casts doubt on whether or not we can have 
(scientific) knowledge of, or, at least, (scientifically) justified beliefs about, how different 
people’s preferences compare in terms of strength.
In general, IUCs can be justified if the assumption of interpersonal similarity, in one of 
its forms, can be vindicated. I consider two strategies, which attempt to vindicate this 
assumption by means of, respectively, an inference to the best explanation type of argument 
and a nativist argument. I argue that both strategies fail.
These results suggest that preferences may be interpersonally incomparable with respect 
to the dimension of strength. I consider four ‘possibility’ arguments addressing this 
challenge. I argue that, although some of them may solve the conceptual problem 
concerning the interpersonal comparability of preference strengths, they all fail to solve the 
epistemological problem of IUCs.
Nevertheless, I argue that a ‘modest’ transcendental argument shows that IUCs can, at 
least, be justified, provided that we embrace a coherentist view about the structure of 
epistemic justification.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a commonplace that, in everyday life, we ascribe all sort of mental states to other 
people: sensations, like pain and hunger; emotions, like fear and love; and propositional 
attitudes, like desires, preferences and beliefs. Examples vary from the trivial to the more 
complex. I see Nancy drinking a glass of water and I ascribe to her the belief that the glass 
contains water and a desire to quench her thirst. In a different circumstance, I see Nancy 
waving on the street and I ascribe to her the intention of either saying hello or signalling a 
turn, depending on the information that I possess about the surrounding environment and 
about her personal history. The capacity of “understanding the mind”, or, as it is often 
referred to, the capacity of mindreading, typically serves a variety of purposes, which 
include the prediction, explanation, and interpretation of other individuals’ behaviour.
In everyday life, not only do we ascribe mental states, but we also compare them. We 
compare mental states with respect to a variety of dimensions: their type, their intensity 
and, in the case of propositional attitudes, their content. We compare both our own and 
other people’s mental states, that is, we make both intra-personal and inter-personal 
comparisons. A remarkable fact is that we typically make interpersonal comparisons (ICs, 
for short) of mental states with relatively little difficulty. Moreover, we often do not find 
inter-personal comparisons of mental states more difficult than intra-personal comparisons, 
that is, of comparisons involving our own mental states1.
Here is an example offered by Richard Jeffrey of an everyday situation where the 
comparison of two individuals’ mental states has some relevance:
“Shall we open the can of New England clam chowder or the can of tomato soup, for the 
children’s lunch? Adam prefers the chowder; his sister Eve prefers the other. Their 
preferences conflict. But it is acknowledged between them that Adam finds tomatoes really 
repulsive, and loves clams, whereas Eve can take clam chowder or leave it alone, but is 
moderately fond of tomato soup. They agree to have the chowder.”
As this example shows, ICs of mental states are often made for normative purposes, e.g. 
decisions involving the distribution of goods. However, in everyday practice, we also make
1 See Davidson, D. [1986], reprinted in Davidson, D. [2004], p. 59.
2 Jeffrey, R. [1974], reprinted in Jeffrey, R. [1992], p. 182.
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ICs of mental states for evaluative purposes and, arguably, for explaining other people’s 
behaviour.
The ease with which we make ICs of mental states in everyday life contrasts with the 
difficulties that such comparisons pose at the theoretical level. In particular, what presents 
the most challenging puzzles is the comparison of the intensity of different people’s mental 
states. Consider how Stanley Jevons and Lionel Robbins, respectively, describe the 
problem:
“The susceptibility of one mind may, for what we know, be a thousand times greater 
than that of another. But, provided that the susceptibility was different in a like ratio in all 
directions, we should never be able to discover the difference. Every mind is thus 
inscrutable to every other mind, and no common denominator of feeling seems to be 
possible.”3
“[S]uppose that we differed about the satisfaction derived by A from an income of 
£1,000, and the satisfaction derived by B from an income of twice that magnitude. Asking 
them would provide no solution. Supposing they differed. A might urge that he had more 
satisfaction than B at the margin. While B might urge that, on the contrary, he had more 
satisfaction than A. We do not need to be slavish behaviourists to realise that there is no 
scientific evidence. There is no means o f testing the magnitude o f A's satisfaction as 
compared with B's. If we tested the state of their blood-streams, that would be a test of 
blood, not satisfaction. Introspection does not enable A to measure what is going on in B's 
mind, nor B to measure what is going on in A's. There is no way of comparing the 
satisfactions of different people.”4
It is not surprising that these complaints come from two economists. Since its beginning 
as a modem science, economics has assigned a central place to mental states of various 
sorts and represented them numerically through a utility function. Since, in the course of 
the centuries, economists have taken different mental states as objects of their analysis, 
some confusion has arisen about the meaning of the utility notion. From a historical point 
of view, we can broadly distinguish three ways in which the notion of utility has been 
used5. First, there is the traditional use of utility as synonym of happiness, which, in turn, is
3 Jevons, S. [1911], p. 14.
4 Robbins, L. [1932], pp. 139-140. [Emphasis in the original]
5 See C o o te r , R. and P., R appoport [1984]. It is worth emphasising that the proposed distinction is 
concerned with a historical, rather than conceptual, reconstruction of the meaning of utility.
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defined as the net result of pleasures minus pains. Second, there is the use of utility as 
subjective feeling of satisfaction. Finally, there is the use of utility as a representation of 
individual desires or preferences6. A striking fact is that the interpersonal comparison of 
different people’s utilities remains problematic under each of these interpretations. For 
instance, while Jevons’ remarks target the traditional meaning of utility, Robbins’ remarks 
target (sometimes inconsistently) the second interpretation.
In this thesis, I shall consider utility in the latter sense. More specifically, I shall take 
utility to be a numerical representation of the intensity of individual preferences7. The 
choice of preferences as objects of my analysis responds to a specific motivation. Although 
the difficulties in comparing mental states affect all the fields where mental states play a 
relevant role, the failure to give a plausible theoretical systematization to the problem of 
ICs of preference strength has particularly far-reaching consequences for several areas 
within, or connected to, contemporary economic analysis. More specifically, the problem of 
comparing different people’s preference strengths is particularly important in three, inter­
related, fields: traditional welfare economics, social choice theory and ethics.
Traditional welfare economics tries to rank alternative states of affairs on the basis of 
people’s preferences towards it. If we cannot compare different individuals’ preferences in 
terms of strength, welfare economics is unable to give recommendations in cases where 
changing the state of affairs increases the utility of one or more individuals at the price of 
diminishing the utility of at least one other individual in society. In other words, welfare 
economics is unable to settle distributive conflicts8.
Social choice theory offers another clear example of the importance of the problem. 
Arrow’s seminal work on preference aggregation shows that there is no way to aggregate 
individual preferences in order to obtain a social ranking of alternative states of affairs, 
which satisfies few, very mild, conditions: collective rationality, unrestricted domain, weak 
Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship9. As Sen and 
many others have proved, however, Arrow’s impossibility result can be turned into a 
possibility result if we relax the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives by
6 According to C o o te r , R. and P., R ap p o p o rt [1984], there is another use, namely, the one of utility as 
referring to what is objectively ‘useful’ in terms of need satisfaction. Cooter’s and Rappoport’s interpretation 
is questioned by L i t t le ,  I. M. D. [1985] and H ennipm an, P. [1988]. For replies see, respectively, C o o te r , R. 
and P., R appoport [1985] and R appoport, P. [1988]. It is worth noticing that, although utility does not refer 
here to any mental state, interpersonal utility comparisons remain a problem also in this case.
71 shall utility to be a mere representation of the intensity of individual preferences. This implies that I will 
not take utility to be any sort of emotion, feeling, or propositional attitude distinct from, or even identical to, 
preferences.
For extensive surveys of welfare economics, see M ishan , E. J. [1960] and Chipman, J. and J., M o o re  
[1978].
9 See A rro w , K.[1963].
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introducing ICs of preference strength10. The literature has, for the most part, focused on 
the implications of allowing ICs of different kinds and with alternative informational 
bases11. However, considerably less work has been done on other more foundational issues 
concerning ICs of preference strength.
Finally, the problem is particularly important in ethics and applied ethics. The 
meaningfulness of various ethical doctrines crucially depends on the very possibility of 
making ICs of preference strength. For instance, such comparisons play a crucial role 
within the preference satisfaction theory of well-being. If, as it is usually maintained, the 
degree to which an individual’s life goes well is given by the intensity of his preference for 
the option that the world realises, then, if we cannot compare different individuals’ 
preferences in terms of strength, it follows that we cannot compare different people’s 
degrees of well-being either.
Let us taken for granted that ICs of preferences pose a particularly serious theoretical 
problem. What exactly is the nature of the problem? We can identify a set of distinct, 
although not always independent, questions about ICs, which can sometimes be confused 
and conflated12.
1. The semantic question: what is the meaning of IC judgments?
2. The measurement question: how can we measure the mental states to be 
interpersonally compared?
3. The descriptive question: what are the key features of our everyday practice of 
making ICs?
4. The explanatory question: how can we explain our capacity for making ICs?
5. The metaphysical question: is there a fact of the matter about ICs?
6. The epistemological question: can we have (scientific) knowledge of, or, at least, 
(scientifically) justified beliefs about, ICs?
7. The normative question: how should we make ICs (for different purposes)?
10 See Sen, A. [1970], specially pp. 35-36.
11 See Sen, A. [1970], [1973], [1977], Ham m ond, P. [1976], D ’A sprem on t, C. and G ev ers  [1977], Miskin, 
E. [1978], R o b e rts , K. [1980a,b], [1995] and S u zu m u ra , K. [1996] among the others. There are several 
proposals concerning the informational basis to adopt. On the non-utilitarian side, different authors advocate 
the adoption of primary goods, resources, rights, opportunities, capabilities, basic needs, as relevant objects of 
comparison. On the utilitarian side, different authors suggest defining utility in terms of welfare, preferences, 
interests, happiness, desire satisfaction and so on. In particular, see R aw ls , J. [1971], [1982] for primary 
goods, D w ork in , R. [1981a,b], [2000], for a resource-based approach, N ozick, R. [1974] for rights, 
A rn eso n , R. J. [1989] and R oem er, J. E. [1998] for opportunities, Sen, A. [1985], [1993] for capabilities, 
G riffin , J. [1986] for desire satisfaction, D avidson , D. [1986] for interests, Ng, Y.-K. [1996], [1997] for 
happiness, while, for the literature concerning basic needs, see SEN, A. [1999], p. 359.
12 This set of questions is similar, although not identical, to the one proposed by Davies and Stone in the 
context o f the problem of mindreading. See DAVIES, M. and T., STONE [1996], pp. 119-120.
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For the purpose of this thesis, the metaphysical and the epistemological questions are the 
most important ones. The former question concerns whether or not there are any facts that 
would make IC judgments true. The latter concerns whether or not we can have epistemic 
access to these (alleged) facts. As a working hypothesis, I will initially presuppose an 
affirmative answer to the metaphysical question. This means that I shall take ICs to be 
factual judgments. My focus will be on the question of whether or not, and to what extent, 
we can have (scientific) knowledge of, or, at least, (scientifically) justified beliefs about, 
ICs of preference strength. However, in the course of my analysis, I shall reconsider the 
metaphysical question more closely and try to offer a more direct justification for my initial 
assumption. Since economists typically represent individual preferences by a (family of) 
utility fiinction(s), I shall equally refer (with the qualifications to be seen in chapter 1) to 
the problem of comparing preference strengths as the problem of interpersonal utility 
comparisons (IUCs, for short).
In order to answer these questions, I shall briefly touch on the issue of the nature of 
mental states, in general, and preferences, in particular. Orthodox economics oscillates 
between behaviourism and dispositionalism. According to the former doctrine -  pioneered 
by Samuelson in his “revealed preference approach”13 -  preferences are nothing but 
instances of observable choice behaviour. According to the latter doctrine, preferences are 
dispositions to cause observable choice behaviour. Traditionally, the problem of IUCs has 
been discussed with respect to these two ways of conceiving the nature of preferences. 
However, at least since the ‘70s, some philosophers of mind have suggested adopting a 
different, functionalist, account of the nature of mental states14. More recently, other 
philosophers have advanced an alternative, experientialist, characterisation of the nature of 
mental states15. According to functionalism, mental states are individuated with respect to 
the role that they occupy in the individuals’ mind, in relation to inputs, other mental states 
and behavioural outputs. Instead, according to experientialism, mental states are 
individuated with respect to the family of conscious experiences that individuals undergo. 
One of the goals of my thesis is to see how these different conceptions affect the 
conclusions concerning the epistemological problem of ICs of preference strength.
I shall also indirectly consider some of the other question about ICs listed above. In 
order to understand whether or not we can form justified beliefs about how different 
people’s preferences compare in terms of strength, I shall consider the explanatory question
13 See S am uelson , P. A. [1947].
14 Lewis, D. [1972] is the locus classicus.
15 See, in particular, GOLDMAN, A. [1993].
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of how we make ICs of preference strength. Typically, the activity of making such 
comparisons is conceived as a two-step process. In the first step, preferences are ascribed to 
other individuals. In the second step, preferences are compared with respect to their 
intensity. One suggestion is that the problem of comparing preferences is just a particular 
case of the more general problem of ascribing mental states. By examining the latter, we 
can better understand what conditions need to be satisfied in order for our beliefs about 
how different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength to be justified.
Two qualifications should be added. The explanatory question of how we ascribe 
preferences may refer to the methods and processes used to ascribe preferences by either 
scientific researchers or by ordinary people. In this thesis, I shall consider both cases. With 
respect to the latter case, moreover, the explanatory question can be addressed at different 
levels of description, i.e. personal, sub-personal and physical16. The personal level of 
description focuses on the way in which persons, as such, think about and interpret other 
people’s mental and overt behaviour. The sub-personal level of description focuses on the 
underlying information-processing mechanisms that need to be postulated in order to 
explain people’s mindreading capacity. The physical level of description focuses on the 
physical structure that realizes the mental architecture as conceived at the functional level. 
In this thesis, I shall consider the first two levels of analysis only.
Furthermore, I shall briefly examine the measurement question. Indeed, as I shall claim 
in chapter 1, one of the conditions for having scientifically justified beliefs about ICs is that 
the compared mental states must be accurately and precisely measurable. The problem of 
scientific justification is connected to the problem of measurement. Thus, in my thesis, I 
shall consider the question of how preferences can be measured. Moreover, I shall devote 
some attention to the contrast between beliefs, which supposedly are both measurable and 
comparable, and preferences, which supposedly are measurable but not comparable17.
Coming now to the structure of this thesis, I shall proceed as follows. In chapter 1 ,1 
shall present the problem of IUCs. Indeed, despite its importance, the literature is often 
vague about how to characterize it. As a consequence, the results that are drawn are often 
unclear. For instance, different authors conclude that IUCs are impossible18 or 
meaningless19 or, at best, that they are not factual, but normative, judgments20. These
16 See D e n n e tt, D. [1969].
17 See B ra d le y , R. [2007b] for a recent parallel between the problem of ICs o f degrees o f belief and the 
problem of ICs of degrees of preference.
8 Although the theme of the “impossibility” of IUCs is a common one, in the economic literature, it is hard to 
identify a paradigmatic statement of such a position. For an early reaction against the impossibility o f IUCs, 
instead, see L i t t le ,  I. D. M. [1957], chapter IV.
19 See A rro w , K. [1963], p. 9.
20 See R obbins, L. [1932], p. 139.
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claims seem to conflate some of the distinct issues about ICs that we have listed above: the 
explanatory issue of whether or not we can make ICs at all, the semantic issue of whether 
or not IC judgments are meaningful and the metaphysical issue about the nature of ICs, 
respectively. In chapter 1, my goal is to contrast the ‘standard’ way of presenting the 
problem of IUCs with the one that I favour, according to which the problem is whether or 
not can we have (scientific) knowledge of, or, at least, (scientifically) justified beliefs about 
how different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength.
In the next two chapters I shall look more closely at the issue of whether or nor we can 
have (scientifically) justified ICs of preference strength. In chapter 2 ,1 shall consider some 
accounts offered in the economic literature, which are based on an inference to the best 
explanation kind of argument. The general idea is that a theory, or an assumption, is 
justified if it offers, or contributes to offering, the best explanation of a certain 
phenomenon. In turn, the criteria for individuating the best explanation typically make 
reference to pragmatic considerations, such as explanatory power, simplicity, or parsimony. 
In the case of IUCs, the argument is that we are justified in assuming that different people’s 
utilities are co-scaled insofar as this provides the best explanation of their behaviour in 
terms of the pragmatic virtues seen above. Contrary to a common intuition, however, I shall 
argue that the assumption that different people’s utilities are co-scaled does not add 
anything to the explanation of individual behaviour nor makes a theory including it either 
more parsimonious or simpler than a theory that does not include it. Therefore, this strategy 
fails to successfully address the issue of justification.
An interesting feature of the economic literature is that it often attempts to ground the
solutions given to the problem of IUCs on the explanation of how ordinary people
01supposedly make ICs of preference strength in everyday life . Since this explanatory 
problem concerns mental states (i.e. preferences) and one of their properties (i.e. strength) 
in particular, one would expect the existence of both a large literature in philosophy of 
mind addressing the issue and a particularly strong interdisciplinary exchange between 
economics and philosophy of mind. Instead, and quite surprisingly, neither expectation is 
actually met. On the one hand, economists offer only casual remarks about how ordinary 
people make ICs, which lack both empirical and conceptual support. On the other hand, 
philosophers of mind have almost completely ignored this explanatory problem. One 
significant exception is constituted by Alvin Goldman, who has attempted to bring the
21 See, am ongst the others, HARSANYI, J. [1955] and [1977], LITTLE, I. D. M. [1957], JEFFREY, R. [1974], 
List, C. [2003].
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problem of IUCs in line with current debates in philosophy of mind and epistemology22. In 
chapter 3 ,1 will start from his work and pursue two goals. First, I shall try to show how 
philosophy of mind can contribute to the debate by extending Goldman’s analysis. Indeed, 
Goldman focuses mainly on ICs of happiness and adopts a very specific approach to mental 
ascription, i.e. Simulation Theory. By contrast, I shall focus on ICs of preference strength 
and consider both Simulation Theory and the other main approach to mental ascription, i.e. 
Theory Theory. Second, I shall assess whether or not philosophy of mind can help us find a 
successful solution to the problem of IUCs. I shall devote a special interest to Goldman’s 
own argument from nativism. According to it, the assumption that different people’s 
utilities are co-scaled is justified if the assumption that ICs of preference strength are 
performed through innate mechanisms that are either hyper-similar across individuals or 
very closely representative of the workings of other individuals’ mind-systems is sound. I 
shall argue that, when the notion of innate cognitive capacity or mechanism is properly 
spelt out, this argument reduces to an inference to the best explanation kind of argument. 
Therefore, this strategy too fails to successfully address the issue of justification.
The failure of the previous arguments increases the pressure brought by the sceptical 
challenge. The idea is that, perhaps, the alleged impossibility of having justified IUCs 
stems from the incomparability of preferences with respect to the dimension of strength. As 
a consequence, several authors resort to more radical ‘in principle’ solutions to the problem 
of IUCs. These solutions are based on ‘possibility’ arguments. Their primary goal is to 
show that different people’s preference strengths are indeed comparable. Their secondary 
goal is to show that it is possible, in principle but not by means of empirical or pragmatic 
considerations only, to have (scientific) knowledge of, or, at least, (scientifically) justified 
beliefs about how different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength. In chapter 4, 
I shall consider three ‘possibility’ arguments. Although these arguments are made in the 
context of a more economic-oriented analysis, they significantly borrow conceptual tools 
from both metaphysics and philosophy of mind. The first argument is based on Broome’s 
work on personal goodness. It claims that, if individual preferences are independent from 
personal identity, then it is conceptually possible to construe a universal preference scale, 
provided that each individual can live at least another individual’s pair of lives and that all 
individuals’ lives are connected in a suitable way. If this is the case, different people’s 
preferences are interpersonally comparable in terms of strength. The second and third 
arguments are based on a functionalist understanding of the nature of preferences. Both 
arguments claim that it is conceptually possible to identify two points with respect to which
22 See G oldm an , A. [1995a].
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different people’s preferences play the same causal role. If this is the case, functionalism 
allows us to conclude that preferences are interpersonally comparable in terms of strength. 
The former argument claims that these points are given, respectively, by the most preferred 
and by the least preferred prospects in the individual’s lifetime preference ranking. The 
latter argument -  offered by Bradley -  claims that one point is given by the ethically 
neutral prospect, while the other is given by the total desirability of all prospects. However, 
I shall argue that, although some of these arguments may solve the conceptual problem 
concerning the comparability of different people’s preference strengths, they all fail to 
solve the epistemological problem of IUCs on the grounds that they do not show that the 
relevant causal mechanisms determining individual preferences are really the same across 
individuals.
Once again, the assessment of the more economic-oriented analysis invites a 
corresponding analysis of the same issues from a more philosophy-oriented perspective. In 
chapter 5, I shall examine another ‘possibility’ argument that is typically made in the 
context of the explanation of people’s mindreading capacity at the personal level of 
description. In its original version, this argument proceeds from the premises that we 
interpret each other correctly and that the interpersonal comparability of mental states is 
necessarily required by the very task of interpretation to the conclusion that preferences are 
indeed interpersonally comparable in terms of strength. As such, it takes the form of a 
‘strong’ transcendental argument. In line with Stroud’s critique, I shall argue that this 
position shows, at best, that, necessarily, interpretation requires taking mental states to be 
comparable. However, it does not show that they really are interpersonally comparable. 
Nevertheless, we may still reach results of anti-sceptical significance by employing a 
transcendental argument of a more ‘modest’ form. The goal is to demonstrate only that, 
necessarily, interpretation requires one to take, or believe that, different people’s 
preferences are interpersonally comparable from the start. I shall argue that, if a ‘modest’ 
transcendental argument is defensible, then, if it is combined with coherentism, it shows 
that ICs of preference strength can, at least, be (scientifically) justified.
To summarise, the main strategies examined in this thesis fail to show that that we can 
have (scientific) knowledge of how different people’s preferences compare in terms of 
strength. An interesting exception is offered by a ‘modest’ transcendental strategy, which 
shows that ICs of preference strength can, at least, be (scientifically) justified, i f  one 
embraces coherentism about epistemic justification. Since the success of this strategy is 
conditional on the acceptance of a very specific and not uncontroversial thesis, it does not 
reach the status of conclusiveness that one could hope for. As a consequence, one may read
17
this thesis in a disjunctive fashion: either it provides a positive argument for the possibility 
of having (scientifically) justified IUCs, if coherentism is true, or it provides an argument 
by elimination, to the effect that none of the existing solutions allow for the possibility of 
having (scientifically) justified IUCs.
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CHAPTER 1 
The problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility
1. Introduction
The orthodox view in economics and philosophy is that IUCs pose remarkable 
theoretical difficulties. However, a precise definition of the problem is somehow lacking in 
the literature. As we have seen in the introduction, part of the confusion stems from the 
failure to distinguish the existence of a set of distinct and relatively independent questions 
that can be asked about IUCs. For instance, the problem of IUCs is often characterised by 
means of expressions of the following sort: interpersonal utilities are not on the same scale; 
interpersonal utilities have no factual basis; interpersonal utilities are incomparable; IUCs 
are empirically meaningless; etc. At first sight, however, these expressions are not logically 
equivalent. In this chapter my goal is to present the approach that I will adopt in this thesis 
and to illustrate how it relates to alternative ways of formulating the problem of IUCs. This 
will provide a map of how the relevant notions listed above are connected to each other.
I shall proceed as follows. In section 2 , 1 shall present the ‘standard picture’ of the 
problem of IUCs and its main features. I shall argue that this framework limits a more 
thorough understanding of some relevant issues. First of all, it does not adequately 
distinguish the metaphysical and the epistemological questions about IUCs. Secondly, it 
does not clarify the relationship between the problem of comparing the intensity of 
different people’s preferences and the problem of comparing their utilities. Thirdly, it 
neglects current debates in philosophy of mind and epistemology. A better formulation 
must be able to take all these issues into account.
In section 3 ,1 shall discuss the first limitation by considering the approach originally 
followed by Waldner and, more recently, by List, according to which the problem of IUCs 
is the problem of whether or not IUCs are empirically meaningful1. In section 4 ,1 shall 
discuss the second limitation by considering an alternative characterisation, according to 
which the problem of IUCs is the problem of whether or not different people’s utilities are 
commensurable. Finally, in section 5 ,1 shall discuss the third limitation by considering the 
approach that I will adopt in this thesis, which is based on the treatment of the problem of
1 See W a ld n e r , I. [1972] and List, C. [2003].
19
IUCs given by Goldman in his “Simulation and Interpersonal Utility”2. Broadly speaking, 
the main focus of my analysis will be on the epistemological question of whether or not we 
can have knowledge of, or justified beliefs about, how different individuals’ preferences 
compare in terms of strength. More narrowly, I shall consider whether or not we can have 
scientific knowledge of, or scientifically justified beliefs about, how different people’s 
preferences compare in terms of strength.
2. The problem of IUCs in the ‘standard picture’
Generally speaking, we can say that the problem of IUCs is the problem of comparing 
different people’s utilities. The first difficulty that one encounters concerns the meaning of 
the word ‘utility’. As we have seen in the introduction, ‘utility’ is a technical notion, whose 
meaning has changed in the course of the years, as a consequence of the changes in the 
theories in which it has been embedded3. For clarity, here I shall define it as the numerical 
value of a function, i.e. the utility function, which represents an individual’s preferences. 
Thereby, we can define the problem of IUCs as the problem of comparing different 
people’s preferences, as numerically represented through a (family of) utility function(s).
The ‘standard picture’ characterises the theoretical framework in which the problem of 
IUCs arises as a sequence of four steps4, dealing with:
(1) the determination of individual preferences;
(2) their representation through a (family of) utility function(s);
(3) the interpersonal comparison of utilities;
(4) the formulation of the judgment of interest.
Let us examine each step in detail.
2.1 The determination o f preferences
2 G o ldm an , A. [1995a]. Here, I shall attempt to improve Goldman’s account in two ways. On the one hand, I 
shall elaborate and expand his presentation by analyzing how the conditions for knowledge apply to the 
problem of IUCs and by discussing in more details the idea of scientific justification in the case of IUCs. On 
the other hand, I shall illustrate how this approach is related to alternative ways of formulating the problem of 
IUCs existing in the literature.
3 See also S tig le r ,  G. [1950a,b], C o o te r , R. and P., R ap p o p o rt [1984] and B room e, J. [1999] for a 
historical reconstruction.
4 D avidson , D. [1986], reprinted in D avidson , D. [2004], and F le u rb a e y , M. and J., H am m ond [2004] 
offer similar, although not identical, reconstructions.
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The first step in the ‘standard picture’ is concerned with the individuation of 
preferences. This task is not independent from issues concerning (a) the nature, (b) the 
domain and (c) the properties of preferences.
Orthodox economics oscillates between the adoption of either a behaviourist or a 
dispositionalist account of the nature of preferences. According to the former doctrine -  
prominent in the early days of the revealed preference approach -  preferences are nothing 
but instances of observable choice behaviour. Thus, for instance, an individual’s preference 
for taking, rather than not taking, his umbrella is nothing but the individual’s act of taking 
the umbrella in the corresponding choice situation. However, behaviourism is a highly 
problematic theory of the nature of mental states. The main objection is that it excludes the 
possibility of having preferences in the absence of occurring choice situations. In other 
words, it excludes the possibility of having hypothetical preferences5. Suppose that, in the 
previous example, the individual is not presented with the choice of taking the umbrella. 
We may be tempted to say that he still prefers to perform this action, even if this does not 
currently become manifest in overt behaviour. Thus, it appears that the nature of mental 
states cannot be entirely defined in behaviourist terms.
According to the latter doctrine, preferences are dispositions to cause observable choice 
behaviour. Dispositions manifest themselves only if the relevant conditions are satisfied. In 
our example, the individual’s act of taking the umbrella shows that the individual has a 
categorical state that disposes him to take the umbrella in suitable circumstances. Given 
that observable choice behaviour is not a necessary condition for having preferences, a 
dispositional account can take into account the possibility of having hypothetical 
preferences, while, at the same time, preserving a moderate behaviourist account of their 
nature.
The ‘standard picture’ typically embraces a dispositional account of the nature of 
preferences. In set-theoretic terms, it conceives preferences as binary relations R, that is, 
relations between two items. The items included in the preference domain vary according 
to different decision theories. More specifically, preferences may range over either acts, or 
propositions, or prospects6. The argument in this thesis does not depend on any specific 
ontological choice. However, for clarity, I shall take preferences to range over prospects. 
Prospects are mutually exclusive vectors of possible outcomes, together with a probability 
distribution over these outcomes. We can think of outcomes as states of affairs or possible 
worlds. At the extreme, each outcome is a complete history, or a particular world. More
5 See P e t t i t ,  P. [2006], especially p. 133.
6 For acts, see S av ag e , L. [1954]. For propositions, see J e f f re y , R. [1983]. For prospects, or lotteries, see 
v o n  N eum ann, J. and O., M o rg e n s te rn , [1944].
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commonly, however, it is a set including all the possible worlds of a certain type. Formally, 
let jc be a prospect included in the preference domain A. We can write x  = < O i,..., Ok,..., 
On>, where Ok is an outcome that can occur with a fixed probability pk, for k = 1 ,..., n. A 
pure prospect represents the case of an outcome whose occurrence is certain, i.e. x = <Ok>.
In the ‘standard picture’, the individuation of preferences is typically governed by two 
sets of axioms, namely, choice axioms and preference axioms. The former axioms fix the 
conditions for inferring the existence of preferences from observed or hypothetical choice 
behaviour, in accordance with the general dispositional account of preferences. As the 
accurate individuation of an individual’s preferences must proceed holistically, further 
constraints are imposed on the structure on the individual’s preferences. More specifically, 
preference axioms postulate that each individual has complete and transitive preferences.
2.2 The representation o f preferences
The second step in the ‘standard picture’ is concerned with the numerical representation 
of preferences. Before discussing how this task is performed in the case under 
consideration, I shall illustrate some of the basic elements of measurement theory7. In 
general, measurement consists in the assignment of numbers that preserve certain empirical 
relations. More precisely, measurement starts with an empirical relational structure 27 and a 
numerical relational structure N. Then, it seeks a mapping/from the empirical relational 
structure 27 to the numerical relational structure A, which preserves all the relevant relations 
and operations in 27. The mapping/is called a homomorphism. The triple (27, N,f) is called 
a scale. Two items are measured on the same scale if and only if they are measured with 
respect to an identical triple (27, N,j). For simplicity, however, I shall refer to/alone as a 
scale of measurement. Thereby, I shall say that two items are co-scaled if and only if they 
are assigned numbers through the same function/.
The first basic problem of measurement is the representation problem. The goal is to 
find a set of (necessary and) sufficient conditions for the existence of a homomorphism/ 
from 27 to N. If the conditions are stated in axiomatic form, then the representation problem 
consists in finding a set of axioms that is (necessary and) sufficient to establish a 
representation theorem. In turn, the representation theorem asserts that, if an empirical 
relational structure 27 satisfies these axioms, there exists a homomorphism/into a particular
7 See K ra n tz , D.H., L uce, R.D., Suppes, P. & T v ersk y , A. [1971] and R o b e r ts , F. S. [1979], for a more 
detailed illustration.
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numerical structure N, that is, there exists a function mapping the empirical relational 
structure into the numerical relational structure.
The second basic problem is the uniqueness problem. Given the same empirical 
relational structure E  and numerical relational structure N, it may be possible to find more 
than one function preserving the same relations and operations in I .  The uniqueness 
problem consists in specifying how unique the homomorphism from E  to N  is. More 
precisely, le t/an d  g be homomorphisms from E  to N. If k is a function that transforms/ 
into g, by preserving all the information carried by/, then we can say that A is an admissible 
transformation of scale. The uniqueness theorem specifies the class of admissible 
transformations Is  that yields homomorphisms from the empirical relational structure E  
into the numerical relational structure N s.
The class of admissible transformations defines the type of measurement scale. 
Although there are infinite scale-types, four of them are particularly important: ordinal, 
interval, ratio, and absolute scale of measurement. An ordinal scale is unique up to a 
monotone increasing transformation. An interval scale is unique up to a positive affine 
transformation, of the form X(x) = ax+/3, for some a > 0 and /? e OS. A ratio scale is unique 
up to a similarity/linear transformation of the form X(x) = ox, for some a  > 0. An absolute 
scale is absolutely unique. Interval, ratio and absolute scales are cardinal scales of 
measurement. In an interval scale, both the zero point and the unit are arbitrarily fixed. In a 
ratio scale, the zero is ‘natural’ but the unit is fixed arbitrarily. Finally, in an absolute scale, 
both the zero and the unit are ‘natural’. The class of admissible transformations defines the 
meaningfulness of statements involving a numerical scale of measurement. The standard 
criterion for meaningfulness is invariance under the class of transformations up to which 
the numerical representation under consideration is unique. Following Roberts, we can say 
that “a statement involving numerical scales is meaningful if and only if its truth (or falsity) 
remains unchanged under all admissible transformations of all the scales involved”9.
Let us go back to preferences. It is worth emphasising that the representation problem 
arises at two different stages. The first stage concerns the representation of the agent’s 
observed or hypothetical choice behaviour in terms of preference relations with certain 
properties. The second stage concerns the representation of the agent’s preferences by a 
numerical function. If the agent’s choices satisfy the weak axioms of revealed preferences, 
they can be represented in terms of preferences with ordering properties, i.e. preferences 
forming an ordering of options. On the other hand, if the agent’s preferences satisfy the
8 See K ra n tz , D.H., Luce, R.D., Suppes, P. & T v ersk y , A. [1971].
9 Roberts, F. S. [1979], p. 71.
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conditions of completeness and transitivity, they can be represented though an ordinal 
utility function m, unique up to a monotone increasing transformation.
If we want to represent preferences on a cardinal scale, the corresponding set of axioms 
must be richer, since such a representation contains more information than the ordinal one. 
The common view is that the evidence only suffices to obtain a representation of 
preferences on an interval scale, while it is insufficient to represent preferences on both a 
ratio and an absolute scale. At the same time, it is possible to represent preferences on an 
interval scale in more than one way. This means that there is more than one set of axioms 
that is sufficient for the cardinalization of preferences. The most common suggestion -  and 
the one that I shall mostly refer to in this thesis -  is to use a von Neumann-Morgenstem 
(vNM) utility function10. In the vNM framework, the representation of preferences on an 
interval scale is supposed to capture not only the order of preferences, but also the degree, 
or intensity, of the individual’s preferences for the options in the preference domain. 
Choice behaviour remains the relevant evidence, although data are gathered both from 
situations of certainty and from situations of uncertainty. Together with the ordering 
axioms, then, the set of axioms includes an Archimedean and an independence axiom. If 
individual preferences satisfy those conditions, they can be represented through a vNM 
utility function w, unique up to a positive affine transformation. Measurement leads to the 
formation of profiles of utility functions, that is, of n-tuples of {ui}, for any individual i= 1, 
...,n .
2.3 The comparison o f different people’s utilities
The third step in the ‘standard picture’ is concerned with the comparison of different 
people’s utilities. There are two main kinds of IUCs, namely, ICs of utility levels and ICs 
of utility differences. For any two individuals i andy, and for any four options x , y, w, z e  
A, ICs of utility levels are judgments of the form: Ui(jc) > Uj(y), while ICs of utility 
differences are judgments of the form: ui(jc) - ui(y) / Uj(vv) - ufz) = K  for some X e  E .  In 
addition to these, List has recently drawn attention to a third kind of IUCs, namely, ICs 
with respect to an interpersonally significant zero-line. If a significant zero-line exists, an 
individual i can have utility less than / equal to / greater than a utility level of zero. 
Formally, this means that sign(Ui(jc)) = 8, where 8 □{-!, 0, 1}. In turn, this sign-function
10 See v o n  N eu m a n n , J. and O., M o rg en stern , [1944]. An alternative suggestion is to use the ‘just 
noticeable difference’ method. Another suggestion is based on ‘probabilistic choice’ models. For references, 
see H a m m o n d , P. [1991].
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allows us to make ICs of utility levels between individuals with utility, respectively, less 
than / equal to / greater than the interpersonally significant zero-line11.
In the last step, IUCs are used to formulate a judgment of interest. If the judgment 
concerns a decision involving two (or more) individuals, a decision rule typically 
establishes the relevant kind of comparison to be made. Roughly, we can distinguish two 
main purposes for which IUCs can be made: explanatory and normative. On the one hand, 
IUCs are supposed to help explain features of an individual’s behaviour by establishing a 
comparison both with similar features and with the determinants of another individual’s 
behaviour. The judgment of interest is an explanatory one. The idea is that, by ascribing 
comparable degrees of preference, one can make sense of why different individuals show 
different behaviours. On the other hand, IUCs are supposed to help reaching decisions 
based on the individuals’ preferences. The judgment of interest is a normative one. The 
idea is that, when a choice affects other people and the individual’s preferences are the 
variables on which the outcome is based, decision-making requires making IUCs.
According to the ‘standard picture’, the problem of IUCs arises at the third stage. Choice 
behaviour is not sufficient to determine whether or not preferences represented by the same 
utility values, but belonging to different individuals, have really the same intensity. The 
problem is that, even when different individuals show the same choice behaviour, the 
evidence is not sufficient to establish whether or not the function representing their 
preferences is really the same. In other words, on the basis of choice behaviour alone, it is 
not possible to claim that different people’s utilities are co-scaled. To see why, let us 
consider an example12.
Suppose there are two individuals, i and j, and four options x, y, w, z e  A. Individual i 
ranks the options in the following way: jcRyRwRz. On the other hand, individual j  ranks the 
options in the following way: wRzRxRy. Suppose we measure their preferences on a 
(interval) zero-one scale, such that we assign the value 1 to the most preferred option and 
the value 0 to the worst option. Then, we can assign a value that represents the intensity of 
their preferences for the other options, relative to the best and the worst in each individual’s 
ranking, in the standard vNM way. Suppose we get that uj(y) = Uj(x) = 0.6. We also get that 
Ui(jc) - Ui(y) = Uj(w) - Uj(x) = 0.4. Can we conclude that individual i prefers option y with the 
same strength with which individual j  prefers option jc? In other words, is choice behaviour 
sufficient to determine the interpersonal comparison of individuals i ’s and/  s utility levels? 
Or else, can we conclude that the difference in strength of individual i’s preference for
11 See L ist , C. [2001] for a more detailed introduction to this kind of IUCs.
12 I shall offer an example in terms of an interval scale of measurement. The problem remains, mutatis 
mutandis, if we measure preferences on an ordinal scale.
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option x  over y is the same as the difference in strength of individual f s  preference for 
option w over jc? In other words, is choice behaviour sufficient to determine the 
interpersonal comparison of individuals f s  and f s  utility differences?
The answer is negative in both cases. Even if we identically normalize the scales used 
for measuring different individuals’ preferences, the evidence is not sufficient to determine 
whether the resulting utility values represent the same interpersonal preference strengths. 
The measurement is relative to the best and the worst options in each individual’s 
preference ranking. However, choice behaviour does not imply anything about how 
different people’s preferences for their best (worst) option compare in terms of strength. As 
it is typically put, choice behavioural evidence is consistent with the case in which i prefers 
the most preferred option with intensity ten times greater than j.
2.4 The analogy with temperature
The problem described in the previous section is not just that the individuals’ 
preferences can be represented by more than one utility function, in accordance with the 
admissible transformations specified by the uniqueness theorem. Rather, the problem is that 
the evidence is not sufficient to determine, in the first instance, the admissible 
transformations that should be applied in order to co-scale different individuals’ utilities. In 
other words, it is not only the case that the evidence is insufficient for showing that u\ = «j =
u. Rather, it also the case that the evidence is insufficient for individuating the admissible 
transformations h  and 2j, which would allow us to co-scale individuals f  s and f s  utilities.
It is easy to understand this point if we consider the following analogy with the 
measurement of temperature. Consider a domain of objects T. For any four objects jc, y, w, z 
e  T, we can establish a temperature ranking on the basis of the empirical relation ‘warmer 
than’. If this relation satisfies the axioms that are relevant for measurement, it can be 
represented though a cardinal scale that measures degrees of warmth, or, more commonly, 
the temperature of each of the objects in the domain. As it is well known, there are many 
interval scales of measurement that can be used to represent the warmth relation. For 
instance, we can use either a Celsius or a Fahrenheit scale. Suppose we measure the 
temperature of jc on a Celsius scale C and the temperature of y on a Fahrenheit scale F. 
Suppose also that the numerical value representing the temperature of jc and y is the same, 
e.g. 20°. We cannot conclude from this that both jc and y are equally warm. As a matter of 
fact, the numerical value representing their temperature is relative to different scales of 
measurement. Therefore, it is more correct to say that the temperature of jc is 20° C and the
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temperature of y is 20° F. Since the scales are different, it is (at least) not obvious that the 
temperature of x  and y is really the same.
We can think about the problem of IUCs in a similar way. When we get U j(y) =  Uj(jc) =  
0.6, we cannot conclude that the intensity of individual V s and f s  preferences is really the 
same. After all, the scale of measurement representing i ’ s  preferences might as well be 
different from the scale of measurement representing/s preferences. For instance u\ could 
be a Celsius-like utility function, whereas Wj could be a Fahrenheit-like utility function. As 
a consequence, the fact that the utility value in correspondence of option x  and y is the same 
is not sufficient to conclude that their preferences have identical strength.
The difference between the comparison of the temperature of different objects and IUCs 
is that in the former case, but not in the latter, the empirical evidence is sufficient to 
determine a function A that transforms one scale into the other while preserving the same 
information. In other words, in the case of temperature, we can determine the admissible 
transformation that allows us to measure the temperature of different objects on the same 
scale. More precisely, for any object x  e  T, we can convert the measurement from Celsius 
to Fahrenheit degrees (and viceversa) by means of the following formula: C(x) = (F(x)- 
32)/1.8. What makes the determination of the admissible transformation A possible, and, 
more generally, the very determination of whether an object is measured on a Celsius or a 
Fahrenheit scale, is the existence of two common points with respect to which the 
temperature of every object can be compared, namely, the water’s freezing point and the 
water’s boiling point. The former is at 0° C, while it is at 32° F; the latter is at 100° C, while 
it is at 212° F.
According to the ‘standard picture’, choice behavioural evidence is insufficient to 
determine whether or not any such common point exists, with respect to which the intensity 
of different people’s preferences can be measured and compared. As a consequence, not 
only it is not possible to determine the class of admissible transformations that would co­
scale different people’s utilities, but it is also not possible to determine exactly whether the 
utility function representing an individual’s preferences is really the same as the utility 
function representing another individual’s preferences or a different one.
2.5 Limitations
Let us take stock. The ‘standard picture’ characterises the problem of IUCs in terms of 
two features. First, it describes the problem by suggesting that, although the measurement 
is relative to the same type of measurement scale, different people’s utilities may not be co­
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scaled. This means that it is not possible to determine whether or not U{ = u} = w. Second, it 
identifies the source of the problem in the insufficiency of choice behavioural evidence for 
co-scaling different people’s utilities. This means that IUCs are underdetermined by choice 
behavioural evidence, in a sense that will be clarified below.
The worry is that this characterisation offers too narrow a view of the problem of IUCs. 
To begin with, the ‘standard picture’ identifies the potential sources of the problem of IUCs 
too narrowly. Insofar as choice behaviour is the only admissible evidence, the only clear 
reason why IUCs are problematic is that they are underdetermined by choice behavioural 
evidence. This seems to suggest that the problem is epistemological and due to the limited 
evidence available13. Yet, as I shall illustrate in section 3, IUCs may not only be 
underdetermined by further empirical evidence, but also indeterminate. If the latter is the 
case, the problem of IUCs is a metaphysical one.
Moreover, the ‘standard picture’ does not clarify how the problem of comparing utilities 
is related to the problem of comparing preference strengths. Since we have taken utility to 
be a numerical representation of preferences, one may think that these problems are 
identical. However, as I shall try to show in section 4 by introducing the notions of 
comparability and commensurability, the problems differ in some respects that are worth 
being considered.
Finally, the ‘standard picture’ insulates the problem of IUCs from current debates in 
philosophy of mind and epistemology. By ignoring contemporary philosophy of mind, it 
ignores recent advances concerning the question of the nature of mental states of mental 
states, the question of their meaning and the question of how we ascribe preference 
strengths to different individuals. Alternative accounts are likely to shape the problem of 
IUCs in different ways.
By ignoring contemporary epistemology, the ‘standard picture’ limits the scope of the 
inquiry. In fact, either it neglects the epistemological question of whether or not we can 
have (scientific) knowledge of, or (scientifically) justified, IUCs; or it implicitly assumes 
that underdetermination by choice behavioural evidence entails the impossibility of having 
(scientific) knowledge and (scientific) justification. However, as I shall illustrate in section 
5, this may not be the case. Although choice behaviour is insufficient to determine IUCs, it 
does not follow that there are no other considerations that can give us (scientific) 
knowledge or, at least, (scientifically) justified ICs of preference strength.
13 On the other hand, if the problem of IUCs is characterised in terms of underdetermination simpliciter, rather 
than underdetermination by choice behavioural evidence, then the ‘standard picture’ has stronger conceptual 
resources than suggested here. Indeed, as underdetermination can be defined relative to different, i.e. non- 
empirical, bases, the ‘standard picture’ may avoid at least the first of the limitations illustrated in this sub­
section.
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3. IUCs and empirical meaningfulness
The first limitation of the ‘standard picture’ concerns the identification of the source of 
the problem of IUCs. By refusing to go beyond choice behavioural evidence, the ‘standard 
picture’ precludes a more thorough analysis of the nature of the problem. An alternative 
consists in formulating the problem of IUCs as the problem of whether or not IUCs are 
empirically meaningful, as List has recently done, in the wake of Waldner’s more dated 
analysis14. According to List, IUCs are empirically meaningful if and only if they are 
determined by empirical evidence. Instead, they are empirically meaningless if and only if 
they are either underdetermined by all the possible empirical evidence or indeterminate. As 
we shall see below, by distinguishing between underdetermination and indeterminacy, this 
approach highlights the distinction between the epistemological and the metaphysical sides 
of the problem of IUCs. I shall proceed by considering the notion of underdetermination 
and indeterminacy in general15 and, then, by applying such a general analysis to the specific 
case of IUCs.
3.1 Underdetermination by the empirical evidence
Let us consider a theory Ti and a set of empirical observations E ti, describing 
observable phenomena. I shall say that, if ETi plays a role in the determination of Ti, ETi 
offers an empirical basis for the theory Ti. There is a variety of other considerations that 
may play a role in the derivation of Ti in addition, or in substitution, to empirical 
observations. If they are of a non-empirical kind (e.g. pragmatic, moral, metaphysical, etc.), 
these considerations offer a non-empirical basis for the theory Ti.
A theory Ti is empirically adequate with respect to Eti if and only if Ti implies ETi, that 
is, if and only if all the observations can be deduced from the theory16. Furthermore, a 
theory Ti is determined by a set of observations ETi if and only Eu implies Ti, that is, if 
and only if the theory can be deduced from the observations. Following List, we can then
14 See L ist, C. [2003] and W a ld n e r , I. [1972],
15 This section follows rather closely the illustration of underdetermination and indeterminacy given by 
G ibson, R. [1986], P eu nenburg , J. and R., H unnem an, [2001], L ist, C. [2003], Lepore, E. and K., Ludw ig 
[2005].
16 It is intended that the relation between theory and empirical observations is always mediated by auxiliary, 
e.g. methodological, assumptions.
29
say that a theory Ti is empirically meaningful if and only if it is determined by some set of 
observations Eti17.
The problem with this characterisation of empirical meaningfulness in terms of 
deductive inferences is that it is too strong. In fact, it implies that a theory Ti derived on the 
basis of probabilistic inferences counts as empirically meaningless. It would thus be 
preferable to adopt a weaker characterisation, according to which a theory Ti is empirically 
meaningful if and only if it is inferred by some set of observations Eti * where the inference 
is either deductive or probabilistic. On the other hand, I regard the subsequent analysis to 
be largely independent from this distinction. Thus, for simplicity, in what follows I shall 
still refer to List’s characterisation. The reader has simply to keep in mind that the same or 
similar considerations apply mutatis mutandis to the weaker characterisation.
Let us now consider a second theory T2 and a set of empirical observations Et2 . Suppose 
E t2 is identical to ETi. In other words, let ETi = E t2 = E. If T2 is empirically adequate with 
respect to E t2 , then we can say that T 1 and T2 are empirically equivalent with respect to E. 
More generally, we can say that two theories are empirically equivalent if and only if the 
same observable facts figure amongst their implications. Typically, there is an infinite 
number of empirically equivalent theories, implying the same observable facts. Suppose 
that two empirically equivalent theories Ti and T2 make incompatible, or mutually 
inconsistent, claims. Clearly, since they imply the same observable facts, their 
incompatibility stems from their assumptions about entities and relations postulated to 
account for unobservable facts. Let us call theoretical terms those terms, in a theory, that 
refer to theoretical entities. Thus, if Ti and T2 make incompatible claims, they have 
incompatible conceptions of unobservable facts, that is, they make incompatible 
assumptions about theoretical terms and theoretical relations18.
We can now define underdetermination as follows. A theory T 1 is underdetermined by a 
set of empirical observations E if and only if it is empirically adequate with respect to E, 
but it is not determined by E. The last condition is satisfied if there exists a theory T2 , 
which is both empirically adequate with respect to E and incompatible with Ti. It is worth 
noticing that underdetermination is relative to a specific set of observations E. This means 
that a broader set of empirical observations E+ may be sufficient to show that one of the 
incompatible theories is empirically meaningful with respect to E+ and the other is not. This
17 See List, C. [2003], p. 232.
18 See P eunenburg , J. and R., H unnem an, [2001], p. 23.
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can happen if, although both Ti and T2  are consistent with E, E+ determines Ti, but not 
T 219.
3.2 Indeterminacy
It may happen that two theories T 1 and T2 are underdetermined with respect to the set of 
all the possible available evidence, Emax. No matter how many observations we collect, Ti 
and T2 remain consistent with them and yet incompatible. This poses an interesting 
problem. Ti and T2 make incompatible claims as a consequence of positing alternative 
theoretical terms and relations. If, although referring to unobservable phenomena, such 
theoretical entities and relations do indeed exist, we can say that there is a fact of the matter 
as to which theory is the correct one. On the other hand, if neither the theoretical entities 
nor the relations postulated by the theories exist, then there is no fact of the matter as to 
which theory is the correct one. This is the case of indeterminacy20.
More precisely, a theory T 1 is indeterminate if and only if it is underdetermined with 
respect to all the possible evidence Emax -  that is, there exists an incompatible theory T2 that 
is also empirically adequate with respect to Emax -  and there is no fact of the matter as 
regard to which theory is the correct one. Following List, we can then say that a theory Ti 
is empirically meaningless if and only if it is either underdetermined by a set of 
observations Emax or indeterminate21.
Another way of defining indeterminacy is the following22. Let us assume that a term or a 
relation is purely theoretical if its content is exhausted by the role that it has for keeping 
track of observable facts. Then, we can say that a theory T 1 is indeterminate if and only if it 
is underdetermined with respect to all the possible evidence Emax and the theoretical terms 
and relations that the theory postulates are purely theoretical23.
The content of a purely theoretical term or relation is exhausted by its role in keeping 
track of observable facts. This means that purely theoretical terms or relations do not refer 
or exist independently of their function within the theory. In other words, there is no fact of 
the matter about them. If the incompatible claims that two theories Ti and T2 stems from 
the assumptions made about theoretical terms and relations, then we have indeterminacy. 
There is no fact of the matter as regard to which theory is the correct one, because there is
19 See L epore, E. and K., Ludw ig [2005], pp. 223-224.
20 See P ed n en b u rg , J. and R., H unnem an, [2001], p. 23.
21 See L ist, C. [2003], p. 232.
22 The two definitions do not seem to be strictly equivalent. This poses the problem of how they are related. 
For simplicity, here I shall ignore this complication.
23 See Lepore, E. and K., Ludw ig [2005], pp. 224-225.
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nothing more in the content of the conflicting theoretical terms and relations that the 
theories postulate than what is required for accounting for observable facts.
The previous definitions of indeterminacy raise the issue of when we can say that there 
is a fact of the matter or, alternatively, that the theoretical terms and relations postulated by 
incompatible theories are not purely theoretical. There are (at least) two readings of 
indeterminacy: an epistemological reading and an ontological one24. According to the 
former, our epistemology, that is, the evidence and methods through which we acquire 
knowledge, fixes our ontology, that is, what there is in the world. If this is the case, 
indeterminacy collapses into underdetermination by all the possible empirical evidence. If 
two theories are empirically equivalent with respect to Emax, then, necessarily, there is no 
case in which we can appeal to a fact of the matter to establish which theory is the correct 
one. Indeed, no further evidence is available to establish what the fact of the matter is. 
What there is cannot be established autonomously from our epistemology.
According to the second reading, instead, our ontology is relatively autonomous, 
although not necessarily completely independent, from our epistemology. Although 
indeterminacy implies underdetermination by all the possible empirical evidence, it does 
not collapse into that. Indeed, indeterminacy and underdetermination are on a par 
epistemologically, but not ontologically. The available empirical evidence is what makes a 
theory empirically justified -  at least according to an evidentialist theory of epistemic 
justification -  while the existence of a fact of the matter is what makes a theory true. Thus, 
the same set of observations can make two empirically equivalent, but alternative, theories 
equally justified, from an epistemic point of view. However, under an ontological reading, 
if there is a fact of the matter, only one of the two theories can be true; by contrast, if there 
is no fact of the matter, no issue of truth arises. As a consequence, it is possible to 
distinguish cases of radical underdetermination, in which the question of which theory is 
correct is meaningful, because there is a fact of the matter that can make one theory true 
and the other false; and cases of indeterminacy, in which the question of which theory is 
correct is meaningless, because there is no fact of the matter that can make either theory 
true.
Finally, there are different ways of understanding the nature of the fact of the matter -  
that is, what counts as fact of the matter -  within an ontological understanding of 
indeterminacy. For instance, Quine understands the expression in a physicalistic way. Fact 
of the matter refers to physical facts. This implies adopting a specific ontological stance, 
according to which our ontology is entirely physicalistic. Ultimately, it is physical facts that
24 My illustration of indeterminacy follows rather closely GffiSON, R. [1986].
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make a theory true or false. Therefore, the additional condition for indeterminacy that there 
is no fact of the matter is equivalent to the condition that there are no further physical facts 
that can adjudicate between two empirically equivalent theories25. Here, however, I shall 
adopt an ontological reading of indeterminacy that does not take any specific ontological 
stance. Thus, I shall remain neutral about the nature of the fact of the matter. More 
precisely, I shall take fact of the matter to indicate whatever fact (physical or otherwise) 
can make a theory or a statement true.
In the light of this analysis, I shall distinguish the following expressions. I shall say that 
a theory, or a statement, has a factual basis if and only if there is a fact of the matter, that is, 
there are facts that can make the theory, or the statement, true. By contrast, I shall say that a 
theory, or a statement, has an empirical basis if and only if there is a set of empirical 
observations that can make the theory, or the statement, epistemically justified. It is worth 
emphasizing the nature of the distinction. Factual basis is an ontological notion, while 
empirical basis is an epistemological notion.
3.3 IUCs, underdetermination and indeterminacy
Let us now go back to IUCs. On the basis of our previous definitions, we can say that 
IUCs are empirically meaningful, with respect to an empirical basis E, such that E < E™1*, if 
and only if they are determined by E, that is, if they are determined by a set of observations 
E. On the other hand, IUCs are empirically meaningless if and only if they are either (i) 
underdetermined by Emax; or (ii) indeterminate, that is, when they are both underdetermined 
by all the possible empirical evidence Emax and there is no fact of the matter about 
interpersonal preference strengths.
Let us consider again the example seen above, where Ui(y) = Uj(x) = 0.6 and u i ( jc )  - uj(y) 
=  U j ( w )  -  U j( x )  = 0.4. In the ‘standard picture’, choice behaviour is the only relevant 
evidence for the ascription of individual preferences. However, choice behaviour is not 
sufficient to determine either the interpersonal comparison of utility levels or the 
interpersonal comparison of utility differences in the example under consideration. The 
problem is that choice behavioural evidence can be consistently accounted for by two 
incompatible theories: a theory Ti, which maintains that different people’s utilities are co­
scaled and, thereby, concluding that i and j  have the same preference strengths, in 
correspondence of the options with the same numerical values; and a theory T2 , which 
maintains that different people’s utilities are not co-scaled and, thereby, concluding that i
25 See Gibson, R. [1986], pp.146-153.
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and j  have not the same preference strengths, in correspondence of the options with the 
same numerical values. Both Ti and T2 fit the same observable phenomena about each 
individual’s behaviour. Their incompatibility derives from their assumptions about 
unobservable facts and relations, i.e. each individual’s preferences and the way in which 
they relate to other individual’s preferences in terms of strength. As such, IUCs are 
underdetermined by choice behavioural evidence.
This approach to the problem of IUCs emphasises two important things. The first is that, 
by restricting the set of admissible evidence to choice behaviour, the ‘standard picture’ 
adopts a particularly narrow empirical basis. As underdetermination is always relative to a 
body of evidence, the possibility remains open that a broader empirical basis may 
determine IUCs. The second is that the ‘standard picture’ hides the distinction between the 
metaphysical and the epistemological questions about IUCs. Either it makes it appear that 
the problem of IUCs can only be epistemological or it makes it appear that the 
underdetermination of IUCs by choice behaviour entails the claim that IUCs have no 
factual basis. In the light of the previous analysis, however, we can say that IUCs have no 
factual basis if and only if there is no fact of the matter about how different people’s 
preferences compare in terms of strength. Since underdetermination is an epistemological 
notion, the underdetermination of IUCs by choice behaviour does not imply that there is no 
fact of the matter about how different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength. 
As such, it does not entail the claim that IUCs have no factual basis. This is the case only if 
IUCs are indeterminate.
Finally, it is worth noticing that the notion of empirical meaningfulness is not equivalent 
to the notion of meaningfulness considered in section 2. IUCs are meaningful if they are 
invariant under the class of admissible transformations. The crucial point is that 
meaningfulness does not imply any restriction on the basis used to make IUCs. They can be 
formed by using an empirical basis or a non-empirical basis or a combination of both. By 
contrast, IUCs are empirically meaningful if and only if they are determined by the 
empirical evidence alone. This means that, in order to be empirically meaningful, IUCs 
must be invariant under a certain set of admissible transformations (that is, they must be 
meaningful) and formed on the basis of empirical evidence only.
4. IUCs, incomparability and incommensurability
The second limitation of the ‘standard picture’ is that it does not clarify how the problem 
of comparing different people’s preference strengths and the problem of comparing
34
different people’s utilities are related. This becomes clear if we formulate the problem of 
IUCs with respect to the notions of incomparability and incommensurability26. By doing 
this, we can also shed light on one way to present the problem of IUCs that is sometimes 
employed in the literature. Once again, I shall firstly illustrate these notions in general and 
then apply them to the case of IUCs.
4.1 Incomparability and Incommensurability
Following Chang’s analysis, I shall say, as a first approximation, that two items are 
incomparable if no positive comparative judgment between them can be made27. More 
specifically, incomparability is relative to four common elements:
(1) a domain of objects D;
(2) a property
(3) a basis B;
(4) a set of positive comparative relations.
Let us consider each element in turn. First, incomparability is a relation between two or 
more objects in a domain of interest. For instance, we can say that a career as a clarinettist 
is incomparable with a career as a lawyer. The objects in the domain may belong to the 
same ontological category (e.g. only careers, only states of affairs, only persons, etc.) or to 
different ontological categories (e.g. persons and states of affairs). Second, incomparability 
is relative to a property O28. A property O is any respect in terms of which the objects 
included in the domain of interest can be compared. For instance, a clarinettist may be 
incomparable with a lawyer in terms of talent. Third, incomparability is relative to a basis. 
A basis is a set of considerations that can be used to compare the objects in the domain of 
interest. For instance, comparisons can be made with respect to empirical considerations, or 
moral considerations, or a combination of both, etc. Fourth, incomparability is relative to a 
set of positive comparative relations. A set of positive comparative relations includes any 
positive relation that can be made to establish a comparison between the items in the 
domain of interest. The issue of what are the relevant comparative relations is crucial in the 
literature. According to the Trichotomy Thesis, there are only three comparative relations,
26 My illustration is based on, and develops, suggestions contained in various papers included in CHANG, R. 
[1997a].
27 Cfr. C hang, R. [1997b], p.2.
28 Cfr. W iggins, D. [1997], pp. 53-54.
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namely, ‘more than’, ‘less than’ and ‘equal then’. For instance, with respect to goodness, 
the relative comparative relations are ‘better’, ‘worse’, or ‘equally good’. However, many 
authors have recently suggested that there are other comparative relations, such as the 
parity relation or the rough equality relation29.
We can now define incomparability more precisely. We can say that two items are 
relatively incomparable with respect to a property O, a basis B and a set of positive 
comparative relations, if it is not the case that either of the comparative relations holds 
between them. For instance, if no comparative relation can be established between the 
goodness of two different careers, these alternatives are value incomparable, or 
incomparable in terms of goodness. If two items are incomparable with respect to any 
property that they have in common, any basis and any set of positive comparative relations, 
then they are absolutely incomparable.
The notion of ‘incommensurability’ suggests the lack of a common measure. It shares 
with incomparability the four elements seen above, but it is also relative to an additional 
element, namely:
(5) a type of measurement scale.
Incommensurability is relative to a scale of measurement because two items in the 
domain of interest may be incommensurate, with respect to any property O, relative to one 
type of scale but not relative to another. For instance, the talent of two artists may be 
incommensurate, relative to an interval scale, but not relative to an ordinal scale of 
measurement30.
We can say that two items are relatively incommensurable with respect to a property O, 
a basis B, a set of positive comparative relations, and a scale of measurement/of O-ness, if 
it is not the case that either of the comparative relations holds between them, with respect to 
their measures of O. For instance, if no numerical comparative relation can be established 
between the goodness of two different careers, then these alternatives are value 
incommensurable. If two items are incommensurate with respect to any property that they 
have in common, any basis, any scale of measurement and any set of positive comparative 
relations, then they are absolutely incommensurable.
We can distinguish two special cases. The first is the case of ontic incomparability 
(incommensurability). Two items are ontically incomparable (incommensurable) if and
29 See C h a n g , R. [1997b]. See also R a b in o w ic z , W. [2004].
30 See C h a n g , R. [1997b], p.2.
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only if, as a matter of fact, no comparative relation holds between the items in the domain 
of interest. The second is the case of epistemic incomparability (incommensurability). Two 
items are epistemically incomparable (incommensurable) if and only if it is impossible to 
know what ontic comparability relation, if any, holds between the items in the domain of 
interest. In the former case, the problem is metaphysical; in the latter case, the problem is 
epistemological.
4.2 What is the relationship between incomparability and incommensurability?
Let us assume, for simplicity, that the set of positive comparative relations is fixed. 
There are some interesting cases to consider. First, suppose that incommensurability and 
incomparability are assessed with respect to a different pair of property and basis. Clearly, 
incommensurability with respect to a specific pair of property and basis does not imply 
incomparability with respect to any alternative pair. That is, two items may be 
incommensurate relative to a property <X>i and a basis Bi, but they may be comparable 
relative to a property O2 and a basis B2 . For instance, two careers may be incommensurate 
in terms of their goodness, relative to both empirical and moral considerations, but they 
may be comparable in terms of money, relative to empirical data only.
Second, suppose that incommensurability and incomparability are assessed with respect 
to the same property <E>. Once again, incommensurability with respect to a specific property 
does not imply incomparability with respect to the same property when comparability is 
relative to a basis different from the one used for commensurability. That is, two items may 
be incommensurate relative to a property ® and a basis Bi, but they may be comparable 
relative to the same property O and a different basis B2 .
Third, suppose that incommensurability and incomparability are assessed with respect to 
the same pair of property <X> and basis B. In this case, incomparability seems to entail 
incommensurability. Likewise, incommensurability seems to entail incomparability. 
However, the latter case is true only when two items are incommensurable with respect to 
all types of measurement scale. In fact, the same basis may be insufficient for cardinal 
commensurability, but sufficient for comparability. In what follows, however, I shall ignore 
this complication.
Finally, it is worth noticing that incommensurability between two items does not 
necessarily entail absence of a common scale between all the items in the domain of 
interest. Some items in the domain of interest may be locally incommensurate and yet 
there may be no doubt that the items in the domain of interest are co-scaled, in the sense
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that the function/, which assigns numbers to represent information about a property <E>, is 
the same for all items. For instance, local incommensurability may occur because the 
available evidence is insufficient for either of the relevant comparative relations to hold 
between the items, with respect to some measures of O only. On the other hand, if the 
available evidence is insufficient for either of the relevant comparative relations to hold 
between the items, with respect to all measures of ®, then we have complete 
incommensurability between the items.
4.3 Comparing preferences and comparing utilities
As the previous sub-sections show, comparability is a relation-theoretic notion, whereas 
commensurability is a measure-theoretic notion. In the light of this analysis, one way to 
understand how the problem of comparing different people’s preferences and the problem 
of comparing different people’s utilities are related to each other is the following. We can 
say that the former is a particular case of the problem of incomparability; whereas the latter 
is a particular case of the problem of incommensurability. To explain why, let us proceed 
by examining how we can map the elements seen above into the case under consideration.
The first element for comparability is the domain of interest D. In the case under 
consideration, the domain is constituted by different individuals’ preferences. The second 
element for comparability is a property O. Different individuals’ preferences may be 
interpersonally compared with respect to different properties, e.g. their content, the 
goodness of their content, their strength, etc. Here the problem under consideration is the 
problem of comparing different individual’s preferences with respect to their strength. The 
third element is a determining basis. As seen above, in the ‘standard picture’, economists 
typically ascribe preferences and related properties to agents on the basis of choice 
behavioural evidence only. The last element is a set of comparative relations. The ‘standard 
view’ adopts the Trichotomy Thesis, according to which different individuals’ preferences 
are interpersonally compared, with respect to their strength, only in terms of the relations 
‘more than’, ‘less then’ and ‘equal then’. For simplicity, in this thesis, I shall follow this 
stance.
Relative to these elements, the problem in the ‘standard picture’ is whether or not 
different people’s preferences are comparable with respect to their property of strength, 
choice behavioural evidence and the Trichotomy Thesis. We saw that commensurability is 
relative also to a type of measurement scale. Relative to this additional element, the 
problem in the ‘standard picture’ is whether or not different people’s preferences are
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commensurable with respect to their property of strength, choice behavioural evidence, the 
Trichotomy Thesis, and a utility representation.
This approach highlights three important things. First, as suggested in the previous 
section, it stresses the fact that choice behavioural evidence provides an empirical, but 
remarkably narrow, basis for comparison. Although preferences are incomparable 
(incommensurable) with respect to choice behaviour, they may turn out to be comparable 
(commensurable) with respect to either a broader empirical basis or to a non-empirical 
basis (i.e. moral, pragmatic, metaphysical, etc.) or a combination of both.
Second, it helps us understand the relationship between the problem of comparing 
preferences and the problem of comparing utilities. As incomparability and 
incommensurability can be assessed with respect to different pairs of property and basis, it 
may occur that different people’s preferences are comparable with respect to a pair of 
property and basis, but they are not commensurable with respect to a different pair. For 
instance, preferences may be comparable with respect to the goodness of their object, 
relative to a moral basis, but may be incommensurable with respect to strength, relative to 
an empirical basis. Or else, they may be comparable, but incommensurable, with respect to 
the same property, if the basis is different. For instance, preferences may be comparable 
with respect to strength, relative to a moral basis, but they may be incommensurable with 
respect to strength, relative to an empirical basis. Finally, when incomparability and 
incommensurability are assessed with respect to the same property and basis, it may occur 
that different people’s preferences are comparable, but not commensurable. For instance, 
this may happen if the relevant basis is sufficient for ordinal comparisons, but not for 
comparisons on a cardinal scale of measurement.
Third, this approach takes into account the difference between the epistemological and 
the metaphysical questions about IUCs. The former is the question of whether or not 
different people’s preferences are epistemically comparable (commensurable) in terms of 
strength. The latter is the question of whether or not different people’s preferences are 
ontologically comparable (commensurable) in terms of strength.
5. IUCs, knowledge and justification
The third limitation of the ‘standard picture’ is that it insulates the problem of IUCs from 
current debates in philosophy of mind and epistemology. By ignoring current philosophy of 
mind, it ignores recent theories addressing the question of the nature of preferences, the 
question of their meaning and the question of how preferences are ascribed to other
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individuals. I shall disregard these issues now and postpone their discussion to chapters 3,4 
and 5, where I shall examine some alternative solutions that explicitly draw from recent 
advances in philosophy of mind. By ignoring current epistemology, the ‘standard picture’ 
insulates the problem of IUCs from issues concerning (scientific) knowledge and 
(scientific) justification. This gap is of particular relevance for the present purpose. As I 
stated in the introduction, the epistemological questions about IUCs is the main focus of 
this thesis. In order to illustrate it in more detail, I shall begin by introducing the relevant 
notions in general and then show how they apply to the case under consideration.
5.1 Knowledge
The standard analysis defines knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). Accordingly, an 
agent S has knowledge of a theory, or a statement, T if and only if S has justified true 
beliefs that T. Thus, the JTB account of knowledge fixes three conditions as individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge. The first condition for an agent S to have 
knowledge of a theory, or a statement, T, is the belief condition. It requires that the agent S 
believes that T. The second condition is the truth condition. It requires that T is true. The 
third condition is the justification condition. It requires that the agent S is justified in 
believing that T. As such, knowledge implies justified beliefs, but not viceversa.
The debate concerning the justification condition is at the heart of theories of 
knowledge. Relevant issues are both whether or not the justification condition is necessary 
and, if it is, how it should be formulated. As far as the former issue is concerned, the 
standard argument in favour of the justification condition is that it is needed in order to rule 
out cases of epistemic luck. These are cases in which beliefs turn out to be true by mere 
accident or luck. Thus, having true beliefs is not sufficient for having knowledge, insofar as 
epistemic luck is possible. According to JTB, a true belief must be justified in order to 
count as a genuine instance of knowledge31.
31 The JTB account of knowledge has been challenged by two counterexamples presented by Gettier in 1963. 
See G e ttie r ,  E. [1963]. Essentially, both of them show that having justified true beliefs is not sufficient for 
knowledge. More specifically, they show that the justification condition, in its original formulations, is not by 
itself sufficient to ensure that, in certain circumstances, an agent’s beliefs are not true by mere luck. The so- 
called “Gettier problem”, then, consists in specifying how the analysis o f knowledge should be modified in 
order to be immune from these counterexamples. Although the “Gettier problem” has a crucial relevance for 
the analysis of knowledge, it does not have any specific bearing on the problem with which this thesis is 
mainly concerned, namely, the problem of IUCs. The opposite is true for the issues related to the justification 
condition. Therefore, in what follows, I shall proceed by assuming that the JTB account of knowledge is 
basically correct and illustrate the main accounts of the justification condition offered in the literature. The 
caveat is that, in order to turn true beliefs into knowledge, these accounts need to be suitably refined so to 
“degettierize” justified true beliefs.
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5.2 The justification condition
The answer to the question of when a belief is justified requires specifying four things:
(1) what justification means; (2) what makes a belief justified; (3) what is the basis of 
justification; and (4) what is the structure of justification.
The literature distinguishes two main notions of justification, namely, a deontological 
and a non-deontological one. Typically, according to the former, an agent S is justified in 
believing a theory, or a statement, T if and only if, in believing T, S is not violating any 
epistemic obligations. According to the latter, S is justified in believing a theory, or a 
statement, T if and only if S believes the theory, or statement, T on a basis that properly 
‘probabilifies’ S’s belief that T.
Amongst deontological conceptions, what makes a belief justified is the fulfilment of 
one’s epistemic duties or obligations. The question of what these obligations are is 
substantial. Usually, they belong to the class of actions that contribute to the achievement 
of the main epistemic goals. In turn, these are identified with the achievement of a body of 
beliefs that has the optimal truth-falsity ratio.
Amongst non-deontological theories, there are two main approaches to the issue of what 
makes a belief justified: evidentialism and reliabilism32. According to evidentialists, 
justification comes from evidence. This means that an agent S is justified in believing a 
theory, or a statement, T if and only if S’s evidence for T supports his belief that T. In other 
words, S is justified in believing that T if and only if S believes that T on the basis of the 
possession of adequate evidence . According to reliabilists, instead, justification comes 
from the reliability of the process whereby the belief originates. This means that an agent S 
is justified in believing a theory, or a statement, T if and only if S’s belief that T results 
from a reliable process. In turn, a process is reliable if it tends to produce true beliefs34.
Second, the basis of justification can be either internal or external. The key idea of 
intemalism is that what makes an agent’s belief justified is internal to the agent, while 
extemalism is simply the denial of intemalism35. Finally, there are two views about the 
structure of justification: foundationalism and coherentism. According to foundationalists,
32 Reliabilism can be conceived both as a theory of knowledge and as a theory of justification. For simplicity, 
here I shall ignore the former case.
33 For a paradigmatic statement of this position, see FELDMAN, R. and E., CONEE [1985].
34 For a paradigmatic statement of this position, see Goldman , A. [1979].
35 Intemalism may come in two forms. On the one hand, accessibility intemalism claims that justification for 
the agent’s beliefs is internal because it is always directly recognizable by the agent. This means that that the 
agent is always in a position to know whether or not his beliefs are justified. On the other hand, mentalist 
intemalism claims that the justification for the agent’s beliefs is internal because what makes a belief justified 
is a mental state of the agent.
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justification is structured like a building. Beliefs belonging to the superstructure are 
justified by other beliefs at the foundations. The latter beliefs are basic in the sense that 
their justification does not derive inferentially from other justified beliefs. Coherentism is 
the denial of foundationalism. It maintains that justification is structured like a web. There 
are no basic beliefs. Rather, each belief is justified in terms of other beliefs and justification 
is simply a function of the relationship between various beliefs. While intemalism is 
typically associated with evidentialism and extemalism with reliabilism, foundationalism 
and coherentism may be equally associated with either evidentialism or reliabilism.
5.3 Scientific justification
Scientific knowledge differs from garden-variety forms of knowledge by further 
constraining the satisfaction of the justification condition. Although scientific justification 
is a necessary condition for having scientific knowledge, it is not entailed by the more 
general justification condition. Consider the case of a prophet, who acquires good evidence 
through God’s revelation. According to evidentialism, he is justified and yet his belief is 
not scientifically justified. Similarly, consider the case of a clairvoyant who forms a belief 
in a perfectly reliable way. According to reliabilism, he is justified and yet his belief is not 
scientifically justified. Whatever account of epistemic justification one favours, an 
additional condition needs to be met for scientific justification: the belief needs to be 
validated, or justified, in accordance with scientific standards.
One of the marks of science is that it leads to intersubjective agreement. Yet, not all 
cases of intersubjective agreement conform to scientific standards. Intersubjective 
agreement must be reached in conformity to specific requirements. Once again we can 
distinguish a deontological notion of scientific justification and a non-deontological 
notion . According to the former, a belief about a theory, or a statement, T is scientifically 
justified if and only if it formed without violating the epistemic obligations accepted by the 
scientific community. According to the latter, a belief about a theory, or a statement, T is 
scientifically justified if and only if it is supported by a scientifically acceptable basis that 
properly ‘probabilifies’ it37.
Within this field, we can distinguish an evidentialist and a reliabilist version of scientific 
justification. In the evidentialist framework, a belief about a theory, or a statement, T is 
scientifically justified if it is supported by evidence that is (a) public, (b) replicable; (c)
36 See Ad a m , M. [2007].
37 Since the literature has found the deontological conception wanting, in what follows I shall mainly 
concentrated on the alternative, non-deontological, conception of scientific justification.
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such as to lead to accurate and precise measurements of the relevant variables. In the 
reliabilist framework, a belief about a theory, or statement, T is scientifically justified if it 
is formed through methods and techniques that are (a) reliable and -  crucially -  known to 
be reliable on the basis of scientific evidence38; (b) replicable; and (c) such as to lead to 
accurate and precise measurements of the relevant variables.
Alternatively, I shall say that, in the evidentialist framework, a belief about a theory, or a 
statement, T is scientifically justified when it is inferred by evidence that satisfies the 
previous conditions, where the inference can be either deductive or probabilistic. Likewise, 
I shall say that, in the reliabilist framework, a belief about a theory, or a statement, T is 
scientifically justified when the methods and techniques whereby it is acquired satisfy the 
previous conditions. In both cases scientific justification may involve the use of non- 
empirical principles. In such circumstances, it is required that the adoption of these 
principles can be justified by appeal to reasons acceptable by the scientific community.
5.4 The epistemological problem o f IUCs
One of the crucial epistemological questions about other people’s mental states is 
whether or not we can have knowledge of, or, at least justified beliefs about, them. This 
question naturally descends from the problem of other people’s minds in traditional 
philosophy of mind. Following Goldman’s suggestion39, we can think of the problem of 
comparing mental states as a particular case of the problem of mental ascription. As such, 
we can define the problem of ICs of preference strength as the problem of whether or not 
we can have knowledge of, or justified beliefs about, how different people’s preferences 
compare in terms of strength. Moreover, we can define the problem of IUCs as the problem 
of whether or not we can have scientific knowledge of, or scientifically justified beliefs 
about, how different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength. The latter 
definition follows from the fact that one of the conditions for scientific justification is that 
the relevant variables must be accurately and precisely measurable and that, as we have 
seen above, preferences are numerically represented through a utility function. From now 
on, therefore, when I speak about the problem of IUCs, I shall refer to it as the problem 
concerning the scientific knowledge or justification of ICs of preference strength.
As one of the necessary conditions for having knowledge is the truth condition, the 
question arises as to how we can conceive it in the case of IUCs. Roughly speaking, truth is
38 See Goldman, A. [1995a].
39 See Goldman, A. [1995a].
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correspondence to what is the case. Earlier, I implicitly equated the notion of ‘what is the 
case’ with the notion of ‘fact of the matter’, where the latter is interpreted in an ontological 
sense. While the available evidence or the reliability of the relevant processes is what 
makes a theory, or a statement, T justified, the correspondence to the fact of the matter is 
what makes a theory, or a statement, T true. In the case of IUCs, correspondence to the fact 
of the matter is what makes IUCs true. In other words, the fact of the matter is the truth- 
maker of a belief about different people’s preference strengths. Thus, the possibility of 
having knowledge of IUCs presupposes the existence of a fact of the matter about IUCs. 
That is, it presupposes an affirmative answer to the metaphysical question about IUCs. In 
what follows, I shall proceed by taking this presupposition for granted. Later -  in the wake 
of the failure of the two main strategies offered to solve the epistemological problem of 
IUCs in the literature - 1 will turn again to this presupposition and consider whether it can 
be justified.
When can we say that there is a fact of the matter about preference strengths? If we 
adopt a physicalistic understanding of the nature of factuality, then we can say that IUCs 
have a factual basis if and only if it is possible, either in practice or in principle, to reduce 
preferences and their properties to neurophysiological states and properties. By contrast, we 
can say that there is no fact of the matter about preference strengths if and only if the 
reduction of preferences and their properties to neurophysiological states and properties is 
excluded in principle. On the other hand, if we adopt a more neutral understanding of the 
nature of factuality, then we can say that IUCs have a factual basis if and only if there are 
facts (physical or otherwise) that can make IUCs true; and that IUCs have no factual basis 
otherwise.
5.5 Relationships
I want to conclude by trying to map the relationship between the various notions 
introduced in this chapter. To begin with, the idea of empirical meaningfulness is clearly 
related to the evidentialist idea of scientific justification. According to List’s 
characterisation, IUCs are empirically meaningful if and only if they are determined by the 
empirical evidence. No non-empirical consideration, apart from strictly methodological 
assumptions, is additionally required. Thus, if we hold an evidentialist position in terms of 
justification, then, if the subject S forms empirically meaningful IUCs on the basis of the 
evidence E, his belief is scientifically justified by the empirical evidence E.
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At first sight the empirical meaninglessness of IUCs seems to threaten possibility of 
having scientifically justified beliefs about how different people’s preferences compare in 
terms of strength. Once again, this is clearly the case if we adopt an evidentialist theory of 
epistemic justification. The argument is straightforward. If all the possible empirical 
evidence is insufficient to determine IUCs, then, if the empirical evidence is what makes 
IUCs scientifically justified, it follows that IUCs cannot be scientifically justified.
However, it is important to notice that this argument does not entail that it is never 
possible to have scientifically justified IUCs. Indeed, evidentialism is not the only theory of 
epistemic justification. If we adopt a reliabilist conception, what makes a belief justified is 
not the empirical evidence, but the reliability of the processes whereby the belief in 
question is formed. Thus, even if all the possible empirical evidence is insufficient to 
determine IUCs, these can nonetheless be scientifically justified, provided that they are 
acquired through reliable processes, that is, processes that tend to produce true beliefs. If 
we have independent grounds to prefer reliabilism to evidentialism as a theory of epistemic 
justification, we can still have scientifically justified IUCs despite the fact that they are 
underdetermined by all the possible empirical evidence. On the other hand, if the empirical 
evidence includes observations about the reliability of the relevant processes, then, if all the 
possible evidence underdetermines IUCs, it follows that IUCs cannot be scientifically 
justified even if we adopt a reliabilist theory of justification.
Nevertheless, there are other possibilities to have scientifically justified IUCs. Firstly, if 
we adopt evidentialism as our theory of epistemic justification, this is the case if IUCs can 
be probabilistically inferred from the empirical evidence, despite the fact that they cannot 
be deductively determined by it. Secondly, under both evidentialism and reliabilism, this is 
the case if there are non-empirical considerations that can break the underdetermination and 
that accord with appropriate scientific standards. Indeed, even if all the possible empirical 
evidence is insufficient to determine IUCs, these can nonetheless be determined and, 
thereby, scientifically justified, provided that there are other non-empirical considerations 
that have recognised evidential value. Together, all these remarks show that empirical 
meaningfulness is, at best, only a sufficient condition for scientific knowledge or scientific 
justification.
As seen above, the problem of whether or not IUCs are empirically meaningful is 
different from the problem of whether or not IUCs have a factual basis. The empirical 
meaningfulness of IUCs implies the existence of a factual basis, but not viceversa. Even if 
IUCs have a factual basis, the empirical evidence may be insufficient to determine them. 
Likewise, the empirical meaninglessness of IUCs does not imply that IUCs have no factual
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basis. Even if all the possible empirical evidence Emax is not sufficient to determine IUCs 
and, thereby, renders IUCs empirically meaningless, it may still be the case that there is a 
fact of the matter concerning IUCs40. This is not true only if IUCs are indeterminate.
Both underdetermination by the empirical evidence and indeterminacy are relations 
between a statement, or a theory, T and an empirical basis E. On the other hand, both 
(relative) incomparability and incommensurability are relations between the items included 
in a theory, or a statement, T and a specific basis B. When incomparability and 
incommensurability are relative to an empirical basis E, they are related to 
underdetermination by the empirical evidence and indeterminacy. For instance, if 
incomparability (incommensurability) is due to underdetermination by the empirical 
evidence only, we have a case of epistemic incomparability (incommensurability). The 
empirical evidence is insufficient to determine whether or not any of the admissible 
relations required to establish a comparison between the items in the domain of interest 
hold. However, underdetermination with respect to an empirical basis E, does not entail 
epistemic interpersonal incomparability (incommensurability) with respect to a broader 
empirical basis E+, or a different non-empirical basis with recognised evidential value, or 
reliable epistemic processes. On the other hand, incomparability (incommensurability) due 
to the indeterminacy of the comparative statement is logically equivalent to ontic 
incomparability (incommensurability) of the items in the domain of interest with respect to 
the property O. There is no fact of the matter about the property <I> that they have in 
common, so that the question about the truth of the comparison is meaningless.
In the ‘standard picture’, the problem of IUCs can be seen as the problem concerning the 
interpersonal commensurability of different people’s preferences, relative to their strength, 
choice behavioural evidence, the Trichotomy Thesis and a suitable scale of measurement. 
The problem arises because IUCs are underdetermined by choice behavioural evidence. On 
the basis of the previous analysis, however, we can say that underdetermination by choice 
behavioural evidence does not entail the epistemic incomparability (incommensurability) of 
IUCs. Furthermore, the underdetermination of IUCs by choice behavioural evidence does 
not entail their ontological incomparability (incommensurability).
If we are interested in scientific knowledge, or justification, the problem of IUCs can be 
seen as the problem concerning the epistemic commensurability of different people’s 
preferences, relative to their strength, a scientifically acceptable basis, the Trichotomy 
Thesis and a suitable scale of measurement. The reference basis can be either an empirical 
one or the union of an empirical and a non-empirical basis, provided that its adoption can
40 A fortiori, when the empirical evidence taken into account is less than all the possible empirical evidence.
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be justified in accordance with scientific standards. As we have seen above, the necessary 
presupposition is that, relative to the same elements, different people’s preferences are 
metaphysically commensurable.
Although it is possible to characterise the problem of IUCs in this way, in what follows, 
in order to avoid confusion, I shall ignore the idea of epistemic comparability 
(commensurability) and use the notion of comparability (commensurability) only in the 
ontological sense.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I focused on the question of how we can formulate the problem of IUCs. 
I presented the ‘standard picture’ and discussed three of its limitations. The first is that it 
does not take into account the possibility that the problem is not only epistemological but 
also ontological. The second is it does not clarify the relationship between the problem of 
comparing the intensity of different people’s preferences and the problem of IUCs. The 
third is that it neglects current debates in philosophy of mind and epistemology.
I suggested an alternative formulation of the problem of IUCs. According to it, the 
problem of IUCs is the problem of whether or not we can have scientific knowledge of, or 
scientifically justified beliefs about, how different people’s preferences compare in terms of 
strength. This characterization is broad enough to provide a unified framework to discuss 
the concerns left unanswered by the ‘standard picture’ and to connect the alternative modes 
of presenting the problem of IUCs existing in the literature.
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CHAPTER 2 
Inferences to the best explanation
1. Introduction
In chapter 1 ,1 defined the problem of IUCs as the problem of whether or not we can 
have scientific knowledge of, or scientifically justified, ICs of preference strength. In the 
‘standard picture’, the problem arises because choice behaviour is sufficient for measuring 
each individual’s preferences but not for determining whether or not different people’s 
preference strengths are really the same when their utilities have the same value. That is, it 
is not possible to claim that different people’s utilities are co-scaled. IUCs are 
underdetermined by choice behavioural evidence.
This is an obstacle for the possibility of having scientific knowledge of, or scientifically 
justified, ICs of preference strength. However, this obstacle is not in principle 
insurmountable. On the one hand, since underdetermination is always relative to a specific 
body of evidence, it may turn out that IUCs can be determined by gathering further 
empirical evidence, in addition to choice behaviour. On the other hand, other non-empirical 
considerations may help break the underdetermination by the empirical evidence and 
potentially lead to scientifically justified beliefs about how different people’s preferences 
compare in terms of strength.
Both considerations are central features of the most common class of solutions existing 
in the literature. These solutions are token applications of a more general strategy, which 
attempts to solve the problem of IUCs by appealing to an inference to the best explanation 
kind of argument. In general, the idea is that a theory, or an assumption, is justified if it 
offers, or contributes to offering, the best explanation of a certain phenomenon. In turn, the 
criteria for individuating the best explanation typically include considerations such as 
explanatory power, simplicity, or parsimony. In the case of IUCs, the argument is that we 
are justified in assuming that different people’s utilities are co-scaled insofar as this 
provides the best explanation of the empirical evidence, with respect to one, or more, of the 
considerations listed above.
In this chapter, my goal is to illustrate and assess this strategy, by focusing on the issue 
of scientific justification in particular. To begin with, we can distinguish two approaches 
pursuing the strategy under consideration, namely, a third-person approach and a first-
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person approach. The former tries to connect the measurement of utility, conceived as the 
representation of preferences revealed by choices, to the measurement of more objective 
empirical proxies. In section 2 ,1 shall illustrate the work done along these lines by the early 
Harsanyi, by Waldner and by List1. The latter approach attempts to reduce inter-personal 
comparisons to intra-personal comparisons of utility. In section 3, I shall illustrate the 
version proposed by the later Harsanyi2. In section 4 ,1 shall argue that Harsanyi’s first- 
person approach is unsuccessful on multiple grounds. In section 5, I shall argue, more 
generally, that all the solutions to the problem of IUCs based on an inference to the best 
explanation type of argument fail to show that IUCs can be scientifically justified. Finally, I 
shall summarise my findings in section 6.
2. Third-person approaches
2.1 Harsanyi*s “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal 
Comparisons o f Utility ”
Let us start from Harsanyi’s work. Harsanyi offers his first defence of IUCs3 four years 
after Arrow’s claim that “the interpersonal comparison of utilities has no meaning” 4, which 
fixes the orthodox view about the subject for many years. Harsanyi is not interested in 
defending the possibility of IUCs5, but rather in clarifying the “logical basis of such 
comparisons”6. Against Robbins, he wants to prove that IUCs are not value judgments “but 
rather factual propositions based on certain principles of inductive logic”7. Using the 
terminology introduced in the first chapter, we can say that Harsanyi wants to show that 
IUCs have a factual basis and that they can be scientifically justified.
Since my purpose is not exegetical, I shall present Harsanyi’s argument in a way that is 
partly different from the one in the original text. Harsanyi takes utility to be a measure of 
preference satisfaction and suggests that the evidence for the ascription of preference 
satisfaction is given by both choice behaviour and (verbal and non verbal) expressions8. As
1 See H arsan y i, J. [1955], W a ld n e r , I. [1972], L ist, C. [2003],
2 See Harsa n y i, J. [1977] and [1982].
3 See Harsanyi, J. [1955].
4 A rro w , K. [1963], p. 9.
5 According to Harsanyi, this had already been done by Little. See L ittle , I. D. M. [1957], chapter IV.
6 See H arsan y i, J. [1955], footnote 20, p. 317. [Emphasis in the original]
7 See H arsan y i, J. [1955], p. 320.
8 In his “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility”, Harsanyi 
distinguishes utility as a measure of people’s satisfaction from two indicators of it: “their preferences as 
revealed by their actual choices, and their (verbal or non verbal) expressions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
in each situation”. See H a rsa n y i, J. [1955], p. 317. My reading is different. Three reasons can be adduced as
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for preferences, they coincide with choice behaviour, in a radical behaviouristic manner. 
By contrast, here I shall take preferences to be behavioural dispositions. Moreover, I shall 
take utility to be a numerical representation of the intensity of an individual’s preferences, 
rather than a representation of preference satisfaction. With this interpretation at hands, 
Harsanyi can be seen as extending the evidence admissible for IUCs beyond choice 
behaviour, so as to include both verbal and non verbal behavioural expressions.
Even if we dispose of such a broader empirical basis, two problems remain according to 
Harsanyi. The first is the “metaphysical problem”. The idea is that, even if we assume 
complete isomorphy between different individuals, with respect to the admissible evidence, 
it may still be the case that they have different mental states and, in particular, different 
preference strengths. As a consequence, even if different individuals’ choice behaviour and 
expressive reactions are actually the same, their utility (functions) may be different.
Although this is a conceptual possibility, in his 1955 paper Harsanyi takes it to be no 
more than “a metaphysical curiosity”9. In order to block any “metaphysical” scepticism, 
Harsanyi suggests adopting a “principle of unwarranted differentiation”, according to 
which “if two objects or human beings show similar behaviour in all their relevant aspects 
open to observation, the assumption of some unobservable hidden difference between them 
must be regarded as a completely gratuitous hypothesis and one contrary to sound scientific 
method”10. Harsanyi concludes that, if two individuals show the same choice behaviour and 
expressive reactions, they have the same (absolute) utilities. This inference is sanctioned by 
the “principle of unwarranted differentiation” and it is justified to the extent that such a 
principle is justified. According to Harsanyi, justification comes from the fact that the 
“principle of unwarranted differentiation” conforms to good scientific practice.
The second problem of IUCs is the “psychological problem”. According to the early 
Harsanyi, this is the most serious difficulty in making IUCs, separate and independent from 
the “metaphysical problem”. It arises because in the real world different individuals do not 
actually show the same choice behaviour and expressive reactions. Harsanyi suggests 
looking at the variables that actually determine different choice behaviour and expressive
justifications. First, Harsanyi’s overall work is vitiated by many repeated ambiguities, so that a literal reading 
is not always the best way to get closer to the spirit of his analysis. Second, Harsanyi gives a purely 
behavioural characterization of preferences, in terms of choices, which is now completely outdated. In order 
to discuss the problem of IUCs, it is better to clearly separate choice behaviour as evidence for the ascription 
of preferences from preferences themselves. Finally, my reading may still be compatible with Harsanyi’s idea 
that utility represents preference satisfaction, provided that we also make the assumption that the degree to 
which an individual’s preferences are satisfied is measured by the intensity of his preferences.
9 See H a rsa n y i, J. [1955], p. 317.
10 See H a r sa n y i, J. [1955], p. 317 [Emphasis in the original]. It is worth noticing that, according to Harsanyi, 
this is not only a recommendation for scientific investigation, but the very principle that guides ordinary 
people’s practice of third-person mental state ascription.
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reactions and, ultimately, causally affect people’s preference strengths and satisfaction. The 
analysis of how preference strength is connected to changes in those variables promises to 
offer an answer to the question of how different individuals’ utilities compare when the 
relevant conditions are not the same.
According to Harsanyi, this can be done in two ways. The first method consists in re­
creating a situation where the isomorphy of the relevant conditions holds in reality. This 
provides a “direct empirical solution” to the psychological problem11. If it is possible to 
manipulate a representative individual in such a way to subject him to different 
psychological determinants, then such an individual will be able to make a direct 
comparison of the utilities associated with the individuals that are actually subject to the 
same psychological determinants. The representative individual provides the metric for 
IUCs. The main difficulty for this method is that some of the relevant conditions cannot be 
changed. This means that there may be no representative individual that can be subject to 
all the relevant determinants.
The second method provides a less direct empirical solution. It starts by gathering 
observations about how different individuals’ choice behaviour and expressive reactions 
are correlated to different psychological conditions. On the basis of our knowledge of the 
laws connecting psychological variables to preferences, we can ascribe degrees of 
preference to each individual that best explain interpersonal differences in choice behaviour 
and expressive reactions. In other words, the second method conceives IUCs as inferences 
to the best explanation, where the explanandum is given by differences in choice behaviour 
and expressive reactions across individuals and the auxiliary nomological information 
concerns the relation between psychological variables and preferences.
According to Harsanyi, this method faces two difficulties. The first is that our 
knowledge of the laws connecting psychological determinants to preferences is precarious. 
This may not be an irresolvable difficulty. In fact, Harsanyi believes that knowledge of 
psychological laws can be derived from further empirical research. However, an additional 
difficulty is that it is possible to gather empirical information only for those variables that 
are capable of change. Therefore, the second, and more serious, difficulty is that there is no 
direct empirical evidence to uncover the possible influence of unchangeable variables upon 
preferences.
The problem is that, when we make IUCs in order to explain different people’s 
alternative behaviour, we can impute preference strengths only on the basis of the 
observation of changeable variables. Harsanyi’s solution consists in postulating that
11 See Harsa n y i, J. [1955], p. 318.
51
unchangeable variables have no influence whatsoever on preferences and, thereby, do not 
affect choice behaviour and the expressive reactions to be explained. This is Harsanyi’s 
“principle of unwarranted correlation”12. It is an a priori principle and cannot be subject to 
empirical scrutiny. Once again, its adoption is justified on the grounds that the principle 
conforms to good scientific practice.
To summarise, Harsanyi’s solution to the “metaphysical problem” guarantees that 
different individuals’ utilities are co-scaled, once they are derived from the ‘correct’ inputs, 
that is, ‘correct’ preference strengths. On the other hand, Harsanyi’s solution to the 
“psychological problem” guarantees that the inputs used to derive interpersonal utilities are 
indeed ‘correct’. This is done, on the one hand, by further empirical investigation about the 
relationship between preferences and psychological determinants and, on the other hand, by 
imposing a ceteris paribus stricture on variables that are not capable of change.
2.2 Waldner’s “The Empirical Meaningfulness o f Interpersonal Utility Comparisons’’
Waldner’s work on the problem of IUCs brings some improvements to Harsanyi’s 
seminal contribution. To begin with, Waldner is the first to present the problem of IUCs in 
terms of the notion of empirical meaningfulness, although he does not provide an explicit 
definition of it. Moreover, he draws a wedge between preference satisfaction and 
preference strength and takes utility to be a numerical representation of the latter notion 
only. Finally, he abandons Harsanyi’s untenable behaviourism and adopts a broad 
dispositional account of preferences13. As we have seen in the previous chapters, according 
to the radical behaviourist account -  fashionable in the post-Robbins period -  preferences 
are nothing but choice behaviour. This explains why the ‘standard picture’ takes choice 
behaviour as the only admissible evidence. A milder form of behaviourism conceives 
preferences as behavioural dispositions, that is, as mental states independent and separate 
from their behavioural manifestations. According to a narrow dispositional account, 
however, preferences are dispositions to cause choice behaviour only, or, which is the 
same, dispositions towards actions. As a consequence, choice behaviour remains the only 
type of admissible evidence for the ascription of preferences. By contrast, Waldner adopts a 
broad dispositional account, according to which preferences are dispositions towards a 
broad range of behavioural outputs, such as actions, primarily, but also “certain 
unintentional expressive reactions, facial expressions, thoughts, day-dreams, musings,
12 See H a r sa n y i, J. [1955], footnote 27, p. 319.
13 Strictly speaking, Waldner’s analysis is formulated in terms of desires and not preferences. I shall ignore 
possible complications and consider preferences as relational desires. See W a ld n er , I. [1972], p. 90.
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etc.”14. This view of preferences finally opens the possibility of extending the admissible 
evidence beyond mere choice behaviour in a less ambiguous way than in Harsanyi’s 1955 
paper.
The first problem for Waldner is that there is no theory establishing, in a precise way, 
which behavioural outputs are connected to preferences. This problem can be solved by 
considering all the platitudinous beliefs about preferences that enjoy intersubjective 
agreement between the folks15. Everyday beliefs concerning how preferences and 
behavioural outputs are connected provide the first approximation towards a more scientific 
dispositional theory of preferences. This way, behavioural outputs other than choices can 
be used as additional evidence for IUCs, as they typically are in everyday cases. In order to 
“bring out the logical problems involved”16, Waldner focuses not just on rough 
correlations, but on hypothetical precise laws. In the terminology introduced above, his 
working hypothesis is that, although rough correlations may suffice to justify everyday ICs 
of preferences, only well-established and precise laws may provide sufficient evidence for 
the scientific justification of ICs of preference strength.
Waldner is not interested in all the possible behavioural outputs connected to 
preferences; rather, he selects only two behavioural expressions, namely, latency of choice, 
that is, the time delay between the presentation of the option and the actual choice-making, 
and probability of choice, that is, the probability of choosing one option rather than another. 
Moreover, he considers laws that connect behavioural proxies only to differences in, and 
not levels of, preference strengths. Then, for each individual i, possible laws of the kind 
envisaged by Waldner take the following form: Pi —► ti(x/y) = fi(ui(;c) -  Ui(y)) and Pi —► 
pi(jc/y) = gi(uj(jc) -  Ui(y)), where Pj is a general type of preference, ti(jc/y) and pi(x/y) are, 
respectively, the latency of individual z’s choice of x  rather than y and the probability of 
individual V s choice of x  rather than y, and Ui(jc) -  Ui(y) is the difference in intensity of 
individual f  s preference for option x  over option y, determined on the basis of choice 
behavioural evidence only17.
At first sight, the goal is to discover functional relations /  and g, unique for all 
individuals, which connect intervals of preference strengths, individuated through choice 
behavioural evidence, to other proxies, such as latency of choice and probability of choice. 
One problem is that the representation of preference strengths through a utility function is 
unique only up to a positive affine transformation. As a consequence, the evidence offered
14 See W ald n er , I. [1972], p. 95.
15 This strategy clearly reminds Lewis’ version of commonsense functionalism. See LEWIS, D. [1972].
16 See W ald n er , I. [1972], p. 96.
17 See W a ld n er , I. [1972], p. 97.
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by choice behaviour and other behavioural proxies is not sufficient to determine absolute 
functions/and g connecting preference strengths to latency of choice and probability of 
choice, respectively, but it can only determine a family of functions preserving the same 
information. Unless there is an independent way to determine absolute utility functions in 
the first instance, it is also impossible to determine absolute functions /  and g. Clearly, 
Waldner’s conclusion contrasts with Harsanyi’s hope of deriving absolute utility functions 
by collecting further empirical evidence about psychological laws. The role of empirical 
investigation is different in Waldner’s account. It aims at individuating the admissible 
transformations a and / ,  unique for all individuals, such that any one of the functions 
establishing a connection between an individual’s preference strengths and, respectively, 
latency of choice and probability of choice, can be transformed into one of the same 
functions of another individual. More formally, the goal is to individuate the unique 
admissible transformations a and/, which preserves the following correlations: P —* [ti(jc/y) 
=  tj(x/y) <-► ui(x) -  Ui(y) = a (uj(*) -  uj(y))] and P —► [p i(x /y ) = P j(* /y) <-► uj(*) -  Ui(y) =  /  
(uj(jt) -  U j(y))], for any individuals i and / 8.
This task presents two difficulties. First, for each individual, both latency of choice and 
probability of choice may depend on variables other than preference strength. This 
complicates the generalization of the admissible transformations a and /  across individuals, 
that is, the individuation of as and / s  unique for all individuals. At best, the laws 
connecting preference strengths to latency of choice and probability of choice are only 
ceteris paribus laws. As such, the issue concerns the individuation of the conditions that 
should be included in the ceteris paribus clauses. This was part of Harsanyi’s 
“psychological problem” of IUCs. Unlike Harsanyi, however, Waldner does not resort to 
any non-empirical regulatory principle, but confides that further empirical research will be 
able to unpack the relevant conditions.
The second difficulty is that there may be hidden differences in “sensitivity” across 
individuals which may prevent the individuation of unique admissible transformations a 
and /?, even in the case in which different individuals show equal latency of choice and 
probability of choice. This is Harsanyi’s “metaphysical problem” again. According to 
Waldner, this claim raises a purely conceptual issue. No further empirical evidence could 
ever prove such a special “sensitivity”, since any further empirical evidence would be used 
to refine the ceteris paribus clauses annexed to the laws under consideration. Like 
Harsanyi, Waldner suggests handling the problem by resorting to “the requirement to strive
18 See W a ld n e r ,  I. [1972], p. 99.
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for simplicity of empirical theories”, which is coded in “the principle of not postulating any 
differences unless there is some reason to do so”19.
2.3 L ist’s “Are Interpersonal Comparisons o f Utility Indeterminate?”
Thirty years later, List generalizes, and provides new justifications for, Waldner’s 
approach. List follows Waldner in presenting the problem of IUCs as the problem of 
whether or not IUCs are empirically meaningful. In addition, he provides a detailed 
definition of the notion of empirical meaningfulness, which brings the problem of IUCs 
closer to issues in philosophy of science. Moreover, List adopts a broader conception of 
utility than Waldner, which covers a whole range of different interpretations. For the 
present purpose, I shall still take utility to represent preference strengths only. The key 
property is that utility, so defined, “may surface observably in the form of a person’s choice 
behaviour and/or other observable proxies”20. This allows for the possibility that further 
empirical evidence, in addition to choice behaviour, may be considered for IUCs. Finally, 
List generalizes Waldner’s approach in two ways. First, he considers all the potential types 
of empirical evidence by dividing the proxies into classes, in accordance with the type of 
scale through which they are measured. Second, he considers the implications that the use 
of these empirical proxies has not only for ICs of utility differences, but also for ICs of 
utility levels and IUCs with respect to an interpersonally significant zero-line21.
List investigates the unwelcome prospect that IUCs are empirically meaningless in the 
most favourable and ideal case in which one disposes of a particularly rich set of empirical 
evidence E. Such a set includes “a person’s observable facial expression of pleasure or 
pain, a person’s relevant neural activity, in response to the options or in response to 
switches between options”, in addition to Waldner’s latency of choice and probability of 
choice22. If the relevant conditions are satisfied, these observable proxies can be measured, 
for each individual i, through proxy functions f  , gi and h  having different uniqueness 
properties. Moreover, if the proxies behave in a way that is consistent with individual 
preferences, then, for each individual /, it may possible to find, respectively, admissible 
transformations (pu y/i, sign\ that connect these proxy functions to some profile of utility 
functions, where utility is taken here to be a representation of individual V s preferences as
19 See W a ld n er , I. [1972], p. 102.
20 LIST, C. [2003], p. 229. [Emphasis in the original]
21 See List, C. [2003], p. 243.
22 See List, C. [2003], p. 243 and p. 245.
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revealed by choice behaviour. The resulting relations look as follows: fj (jc) = cpi (Ui(x)), gj 
(x, y) = \j/i (Ui(*) -  ui(y)), h(x) = sign, (ui(*))23.
There are two difficulties. First, the proxy functions / ,  g and h may present the same 
problems of measurability, uniqueness and comparability of the utility function u. In 
particular, for any two individuals i and y, it might not be possible to determine whether 
their respective proxy functions are co-scaled. Second, it might be the case that the 
admissible transformations y>, y/ and sign are not the same across individuals. Both 
conditions should be satisfied, in order for IUCs to be empirically meaningful. The idea is 
that, for any two individuals i and y, if their proxy functions/, g and h are co-scaled, and if 
they have identical admissible transformations (p, y/ and sign then it is possible to take 
interpersonally comparable proxy measures as arguments and transform them into 
interpersonally comparable utility measures, by applying the relevant admissible 
transformation.
List avoids the first difficulty by stipulation. In particular, he claims that “what makes/, 
gi and hi observable is that, whatever scale of measurement we choose, this scale is a 
common one for all persons”24. However, no similar solution is available for the second 
difficulty, on pain of begging the question. Even if we dispose of all the admissible 
empirical evidence, we cannot determine whether different individuals have identical 
admissible transformations (p, y/ and sign.
Two conclusions follow. First, IUCs are underdetermined by the empirical evidence in a 
particularly robust way. Even if we extend the set of empirical evidence E beyond choice 
behaviour, IUCs remain underdetermined. Furthermore, since they are underdetermined 
with respect to all the possible empirical evidence E"13*, IUCs are potentially indeterminate, 
if it turns out that there is no fact of the matter about preference strengths. Notice that if we 
assume that all the relevant empirical evidence is the same across individuals, we are back 
to Harsanyi’s “metaphysical problem”, which appears now as a particular case of the more 
general problem of underdetermination of IUCs by the empirical evidence.
Second, one way to break the underdetermination and determine IUCs consists in 
assuming “interpersonal sameness of the conversion of utility into the proxy functions”25. 
This is equivalent to assuming that different individuals have identical admissible 
transformations (p, y/ and sign. However, this assumption is non-empirical, since it cannot 
be sanctioned by the empirical evidence. List offers a pragmatic justification for embracing 
it. The idea is that, even if the assumption of “interpersonal sameness of the conversion of
23 See List, C. [2003], pp. 244-245.
24 LIST, C. [2003], footnote 16, p. 259. [Emphasis in the original]
25 List, C. [2003], p. 247.
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utility into the proxy functions” cannot be empirically confirmed, in a realist sense, it 
should still be taken to hold in a pragmatic sense. In analogy with Quine’s analysis of 
translation practice, such an assumption provides the most parsimonious way of accounting 
for different people’s behaviour. In other words, the principle of parsimony provides the 
justification for the assumption that the admissible transformations (p, yj and sign are
0f\identical across individuals .
3. First-person approaches
The three approaches seen above have various things in common. First, they are all 
third-person approaches to IUCs. Typically, they either limit or exclude the role of 
introspection as a source of evidence for IUCs. Instead, they assign a major role to 
empirical research in order to gain scientific knowledge of precise laws connecting 
preferences to other empirical proxies. Second, they all explore the use of non-empirical 
principles, in addition to the available empirical evidence, in order to determine IUCs. 
Finally, they all justify the adoption of these non-empirical principles by reference to 
pragmatic considerations that are derived from scientific practice. Therefore, according to 
these accounts, it is scientific practice that provides the ultimate standard for having 
scientifically justified ICs of preference strengths.
However, the appeal to pragmatic arguments is not peculiar to third-person approaches, 
but it is a central feature of first-person approaches to IUCs as well. The main characteristic 
of first-person approaches is that they offer solutions to the problem of IUCs that are based 
on an introspective reduction of inter-personal comparisons to intra-personal comparisons 
of utility. Typically, such a reduction involves constructing an extended preference 
ranking27. Although this approach has been variously explored by many authors28,1 shall 
here focus only on its most influential version: the one of the later Harsanyi.
3.1 Harsanyi *s “Morality and Social Welfare ”
Harsanyi considers the following setting. Suppose there are n individuals 1,..., n. Let A 
= x, y ..., z be the preference domain, which includes lotteries describing the possible
26 Furthermore, List suggests another (normative) way to break the underdetermination of IUCs by the 
empirical evidence. The idea is that if it is intersubjectively agreed that certain options or states of affairs are 
normatively significant, we can make meaningful IUCs of the types considered above.
27 However, there are also approaches where the intra-personal reduction takes place without the construction 
of an extended preference ranking. See G ibbard, A. [1986].
28 See Se n , A. [1970] and [1979a] and A rro w , K. [1977], amongst the others.
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objective situations in which an individual can find himself. By assumption, the set is the 
same for all individuals. Suppose that individuals have preferences over the lotteries in the 
set A. Let us denote by Pi the set of these preferences, for each individual i = 1, ..., n. Pi 
describes the possible subjective states in which an individual can find himself. If the 
expected utility axioms hold, preferences can be represented through a utility function m, 
unique up to a positive affine transformation. We can then derive a profile of utility 
functions {uj}, for each individual i = 1 , . . . ,  n.
Suppose that an observer k wants to interpersonally compare individual V s and 
individual/  s utilities. Harsanyi considers the following questions29:
(1) What kind of judgments are IUCs?
(2) How can the observer make IUCs?
(3) Do IUCs have intersubjective validity?
According to Harsanyi, IUCs are logically equivalent to preferences between extended 
alternatives. An extended alternative is an option including both a possible objective 
situation, i.e. a state of the world, and a possible subjective situation, i.e. a state of mind, in 
which an individual can find himself. Formally, it has the following form: [.x, Pi], for all 
states of the world x  and for all individuals i. Thus, according to Harsanyi, an observer 
makes IUCs if and only if he forms preferences between extended alternatives (i.e. he 
forms extended preferences). Notice that this conception of IUCs marks a significant 
change in Harsanyi’s work. In his 1955 paper, Harsanyi takes IUCs to be “factual 
propositions”. They represent the world as it is supposed to be and they can be either true 
or false. As such, they are the objects of doxastic attitudes, such as beliefs, which have a 
mind-to-world direction of fit. This means that they are supposed to fit the world. Instead, 
in the 1977 paper, Harsanyi takes IUCs to be logically equivalent to extended preferences. 
This shows that, in Harsanyi’s view, IUCs cease to be representations of the world. In fact, 
preferences are attitudes that have a world-to-mind direction of fit. This means that, unlike 
beliefs, the world is supposed to fit them. The crucial notion here is not truth, but 
satisfaction: preferences can be either satisfied or not satisfied, perhaps with different 
degrees30.
29 See Harsanyi, J. [1977].
30 See H a r sa n y i, J. [1977] and [1982]. There are probably several reasons why Harsanyi switches from the 
third-person approach defended in the 1955 paper to the first-person approach firstly defended in the 1977 
paper. Here is one hypothesis. Recall that one of the problems of the second method for solving the 
“psychological problem” of IUCs was that it relied on knowledge of laws connecting psychological 
determinants to preferences. In 1955, Harsanyi is optimistic that further empirical research will lead to
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How can the observer make IUCs then? The starting point consists in considering the 
preferences that each individual has in correspondence with each objective state of the 
world. The profile of utility functions {u*} conveys information about the structure and 
properties of each individual Vs set of preferences Pj. However, such information is 
insufficient to ground IUCs, because it does not imply anything about how different 
people’s preferences compare. The reduction of inter-personal utility comparisons to intra- 
personal utility comparisons provides the way for comparing different people’s preference 
strengths. The fundamental operation is imaginative empathy. According to Harsanyi, an 
observer k can compare the intensity of an individual Vs preferences for option x  with the 
intensity of an individual f s  preferences for option y simply by imagining being in the 
place of, respectively, individual i in state of the world x  and individual j  in state of the 
world y. Through imagination, the observer k forms preferences between the extended 
alternatives [xt Pj] and [y, Pj]. By considering all states of the world and all individuals, the 
observer k forms a set of preferences between extended alternatives combining different 
pairs of individuals/states of the world. Finally, if these preferences satisfy the expected 
utility axioms, they can be represented by an extended utility function of the following 
form: Vk[x, Pi].
In order to reduce inter-personal comparisons of utilities to intra-personal comparisons 
of extended utilities, the following conditions need to be satisfied:
(1) Rationality of individual preferences over simple alternatives;
(2) Rationality of individual preferences over extended alternatives;
(3) The Principle of Acceptance.
Conditions (1) and (2) express the standard consistency requirements necessary for 
representing simple and extended preferences through, respectively, a utility function and 
an extended utility function. Condition (3) is crucial, because it connects simple to 
extended utilities. The Principle of Acceptance requires that, when considering extended
discovering these laws. Despite the possibilities offered by future scientific progress, however, the problem 
concerning IUCs made from a third-person perspective remains twofold. One difficulty regards the 
individuation of the relevant conditions determining an individual’s preferences. The other difficulty regards 
the absence of well-established and precise psychological laws. Therefore, a third-person approach is 
potentially subject to two different kinds of mistake. By contrast, a first-person approach promises to reduce 
the impact of, at least, the second difficulty. On a realist interpretation, psychological laws represent the 
actual working of an individual’s mind. In particular, they represent the way in which an individual exposed 
to certain environmental conditions forms his mental states. One may argue that, even if  the individual does 
not have explicit knowledge of the relevant psychological laws, he may put them to work through 
imagination. If the individual’s mind works in a similar way in the imagined as in the actual case, the problem 
of IUCs becomes only a matter of individuating the relevant conditions determining different individuals’ 
preferences.
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situations [jc, P J , [z, Pi], the observer’s extended preferences agree with individual i ’s 
simple preferences. In other words, when the observer imagines being in different states of 
the world but with the same preferences as individual /, his extended ranking must agree 
with individual V s simple ranking. According to Harsanyi, the Principle of Acceptance 
implies that, for any state of the world x  and for any individual i, there exists a function uj, 
such that Ui(x) = Vk[jc, Pi]. Since, trivially, there exists a function Uk, such that Uk(x) = Vk[jc, 
P J, the Principle of Acceptance connects each individual’s simple utility to the observer’s 
extended utility. As such, the Principle of Acceptance is the basic condition for the 
reduction of inter-personal utility comparisons to intra-personal extended utility 
comparisons.
Conditions (1) -  (3) account for how an observer k makes IUCs. The question arises 
whether or not IUCs are intersubjectively valid. The Principle of Acceptance merely 
implies that, for any observer k and for all individuals i, the observer’s extended 
preferences agree with each individual’s simple preferences. However, the Principle of 
Acceptance does not imply that two different observers compare the extended alternatives 
including different individuals’ subjective attitudes in the same way. For instance, suppose 
that an observer k  and an observer h compare the extended alternatives [jc, Pi] and [y, Pj], 
that is, form a preference relation over these extended alternatives. Nothing implies that 
their preferences will be the same. Even if the Principle of Acceptance holds, k and h may 
form different extended preferences. Does this mean that IUCs are inherently subjective 
and they do not possess intersubjective validity? Harsanyi thinks otherwise.
The starting point is the idea that IUCs are intersubjectively valid if and only if people 
form the same extended preferences. The further claim is that, if certain conditions are 
satisfied, people are bound to form the same extended preferences. Therefore, it is possible 
to have intersubjectively valid IUCs. Harsanyi’s argument is based on three important 
assumptions that are worth examining. The first assumption is that (both simple and 
extended) preferences are determined by causal variables. More formally, for each 
individual /, there is a function that maps a vector of causal variables <cn, Ci2 , ..., Cim> 
into specific preference relations, where Cira e Q  and Q  is the set of causes. This 
assumption has one important implication. As we have seen, according to Harsanyi, 
comparing different individuals’ preferences is logically equivalent to forming preferences 
over extended alternatives of the form [x, PJ, where x is an objective state of the world and 
Pi is the set of individual i*s simple preferences. Now, if preferences are determined by 
causal variables, we can write the extended alternative [.x, Pi] as [jc, CJ, where Q  is the set 
of causal determinants of individual f  s preferences, because [jc, CJ implies [jc, PJ.
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Moreover, if we consider the numerical representation of extended preferences, we can 
write the extended utility \\[x , Pi] as Vk[jc, CJ, since the latter implies the former.
In accordance with the position already expressed in the 1955 paper, Harsanyi thinks 
that differences in either the determining causal variables or their properties explain the 
empirical fact that people have simple preferences with different intensity. At first sight, the 
same can happen in the case of extended preferences. That is, differences in the 
determining causal variables may lead people to form extended preferences with different 
intensity. Yet, Harsanyi thinks that people are bound to form the same extended 
preferences. The next two assumptions are crucial for his conclusion. We have seen in the 
previous paragraph that each observer considers extended alternatives that can be expressed 
in the following way [jc, Q], where jc is an objective state of the world and Q  is the set of 
causal variables determining individual f  s preferences. According to Harsanyi, when 
considering such alternatives, each observer imagines being in the place of individual /, that 
is, each observer imagines facing the objective properties and the causal conditions that 
individual i faces. Crucially, Harsanyi thinks that imagining facing individual V s causal 
variables is the same as imagining being subject to these causal variables. This is 
Harsanyi’s second assumption. This assumption implies that, by considering the same 
extended alternative [jc, Q], different observers imagine being subject to the same causal 
variables Q.
Suppose that the second assumption is sound. Something else is required for Harsanyi to 
conclude that different observers will form the same extended preferences. Indeed, even if 
they imagine being subject to the same causal variables, they may still form different 
extended preferences because the mechanisms governing preference formation are 
interpersonally different. Harsanyi’s third assumption is that the laws of human psychology 
are the same for all individuals. In a more formal terminology, we can say that the function 
mapping causal variables into individual preferences is unique for all individuals. This 
means that, for any two individuals k  and /i,/k =/h - f 1. This assumption is crucial. It 
excludes the existence of fundamental differences concerning the way in which people 
form their (both simple and extended) preferences. Harsanyi labels this assumption the 
“similarity postulate”. According to it, “once proper allowances have been made for the 
empirically given differences in taste, education, etc., between me and another person, then 
it is reasonable for me to assume that our basic psychological reactions to any given
31 Since the function mapping causal variables into individual preferences may not be absolutely unique, 
perhaps it is more precise to say that the fam ily  of functions mapping causal variables into individual 
preferences is the same across individuals.
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alternative will be otherwise much the same”32. According to Harsanyi, the “similarity 
postulate” is “a nonempirical a priori postulate”. Its justification is entirely pragmatic and 
relies on the idea that a theory embracing such a postulate is “less arbitrary” than any other 
empirically adequate theory33.
If the third assumption holds, different observers considering extended alternatives of 
the form [jc, Q] will not only be subject to the same causal variables Q, but will also form 
the same extended preferences on the basis of such causal variables. Thus, different 
observers k and h will have the same extended utility functions Vk = Vh = v and the same 
extended utilities Vk[jc, Q] = Vh[;c, Q] = v[jc, Q]. Given that, according to Harsanyi, Uh(jc) = 
vh[jc, Ch], the following identities hold when h = i: Uh(jc) = Vh[jt, Ch] = v[jc, Ch]. Therefore, 
Harsanyi shows that there exists a universal extended utility scale, which is connected to 
each individual’s simple utility function. The conclusion is that any two individuals k  and 
h will have the same extended utility functions and, thereby, will make the same, 
intersubjectively valid, ICs of simple utilities.
To summarise: the Principle of Acceptance assures that the reduction from inter­
personal utility comparisons to intra-personal extended utility comparisons is possible. The 
assumptions that preferences are determined by causal variables, that imagining facing 
certain causes is the same as imagining being subject to these causes and that the 
psychological laws on the basis of which preferences are determined are the same for all 
individuals assure that the introspective reduction determines intersubjectively valid IUCs. 
If IUCs are logically equivalent to extended preferences and extended preferences are the 
same for all individual, IUCs can be determined by the combination of empirical evidence 
and a non-empirical postulate, i.e. the “similarity postulate”.
4. Troubles for Harsanyi’s first-person approach
According to Harsanyi, forming identical extended preferences is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for having intersubjectively valid IUCs. In this section I will argue 
against the necessity claim. My line of thought is the following. Harsanyi argues that 
comparing different individuals’ simple preferences requires forming extended preferences. 
Moreover, he argues that forming extended preferences requires imagining being subject to 
the same causal circumstances to which the individuals under comparison are subject. The 
latter stage is required in order to understand which preferences those individuals have in
32 See Harsanyi, J. [1982], p. 50.
33 See Ha r sa n y i, J. [1982], p. 51.
62
various objective states of the world. Following the recent literature on mindreading, I shall 
claim that such understanding involves forming a specific type of hypothetical preferences, 
i.e. pretend preferences, which are different from extended preferences. Then, I shall argue 
that, if extended preferences are based on pretend preferences, forming extended 
preferences is entirely redundant, because pretend preferences are sufficient for making 
IUCs.
In the remaining of this section, I shall also consider some other reasons to reject 
Harsanyi’s extended preference approach. In particular, I will sketch Broome’s argument 
against the assumption that imagining facing the same causal variables determining an 
individual’s preferences is the same as imagining being subject to the same causal variables 
determining his preferences. Finally, in the next section, I shall consider further reasons 
against Harsanyi’s approach by examining and rejecting the justification that Harsanyi 
gives in support of his third assumption, i.e. the assumption that psychological laws are the 
same for all individuals.
4.1 Early objections
Harsanyi claims that imaginative empathy is the crucial capacity that an observer must 
possess for making IUCs. Imagination is required for understanding the intensity of other 
individuals’ preferences in specific objective situations from a first-person perspective. In 
turn, such understanding is required for constructing an extended preference ranking with 
the properties that Harsanyi envisages. In the course of the years, Harsanyi’s proposal has 
raised various objections, which are worth examining before presenting my own objection.
It seemed to several authors that, in Harsanyi’s approach, understanding another 
individual’s preferences through empathic identification presupposes that the observer can 
have the very same preferences as the observed individual. The first objection is that this is 
impossible. The idea is that an observer k cannot have the same preferences as an observed 
individual i while remaining himself34. However, and contrary to a widespread opinion, this 
objection is not too damaging. It can be dealt with by simply weakening the notion of 
sameness of preferences that the objection implicitly relies on. More precisely, in order for 
individual k  to have the same preferences of individual i, it is not required that individual 
fc’s preferences are individual Vs very own preferences. Rather, it is only required that 
individual fc’s preferences are similar to individual Vs preferences in certain relevant 
respects, namely, their content, their strength and their other structural properties. One way
34 See, for instance, M a cKa y , A. F. [1986].
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to capture this reply is by making the assumption that preferences are independent from 
personal identity35. If this assumption holds, two individuals can have identical preferences 
while remaining fundamentally themselves.
This leads to a second objection. The idea is that, even if we adopt a weaker notion of 
sameness of preferences, imagination does not guarantee that the observer k  will have the 
same preferences as the observed individual i. According to MacKay, the assumption 
underlying Harsanyi’s approach is that if an observer k imagines being subject to the same 
causal variables as an individual i, then he has the same preferences as individual i. 
However, this is an instance of a more general principle, according to which if an 
individual imagines satisfying certain conditions, then he obtains the same results that 
would follow were those conditions actually satisfied. It is easy to find counterexamples to 
this principle. Consider the following counterfactual: if I imagine having been raised in 
France, I can speak French fluently (<ceteris paribus). Clearly, imagining having been raised 
in France does not make me able to speak a single word of French. Therefore, the principle 
is false. Imagining that certain conditions are satisfied does not imply that the effect 
determined by the actual satisfaction of those conditions ensues36.
One way to meet MacKay’s challenge consists in reformulating the assumption 
underlying Harsanyi’s approach in the following way: if an observer k imagines being 
subject to the same causal variables as an individual i, then k imagines having the same 
preferences as i. Two issues arise. First, one may wonder what exactly it means to say that 
individual k imagines having the same preferences as i. Second, one may wonder what 
exactly the outcome of individual k’s imagination is. We can provide an answer to both 
questions by turning our attention to a current approach to mindreading, namely, 
Simulation Theory (ST)37. ST conceives imagination as a sort of replication or re­
enactment of another individual’s mental life. The main idea is that, in order to predict or 
explain another individual’s behaviour, the simulator uses himself as an analogue model. 
More specifically, the simulator imagines being in the other person’s shoes, that is, he 
pretends to have the initial mental states of the other individual. These mental states are 
inputs fed into his practical reasoning system, which, as it is often put, runs off-line. If the
35 This assumption can be interpreted also in the reverse way, as saying that personal identity is independent 
from personal preferences. This means that one remains fundamentally the same individual even if one has 
the same preferences of another individual. Cff. M o n g in , P. [2001], pp. 156-157.
36 See M a c Ka y , A. F. [1986], pp. 316-322.
37 Since I shall discuss ST in greater detail in the next chapter, here I shall confine myself to a basic 
illustration. The current debate concerning ST starts with Go r d o n , R. [1986], H eal , J. [1986] and Goldm an , 
A. [1989]. Three useful collections of papers discussing the early debate between Simulation Theory and its 
alternative, Theory-Theory, are Da vies , M. and T., Sto n e , [1995a,b] and C arruthers, P. and P. K., Sm ith ,
[1996].
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inputs are individuated correctly and the relevant processes are sufficiently similar across 
individuals, the outputs of the simulation heuristic correspond to the other individual’s 
targeted mental states in certain crucial respects. In particular, if the goal of the simulation 
heuristic is to predict another individual’s behaviour, the output will be either a pretend 
decision or a pretend intention. On the other hand, if the goal is to explain another 
individual’s behaviour in terms of his mental states, the output will be some other pretend 
mental state.
Harsanyi’s argument can be reformulated in the jargon of current ST. One difficulty is 
that, in Harsanyi’s framework, the inputs include also non-mental causal variables, whereas 
the inputs of simulation are pretend mental states only. If we ignore this complication, we 
can say that, if individual k pretends being subject to the same causal variables as 
individual i, then k pretends having the same preferences as i, that is, k forms pretend 
preferences. Notice that, in order to have intersubjectively valid IUCs, it must be the case 
that k 's pretend preferences correspond to i ’s actual preferences in the relevant respects. 
However, Harsanyi’s similarity postulate is not sufficient for this. Indeed, even if the 
psychological laws determining preferences on the basis of actual causal circumstances are 
the same across individuals, imagination may lead one individual to form pretend 
preferences that are radically different from another individual’s actual preferences, on the 
basis of imagined causal circumstances. In order for having intersubjectively valid IUCs, 
the additional assumption is required that the off-line working of the individual’s mind- 
system approximates its online working. If this is the case, then, if individual k pretends 
being subject to the same causal circumstances of individual i, he forms pretend 
preferences corresponding to individual Vs actual preferences.
4.2 Challenging the necessity claim
Reformulating Harsanyi’s argument in accordance with current ST can accommodate 
MacKay’s objection. However, the success of this manoeuvre comes at a significant cost. 
Harsanyi’s strategy becomes vulnerable to another objection: if extended preferences are 
based on pretend preferences, the construction of an extended preference ranking is entirely 
redundant because pretend preferences are sufficient for making IUCs. More specifically, if 
two observers form the same pretend preferences, they can make intersubjectively valid 
IUCs, without having to form also extended preferences.
Let us start by refining the distinction between extended and pretend preferences. An 
extended preference relation is a preference relation taking the form [x, Q] Rk [y, Cj]. We
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can interpret it as saying that individual k prefers the extended alternative [jc, Q], including 
i ’s objective and subjective conditions, to the extended alternative [y , Cj], including/s 
objective and subjective conditions, for any options jc and y  and for any three individual i j , 
k=  1 ,..., n38. Instead, a pretend preference relation is a special type of simple preference 
relation. More specifically, pretend preferences are simple preferences formed by 
imagining being subject to some specified causal variables. As such, they are hypothetical 
simple preferences. In what follows, I shall use the notation (jc;p  Ck) to refer to a pretend 
alternative.
Harsanyi’s main claim is that forming pretend preferences is necessary in order to form 
extended preferences. We can formally represent this claim as follows: [jc, Q] Rk [y, Cj] —► 
(jc;p  Ci) Rk (y;p Cj). How can we interpret this conditional? The interpretation of the left 
hand side is straightforward. It says that individual k prefers the state of the world x  and the 
causal circumstances Ci to the state of the world y  and the causal circumstances Cj. On the 
other hand, the interpretation of the right hand side is trickier. At first sight, it says that 
individual k prefers the state of the world jc when imagining being subject to causal 
circumstances Ci to the state of the world y  when imagining being subject to causal 
circumstances Cj. The problem with this interpretation is that it seems to require individual 
k to imagine being subject simultaneously to both causal circumstances Ci and causal 
circumstances Cj. In fact, in order to entertain a preference relation between the options (jc;p 
C j) and (y ;p  Cj), individual k has to represent both jc and y  while, respectively, imagining 
being subject to Ci and imagining being subject to Cj.
The intuitive reply is that individual k  forms his pretend preferences by reiterating the 
imagination process. First, the observer k imagines being subject to causal circumstances Q  
and forms pretend preferences for jc. Second, he imagines being subject to causal 
circumstances Cj and forms pretend preferences fory. Third, he combines those preferences 
into a single pretend preference relation. The problem is that the third stage is more 
contentious than it seems at first sight. Consider the following characterisation of the
'J Q
simulation heuristics :
SIM1 (a) IDENTIFY with the other individual
(b) IMAGINE being in the same causal situation 
SIM2 (a) PRETEND to have the other individual’s mental states
SIM3 (a) CLASSIFY reactions
38 Notice that it may be the case that jc =  y .  Moreover, it may be the case that i = j ,  or k = j  or k  = / or that i = j  
= k.
39 Here I am borrowing from (and adapting) P er n er , J. [1996], pp. 92-93 and p. 97 in particular.
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(b) DE-IDENTIFY and ATTRIBUTE the last reaction to the other 
individual
According to SIM3, the simulator classifies the output of the simulation process and 
attributes it to the simulated individual. By so doing he forms a belief that the other 
individual has a certain mental state. In the case under consideration, first, individual k 
classifies the pretend output as a preference for x and then ascribes it to individual i. Then, 
he reiterates the procedure, that is, he classifies the output as a pretend preference for y and 
ascribes it to individual j. Eventually, individual k forms a belief about i’s preferences for jc 
and a belief about f  s preferences for y.
This characterisation shows that the third stage of the simulation heuristic leads to the 
formation of beliefs rather than pretend preferences of the kind envisaged in the conditional 
seen above. Thus, extended preferences are based on pretend preferences in the sense that 
the observer k forms extended preferences on the basis of beliefs about individual i’s and 
individual/  s actual preferences, which, in turn, are formed on the basis of separate pretend 
preferences. At this point, however, a worry arises: it appears that forming extended 
preferences is unnecessary for making IUCs. Indeed, extended preferences are formed by 
drawing both on the mechanisms and on the inputs used to form pretend preferences. Yet, 
these pretend preferences seem to be perfectly sufficient for making IUCs. Indeed, in order 
to compare i’s and f  s respective preferences, individual k has simply to combine the beliefs 
about their preferences, which he has formed on the basis of his pretend preferences. The 
outcome is a further belief, i.e. the belief about how i’s preference for x  compares with j ’s 
preference for y with respect to strength. If the observer can use the outcomes of simulation 
to make IUCs, extended preferences appear to be entirely redundant and, therefore, 
unnecessary. The formation of pretend preferences leads to the interpersonal comparison of 
the individuals’ believed preference strengths. If the assumptions about the simulation 
mechanisms are satisfied, different observers form the same pretend preferences and, 
thereby, the same beliefs about other individuals’ preference strengths. By combining these 
beliefs, they form intersubjectively valid IUCs. Therefore, pretend preference formation is 
sufficient for making intersubjectively valid IUCs40.
4.3 Other objections against Harsanyi ’s approach
40 This also suggests adopting a cognitivist view of IUCs. According to it, and pace Harsanyi, IUCs are 
cognitive judgments such as beliefs rather than non-cognitive judgments such as extended preferences. For a 
similar objection see MONGIN, P. [2001]. This conclusion has some positive consequences. By modifying 
Harsanyi’s non-cognitivist view into a cognitivist one, Harsanyi’s first-person approach fit the presupposition 
that IUCs are factual judgments explored in this thesis.
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The previous sub-section rejects the claim that extended preferences are necessary for 
making IUCs. Even if they were, however, there would be other reasons to dismiss 
Harsanyi’s approach as incapable of providing a solution to the epistemological problem of 
IUCs. In particular, further objections may be raised about the assumptions on which 
Harsanyi’s argument is based. In the next section, I shall present an argument against the 
pragmatic justification that Harsanyi offers in support of his third assumption, i.e. the 
assumption that the laws of human psychology are the same for all individuals. Instead, in 
this section, I shall briefly illustrate Broome’s argument against Harsanyi’s second 
assumption, i.e. the assumption that imagining facing the same causal circumstances as 
another individual is the same as imagining being subject to those causal circumstances.
Broome’s main idea is that Harsanyi conflates the object of preference with the cause of 
preference41. When the observer k imagines facing the same causal variables under which 
individual i is subject, he considers the set of causes Q  as object of his (extended) 
preferences. By contrast, when the observer k imagines being subject to the same causal 
variables as individual i, he considers the set of causes Q  as determinant of his (pretend) 
preferences. In the former case, the observer considers the extended alternative [jc, Ci]. In 
the latter case, he considers the pretend alternative (jc;p  Ci). Broome highlights the 
differences between the two cases by representing the second situation in the following 
way: [jc; Ci], with emphasis on the fact that the set of causes is not part of the object of 
preference, but is simply its determinant.
Broome’s distinction has important consequences for the soundness of Harsanyi’s 
proposal. Harsanyi’s analysis starts from the observation that, if different individuals were 
subject to identical causes and if the psychological laws governing preference formation 
were also the same, they would have identical preferences. In ordinary life, causes are 
typically different and so are people’s preferences. At first sight, the same can happen for 
all sorts of preferences, including extended preferences. That is, different people can form 
different extended preferences because they may be subject to different causes. Instead, 
Harsanyi thinks that people are bound to form identical extended preferences. The reason is 
that, if they consider the same extended alternatives, they will be subject to the same causal 
variables. His second assumption is crucial for this conclusion. Yet, if this assumption 
stems from a conflation of the object of preference with the cause of preference, then the 
soundness of this assumption is, at best, not obvious and, at worst, highly questionable.
41 See B roome, J. [1993] and [1999].
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If we embrace Broome’s distinction, Harsanyi’s assumption requires that when different 
observers consider the extended alternative [jc, CJ, they consider the (pretend) extended 
alternative ([ jc, CJ;p Ci) or, in Broome’s own formal representation, the extended 
alternative [jc, Q; CJ, for any individual i. The problem for Harsanyi is that forming 
extended preferences does not imply imagining being subject to the same causal 
circumstances that figure as object of extended preferences. Indeed, people can form 
extended preferences while being (actually or imaginatively) subject to different causal 
variables. For instance, when considering the extended alternative [jc, CJ, different 
observers k and h may indeed be considering the extended alternatives ([jc, CJ; Ck) and ([jc, 
CJ; Ch), respectively, where Ck *  Ch. If this is the case, there is no guarantee that they will 
form the same extended preferences. In turn, this shows that there is no guarantee that they 
will make intersubjectively valid IUCs.
I take Broome’s distinction to be correct. So I shall quickly move on to a more general 
objection against approaches based on pragmatic considerations. The conclusion of this 
sub-section is that Harsanyi’s approach fails to show that there is an introspective method 
by which we can make intersubjectively valid IUCs.
5. Against pragmatic solutions
Let us take stock. The central question about IUCs is the question of whether or not we 
can have scientific knowledge of, or scientifically justified, ICs of preference strength. 
Recall that, in the ‘standard picture’, the problem arises because IUCs are underdetermined 
by choice behavioural evidence. Since underdetermination is only relative to a body of 
evidence E, the most natural reaction consists in trying to ground IUCs on a larger body of 
evidence E+. The surprising result is that, even when we ideally dispose of the richest 
empirical basis Emax, as in the cases considered by Christian List, IUCs remain 
underdetermined by the empirical evidence. This means that IUCs are empirically 
meaningless in a particularly robust way.
Empirical meaninglessness threatens the possibility of having scientific knowledge of, 
or, at least, scientifically justified, IUCs. From an evidentialist point of view, the same 
empirical evidence supports two incompatible beliefs about how different people’s 
preferences compare in terms of strength. From a reliabilist point of view, the empirical 
evidence casts doubt on the reliability of processes of belief formation that can give raise to 
incompatible beliefs about how different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength. 
However, empirical meaninglessness does not entirely compromise the possibility of a
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positive solution. After all, empirical meaningfulness is, at best, only a sufficient condition 
for having scientifically justified IUCs. Although a purely empirical basis does not 
guarantee the satisfaction of the conditions required for scientific justification, other, non- 
empirical, considerations may be added to meet the requirement.
The authors considered in the previous sections propose to add similar, although not 
identical, non-empirical principles in order to determine IUCs. In his 1955 paper, Harsanyi 
suggests adding two non-empirical principles: the “principle of unwarranted 
differentiation”, according to which “if two objects or human beings show similar 
behaviour in all their relevant aspects open to observation, the assumption of some 
unobservable hidden difference between them must be regarded as a completely gratuitous 
hypothesis and one contrary to sound scientific method”42, in order to deal with the 
“metaphysical problem”; and “the principle of unwarranted correlation”, according to 
which unchangeable variables have no influence on preferences, in order to deal with the 
“psychological problem”.
In the wake of the early Harsanyi, in his 1972 paper, Waldner rejects the hypothesis that 
some individuals may be more “sensitive” than others by resorting to “the principle of not 
postulating any differences unless there is some reason to do so”43. In his 1977 paper, 
instead, Harsanyi somehow combines the “principle of unwarranted differentiation” and 
“the principle of unwarranted correlation” into a single “similarity postulate”, according to 
which “once proper allowances have been made for the empirically given differences in 
taste, education, etc., between me and another person, then it is reasonable for me to 
assume that our basic psychological reactions to any given alternative will be otherwise 
much the same”44. Finally, in his 2003 paper, List suggests basing the choice between 
alternative ways of accounting for people’s behaviour, in order to make IUCs, on a 
commonsensical “principle of parsimony”.
These principles have two things in common. The first is that they serve the purpose of 
breaking the underdetermination of IUCs by the empirical evidence. The idea is that, if the 
union of an empirical and a non-empirical basis determines IUCs, then IUCs can be 
scientifically justified, provided that all the other requirements fixed by scientific standards 
are met. The second thing is that these non-empirical principles are justified on the basis of 
an inference to the best explanation type of argument. In other words, it is argued that their 
acceptance leads to better explanations of people’s behaviour. In turn, the goodness of an 
explanation is assessed in terms of considerations of simplicity, parsimony and explanatory
42 See Ha r sa n y i, J. [1955], p. 317. [Emphasis in the original]
43 See W a ld n er , I. [1972], p. 102.
44 See Harsanyi, J. [1982], p. 50.
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power. Since these are virtues that allegedly characterise good scientific practice, we can 
say that the adoption of these principles is vindicated by showing that it conforms to good 
scientific practice. To summarise, the accounts examined so far suggest that IUCs can be 
scientifically justified if they are determined on the basis of the union of an empirical basis 
and a non-empirical basis, whose adoption conforms to good scientific practice. This 
approach is the most common in the literature on IUCs. However, I shall argue that it is not 
successful.
The first objection concerns the epistemic value of pragmatic virtues such as simplicity 
and parsimony. As we have seen, the underdetermination of IUCs by the empirical 
evidence implies that there are at least two empirically equivalent, but incompatible, 
theories: a theory Ti, which assumes that interpersonal utilities are co-scaled, and a theory 
T2 , which assumes that interpersonal utilities are not co-scaled. A pragmatic argument of 
the kind under discussion adjudicates between the two by reference to some pragmatic 
advantages (simplicity and parsimony) that one theory (Ti), the one embracing non- 
empirical principles, has over the other theory (T2), the one which does not. Parsimony and 
simplicity are certainly theoretical virtues. As such, they have pragmatic value. For 
instance, they can play a relevant role in theory choice, in the case of empirical 
underdetermination. However, in the case of IUCs, they do not merely have a 
methodological role, but also an epistemic role. This means that if a theory Ti is simpler 
than an alternative theory T2 , then believing Ti is epistemically justified. In virtue of what 
is this the case? One may argue that a more pragmatically advantageous theory is not just 
instrumentally preferable, in the sense that it is better than its alternatives with respect to 
the uses for which it is intended, but is also epistemically preferable, in the sense that it is 
more likely to be true. In other words, pragmatic virtues would be reliable means to arrive 
at true statements about the world. However -  the objection goes -  this may be extremely 
difficult to prove. It is questionable whether or not parsimony and simplicity have any 
epistemic value at all. That is, it is questionable whether they can be used to infer 
something about how the world really is45. In the case of IUCs, this implies that the 
adoption of non-empirical principles on the basis of pragmatic virtues has, at best, 
methodological value, but no epistemic value at all. As a consequence, IUCs may be, at 
best, intersubjectively agreed upon, but not scientifically justified.
Although worth discussing, I shall not pursue this line of criticism here. I think there are 
independent grounds for rejecting this strategy. My argument shall try to prove that, even if
45 However, it is worth pointing out that several attempts have indeed been made to show that pragmatic 
virtues do have epistemic value. See SOBER, E. [2001] and [2003].
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pragmatic considerations have epistemic value, they do not vindicate the adoption of non- 
empirical principles to break the underdetermination of IUCs by the empirical evidence, 
because the theory Ti, which assumes that interpersonal utilities are co-scaled, is not the 
most pragmatically advantageous theory.
Let us start with explanatory power. For the purpose at stake, we can leave the notion of 
explanatory power at a fairly intuitive level and say that it concerns the extent to which a 
theory is capable of explaining the phenomena that falls within its range. Let us consider 
the following question: does Ti explain more aspects of individual behaviour than T2 ? The 
answer is negative. The explanatory power of both theories is the same, despite the fact that 
they differ with respect to the assumptions of whether or not interpersonal utilities are co­
scaled. The fact that T 1 allows one to make IUCs does not add anything to the power of the 
explanation. Let us see why.
One of the goals in the explanation of human behaviour is to account for individual 
behaviour in terms of causal entities and processes. In the case under consideration, this 
means explaining behaviour in terms of individual preferences, their causal property of 
strength and their relation with other mental states. Typically, empirical evidence offers a 
ground for positing entities and properties insofar they can causally explain that very same 
evidence. Although non-causal properties can have pragmatic relevance, the explanatory 
power of a theory is typically based on the extent to which the entities and properties 
postulated by the theory are able to causally account for the empirical evidence.
This poses a problem for IUCs. The property of being interpersonally comparable in 
terms of strength is not a causal property of preferences. That is, comparability plays no 
causal role in accounting for individual behaviour. As a consequence, Ti and T2 share the 
same causal properties, since they differ only with respect to the assumptions made about 
interpersonal comparability. Therefore, they have the same explanatory power. IUCs do not 
add anything to the explanatory power of a theory about individual behaviour46.
This conclusion can be challenged. One may object that, contrary to what I have 
claimed, IUCs do add something to the explanation. For instance, if IUCs can be 
meaningfully made, we can offer allegedly comparative explanations of the following kind: 
individual i shows moderate appreciation rather than repulsion for tomato soup because he 
prefers tomato soup more than individual j. The first clause highlights a feature of 
individual Vs behaviour (i.e. appreciation for tomato soup) by comparing it with a feature
46 This explains why the collection of further empirical evidence is typically used for purposes different from 
the ascription of degrees of interpersonal comparability. On the one hand, further evidence helps improve the 
understanding of the content of an individual’s preferences. On the other hand, it helps refine the ascription of 
each individual’s relative preferential strength for different options. It is not used to ground interpersonal 
comparability, because interpersonal comparability does not contribute to increasing explanatory power.
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of individual / s behaviour (i.e. repulsion for tomato soup). The second clause allegedly 
explains individual /’ s behaviour by means of an interpersonal comparison of utility levels 
(i.e. individual i prefers tomato soup more than individual j).
What kind of explanation do statements like this provide? Let us keep in mind that what 
we want to explain is individual behaviour, that is, in our case, individual f  s choice and 
expressive behaviour. Clearly, we can compare two individuals’ behaviour. For instance, 
we can compare individual f  s and individual /  s choices and expressive reactions. 
However, on the one hand, the interpersonal comparison of their behaviour does not imply 
anything about how the preferences that are supposed to explain each individual’s 
behaviour compare in terms of strength. On the other hand, and most importantly, it is 
unclear how IUCs are supposed to explain individual i ’ s  and individual f s  behaviour. The 
claim that individual i prefers tomato soup more than individual j  is not explanatory. 
Rather, it suggests an explanation, i.e. an explanation of individual i ’s  behaviour in terms of 
the relative intensity of his preferences. If there were a common scale of preference 
strength and if we were to know the relative intensity with which individual j  prefers the 
various options in the preference domain, then the claim that individual i prefers tomato 
soup more than individual j  would allow the following inference: individual Vs preference 
for tomato soup is relatively less distant, in terms of strength, from the option that he 
prefers the most than it is for individual j. This would explain why their observable 
behaviour differs. However, this defence of the explanatory role of IUCs ignores one thing: 
we can equally explain individual Vs behaviour and why it differs from individual f s  
behaviour in terms of relative preference strength, without assuming anything about how Vs 
preferences compare with f s .  Therefore, the assumption that different individuals’ utilities 
are co-scaled is not necessary.
Let us now consider parsimony. I shall take parsimony to be defined with respect to the 
number and/or kinds of properties postulated. Thus, the most parsimonious theory is the 
one that explains the evidence with the least number and/or kinds of property assumptions. 
However, the assumption that utilities are co-scaled does not lead to a more parsimonious 
theory. Let us consider again the example illustrated in the first chapter. Suppose U[(y) = 
uj(x) = 0.6 on the basis of a broader empirical basis. The empirical evidence is consistent 
with two incompatible theories, Ti and T2 . On the one hand, Ti holds that utilities are co­
scaled and, thereby, that i and j  have the same preference strengths. Call the attitude 
conveyed by Ti one of ‘optimism’. On the other hand, T2 holds that utilities are not co­
scaled and, thereby, that 2 and j  have not the same preference strengths. Call the attitude 
conveyed by T2 one of ‘scepticism’. If Ti and T2 are the only theories available, it is hard
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not to conclude that the first is more parsimonious than the second. It characterizes the 
individuals’ behaviour by assuming that their preferences share the same, comparable, 
property of strength. In other words, it does not postulate any hidden difference in 
preference strengths when the empirical evidence is identical for both individuals. This is 
precisely what the principles seen above recommend. If so, it looks like their adoption does 
indeed lead to a more parsimonious theory, and is, therefore, justified.
However, there is another theory, T3 , that is compatible with the empirical evidence. T3 
registers the fact that the individuals’ utilities are numerically identical, but does not infer 
anything as to whether or not they are comparable. In other words, T3 does not take any 
position about IUCs. Call the attitude conveyed by T3 one of ‘neutrality’. Neutrality is a 
legitimate position, because the assumption of interpersonal comparability is simply not 
required for the explanation of individual behaviour. Since comparability plays no role, it is 
possible to remain agnostic about whether people’s utilities are co-scaled or not. If what we 
care about is just parsimony, then the question to ask is the following: is it more 
parsimonious to have a theory that does not postulate any differences between individuals’ 
utilities or to have a theory that does not postulate anything at all? Strictly speaking, the 
latter is more parsimonious than the former both with respect to the number and the kinds 
of properties postulated and, therefore, it should be favoured. I admit that we might have 
conflicting intuitions here. However, the fact that the issue cannot be easily solved is 
enough to reject parsimony as a conclusive reason in favour of the adoption of non- 
empirical principles in order to show that IUCs are scientifically justified.
Finally, let us consider simplicity. It is generally difficult to define what simplicity 
amounts to. One account reduces simplicity to parsimony. In this case, the previous 
remarks apply. An alternative account constructs simplicity as elegance, which, in turn, can 
be defined in terms of the ease with which a theory favours computation or decision­
making. Is a theory (Ti) that assumes co-scaled utilities simpler than either a sceptical (T2) 
or a neutral (T3) theory? In order to answer this question, we need to consider the purposes 
for which such a theory can be used. Suppose we use Ti to explain individual behaviour. 
Since the assumption that different people’s utilities are on the same scale plays no role in 
accounting for individual behaviour, it follows that it does not make computation any easier 
for explanatory purposes. Therefore, insofar as the criterion of simplicity is the ease in the 
calculation, TI cannot be deemed simpler than T2 or T3 .
Suppose now that we use Ti to take a decision affecting the interests of two or more 
individuals. In this case, the situation appears to be different. Undoubtedly, a theory that 
assumes that utilities are co-scaled considerably simplifies decision-making. However, in
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the case under consideration, the justification based on simplicity ceases to be purely 
pragmatic and becomes rather close to a normative justification. We do not count as 
simpler a theory assuming interpersonal utility comparability merely because it leads to a 
decision; rather simplicity is valuable to the extent that it leads, or it favours reaching, 
decisions that are considered fair  or even-handed. If this is true, however, it is fairness, or 
even-handedness, which provides the ultimate justification for the assumption that utilities 
are on the same scale. Simplicity plays a mere instrumental role. Assuming that people’s 
utilities are co-scaled is justified only insofar as this helps us reach fair or even-handed 
results. Therefore, the justification is not pragmatic, but normative.
The conclusion is the following. The inference to the best explanation argument for the 
adoption of the non-empirical principles seen above fails. None of the pragmatic virtues 
considered offers conclusive grounds for the acceptance of a non-empirical basis for IUCs. 
Ultimately, this means that this strategy fails to demonstrate that IUCs can be scientifically 
justified and, a fortiori, that we can have scientific knowledge of how preferences compare 
in terms of strength.
6. Conclusion
The problem of IUCs is the problem of whether or not we can have knowledge of, or 
scientifically justified, IUCs. In this chapter, I considered solutions that appeal to an 
inference to the best explanation type of argument. The underlying idea is that IUCs can be 
scientifically justified if they are determined on the basis of the union of an empirical basis 
and a non-empirical basis, whose adoption conforms to good scientific practice. In turn, 
scientific practice is good if it is based on pragmatic virtues such as simplicity, parsimony 
and explanatory power.
I examined two approaches pursuing this strategy, namely, a third-person approach and 
a first-person approach. I argued that both approaches fail because the adoption of a non- 
empirical basis to determine IUCs is not pragmatically advantageous and, thereby, does not 
conform to good scientific practice. As an instance of the first-person approach, I 
considered the later Harsanyi’s position. I argued that his proposal fails also on other 
grounds: his extended preference approach is both redundant and conflates the object of 
preferences with their causes.
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CHAPTER 3 
The argument from nativism
1. Introduction
One interesting feature of at least some of the more economic-oriented solutions to 
the problem of IUCs is that they make reference to the explanation of how ordinary 
people supposedly make ICs of preference strength in everyday life. Since this 
explanatory problem concerns mental states (i.e. preferences) and one of their properties 
(i.e. strength) in particular, one would expect the existence of a large literature in 
philosophy of mind addressing the issue. Instead, and quite surprisingly, philosophers of 
mind have almost completely ignored this explanatory problem. One significant 
exception is constituted by Alvin Goldman, who has attempted to bring the problem of 
IUCs in line with current debates in philosophy of mind and epistemology1.
Typically, people’s everyday practice of comparing mental states is viewed as a two- 
step process. First, they ascribe mental states to different targets (and, in some cases, to 
themselves). Second, they compare the targets’ mental states with respect to strength. If 
this picture is correct, the explanation of how ordinary people make ICs of preferences 
should build on the explanation of how they ascribe preference strengths to other people 
and to themselves. For this purpose, we need to examine two different kinds of 
problems: the problem of the meaning of mental states, that is, the problem of what 
ordinary people mean when they employ mental terms2; and the problem of 
mindreading, that is, the problem of how ordinary people assigns mental states to other 
people.
There are two main theories of the meaning of mental states in current philosophy of 
mind: (commonsense) functionalism and experientialism. For introductory purposes, we 
can briefly describe these accounts in the following way. According to functionalism, 
the meaning of a mental state is given by the set of causal laws in which such a mental 
state figures and which relate it to inputs, other mental states and behavioural outputs.
1 See G o ld m a n , A. [1995a].
2 It is worth emphasising that the problem of the meaning o f mental states differs from the problem of the 
nature of mental states. The former is a semantic problem, concerning what ordinary people mean when 
they employ mental terms. The latter is a metaphysical problem, concerning what mental states really are. 
This difference is often missed because there are as many theory of the meaning of mental terms as there 
are theories of their nature.
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Instead, according to experientialism, the meaning of a mental state is given by the more 
or less conscious experiences that the subject has of it.
On the other hand, there are two alternative explanations of mental ascription: 
Theory Theory (TT) and Simulation Theory (ST). According to the former, ordinary 
people ascribe mental states to others by means of a ‘theory of mind’ that they, more or 
less tacitly, possess. According to the latter, ordinary people ascribe mental states to 
others by trying to replicate, or simulate, their mental life. As it has been recently shown 
in several papers3, both mindreading accounts can be characterised at two different 
levels, namely, the sub-personal level of description and the personal level of 
description. The former level is concerned with the question of what the information- 
processing mechanisms are that underpin our folk psychological practice of mental 
ascription4. The personal level of description focuses on the way in which persons, as 
such, think about or interpret other people’s mental and overt behaviour5.
In this chapter, I want to pursue two goals. The first is to show how philosophy of 
mind can contribute to the debate about IUCs by extending Goldman’s analysis. For the 
present purpose, Goldman’s approach has two limitations. It focuses explicitly on ICs of 
happiness only and it is very specific. In particular, Goldman embraces experientialism 
as a theory of the meaning of mental states, ST as a theory of mindreading and 
reliabilism as a theory of justification. In this chapter, I shall extend Goldman’s analysis 
by focusing on ICs of preference strength and by considering also functionalism as a 
theory of the meaning of mental states, TT as theory of mindreading and evidentialism 
as a theory of justification. Like Goldman, I shall be concerned only with the sub­
personal level of description.
My second goal is to assess whether or not philosophy of mind can help us find a 
successful solution to the problem of IUCs. I shall devote a special interest to 
Goldman’s own argument from nativism. According to it, the assumption that different 
people’s utilities are co-scaled is justified if the assumption that ICs of preference 
strength are performed through innate mechanisms that are either hyper-similar across 
individuals or very closely representative of the workings of other individuals’ mind- 
systems is sound. I shall argue that, when the notion of innate cognitive capacity or 
mechanism is properly spelt out, this argument reduces to an inference to the best
3 See Heal, J. [1994], [1998a], and [2000], Davies, M. [2000], Davies, M. and T., Stone [2000] and 
[2001].
4 See Goldman , A. [1989], [1992], [1995b], [2000], Gallese, V. and A. Goldman, [1998], Stich, S. 
and S., N ichols, [1992], [1995], [1996], [1997], N ichols et al. [1996] and N ichols, S. and S., Stich 
[1998] and [2003].
5 See Heal , J. [1994], [1998a,b] and [2000], Gordon, R. [1992].
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explanation kind of argument. Therefore, this strategy fails to show that ICs of 
preference strength can be scientifically justified.
I shall proceed as follows. In section 2 ,1 shall give a more detailed illustration of the 
main theories about the meaning of mental states. In section 3, I shall illustrate the 
general features of TT and ST. In section 4, I shall illustrate the way in which both 
accounts may explain how the folks form their beliefs about how different people’s 
preferences compare in terms of strength. In section 5 ,1 shall have a closer look at the 
conditions that ought to be satisfied for such beliefs to be scientifically justified. In 
section 6 , I shall discuss the argument from nativism and ultimately reject it. I shall 
summarise my results in section 7.
2. The problem of meaning
Let us start by considering the two main theories of the meaning of mental states in 
contemporary philosophy of mind. The first is commonsense (or analytic) 
functionalism6. Historically, this account descends from logical behaviourism and 
dispositionalism. According to the former doctrine, mental states have a purely 
behaviourist meaning. For instance, preferences mean nothing but choice behaviour. 
Instead, according to the latter doctrine, mental states are conceived as dispositions 
towards some behavioural output. For instance, according to a narrow dispositional 
account, the meaning of preference is that of a disposition towards choice behaviour. On 
the other hand, according to a broad dispositional account, the meaning of preference is 
that of a disposition not only towards choice behaviour, but also towards other 
behavioural expressions.
As philosophers of mind have recognised long time ago, both accounts face some 
problems. Let us consider dispositionalism as a paradigmatic example. According to 
this doctrine, when we say that an individual prefers taking the umbrella rather than not 
taking it, we mean that the individual has a disposition to perform an action of the 
relevant type in suitable circumstances. However, this is the case only provided that we 
also assume that the individual’s other relevant mental states remain the same. Indeed, 
when we say that an individual prefers taking the umbrella rather than not taking it, we 
would not mean that the individual has a disposition to perform the relevant action if we 
also thought that the individual believes that such an object is a baseball bat.
6 See Lewis, D. [1972].
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The lesson is that the meaning of mental states cannot be defined independently from 
other mental states. Thus, some philosophers of mind have recommended the adoption 
of a different, functionalist, account of the meaning of mental states. Such an account 
takes into consideration the interdependencies between different mental states, while, at 
the same time, preserving a moderate behaviourist account of their meaning. More 
precisely, according to functionalism, the meaning of a mental state is given by the set 
of causal laws in which that mental state figures. Such causal laws specify how each 
mental state is related to environmental inputs, other mental states and behavioural 
outputs. The meaning of a mental state is then entirely exhausted by the causal relations 
in which it figures7. It may be the case that the agent employing mental concepts is 
incapable of specifying all these constitutive causal relations. Indeed, this may require a 
sophisticated analysis. If we think of the defining causal relations as forming a theory 
that the agent possesses, then we can say that such a theory operates tacitly, or, 
equivalently, that the theory is tacit.
There are at least two reasons to be interested in the prospects that functionalism 
offers for solving the problem of IUCs. First, functionalism has been the dominant view 
of the meaning of mental states, in philosophy of mind, for the past thirty years. 
Recently, attempts have been made to characterise preferences as well in functionalist 
terms8. It is natural to ask how this affects the traditional debate about IUCs. Second, 
since the origin of decision theory, beliefs and degrees of belief have been typically 
given a functionalist understanding9. Thus, conceiving preferences and degrees of 
preference along the same line is a way of maintaining a consistent understanding of the 
meaning of mental states.
Preferences can be defined in functionalist terms as mental states that are causally 
related to certain inputs, and that, in combination with other mental states, produce 
certain behavioural outputs10. What are these causal relations? According to some 
authors, decision theory is the research area that attempts to specify some of the relevant 
relations11. In particular, decision theory conceives preferences as mental states that lead
7 Thus, the functionalist theory of the meaning of mental states goes beyond the dispositional theory in 
one crucial respect: it includes the relationship with environmental inputs and with other mental states as 
part of the definition of a mental term, in addition with its relationship with behavioural outputs.
See Pettit , P. [2006].
9 See Ramsey , F. P. [1990].
10 The relation that preferences have with both inputs and outputs may turn out to be indirect, that is, 
mediated by other mental states that are connected to preferences.
11 See Lew is, D. [1986] and PETTIT, P. [1991], reprinted in PETTIT, P. [2002], and [2006].
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to choices, in combination with beliefs and desires12. If we define preferences in 
functionalist terms, the property of preferential strength can be seen as a causal property 
of preferences. In other words, preference strength is the causally efficacious property 
that leads an individual to behave in a certain way, when subject to specific 
circumstances and in the presence of other mental states.
Functionalism is not unchallenged13. For instance, Goldman discusses three general 
difficulties that a functionalist account faces14. First, functionalism has trouble in 
specifying the laws in which mental states are supposedly embedded. The fact that even 
the “experts”, e.g. philosophers and social scientists, have poor explicit knowledge of 
the causal relations that define mental terms seems to cast doubt on whether ordinary 
people’s understanding of mental concepts is governed by knowledge, even if implicit, 
of functional laws.
Second, functionalism seems to be unable to capture the qualitative features of some 
of, or perhaps all, our mental states. Consider the ‘inverted spectrum’ problem. Two 
individuals may be functionally identical and yet they may have radically different 
subjective mental experiences. For instance, although functionally identical, they may 
have colour experiences that lie at the opposite poles of the colour spectrum. If this is a 
genuine possibility, it appears that functionalism sanctions the use of identical mental 
terms for mental states that are drastically different, because of its inability to register 
qualitative differences between mental states.
Third, functionalism does not seem to offer a plausible account of self-ascription of 
mental states. In order for an individual to classify one of his own mental states as, for 
instance, a headache, functionalism requires that he be able to identify the causes of 
such a headache, the relationship with other, both occurrent and non-occurrent, mental 
states and the behavioural headache expressions. This seems to burden self-ascription 
with excessive computational requirements. At least phenomenologically, it seems 
plausible that the individual can identify a mental state of his as a headache without 
undergoing this complex series of computations.
12 Roughly speaking, there are three possible ways to conceive the relationship between desires and 
preferences. First, one can be eliminativist about preferences and claim that the notion of preferences is 
syncategoramatic. It is simply a way to conveniently describe an individual’s desires and their relations. 
However, there are no real mental states corresponding to preferences. Second, one can be reductivist and 
claim that preferences are real mental states but mental states that reduce to desires in one sense or 
another, e.g. they constitute a specific, e.g. relational, class of desires. Finally, one can maintain that 
preferences are derivative on desires, in the sense that they are related to, and determined by, them; but 
they do not reduce to desires, except in the loose sense that they are both pro-attitudes of some sort. I 
think that the functionalist position fits more comfortably with the latter position, which I shall thereby 
adopt in what follows.
13 The locus classicus for a critique of functionalism is BLOCK, N. [1980],
14 See Goldman, A. [1993] and [1995a].
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In opposition to functionalism, Goldman recommends the adoption of an 
experientialist theory of the meaning of mental states. According to it, the meaning of a 
mental state is given by the more or less conscious experiences that the subject has of 
it15. An equivalent definition is that the meaning of a mental state is given by the agent’s 
experience of ‘what it is like’ to have that mental state. Thus, according to this account, 
mental states are phenomenologically real and the agent has introspective -  privileged, 
although not infallible -  access to them. Likewise, the strength of a mental state is a real 
psychic magnitude, which the subject experiences and can introspectively discriminate.
Preferences can be defined in experientialist terms as mental states that give raise to 
certain experiences in a subject. It may be the case that there is no unique phenomenal 
experience that different individuals have in common when they are in a preference- 
state. However, it is enough that there is a family of experiences that are sufficiently 
similar to constitute a preference-type. According to an experientialist understanding, 
then, preference strength is a felt property, a qualitative experience of the individual that 
has preferences. The subject has introspective access and can discriminate the strengths 
of his preferences. As such, the meaning of preference strength arises “from points or 
intervals on the experiential scale” 16 that the term denotes.
There is at least one direct reason to be interested in experientialism for the problem 
of IUCs, together with the indirect reasons provided by the limits of functionalism. 
According to Goldman, experientialism offers a better account of what people means 
when they make ICs of preferences than functionalism and, ultimately, promises a 
solution to the problem of IUCs in combination with an ST account of mindreading.
3. The problem of mindreading
The explanation of mental ascription at the sub-personal level of description is 
concerned with the question of what information-processing mechanisms should be 
posited in order to explain the folks’ mindreading capacity, that is, the capacity to 
ascribe mental states to other people.
TT characteristically accounts for this cognitive capacity by positing cognitive 
processes that exploit “an internally represented "knowledge structure" - typically a 
body of rules or principles or propositions - which serves to guide the execution of the
15 See particularly the account offered by GOLDMAN, A. [1995a].
16 G o ld m a n , A. [1995a], p. 713.
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capacity to be explained”17. In short, TT explains mental ascription by arguing that the 
folks possess a ‘theory of mind’ (ToM), to which they have a more or less conscious 
access18. Nichols and Stich represent boxologically the basic architecture of each 
agent’s mind-system, under the TT hypothesis, in the following way19.
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As far as the meaning of mental states is concerned, TT is generally associated with 
analytic functionalism, according to which the meaning of a mental state is given by the
17 See Stic h , S. and S., N ichols [1992], pp. 35-36. See also, Stic h , S. and S., N ichols [1995] and
[1997], N ichols et al. [1996] and N ich o ls , S. and S., Stich  [2003].
18 There are two variants of the TT approach to mindreading, namely, the scientific-theory theory (STT) 
and the modularity theory (MT). According to the former, the ToM that the folks use for mindreading is 
both learnt and stored in the mind in the same way as scientific theories are. In the course of their 
development, children proceeds as little scientists, formulating hypotheses on the basis of the information 
available and revising them in the light of new data. In other words, the ToM that the folks possess is 
included in the belief box. According to the latter, the ToM is neither learnt nor stored in the same way as 
scientific theories are, but it is rather included in one or more innate modules. As such, the ToM that the 
folks possess is connected, but distinct, from the belief box. For the purpose of this thesis, however, we 
can ignore the distinction between the two approaches. See WELLMAN, H. [1990], PERNER, J. [1991], 
GOPNIK, J. and H., W ellm an  [1992], [1994], Go pnik , J. and A. N., M eltzo ff  [1997] for a defence of the 
STT approach. See Le slie , A. [1987], [1988], [1994], [2000], Leslie , A. and T., G erm a n  [1995] and 
B a r o n -Co h e n , S. [1995] for a defence of the MT approach.
19 This figure is borrowed from STICH, S. and S., NICHOLS [1992].
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set of causal laws in which such a mental state figures20. As far as mental ascription is 
concerned, TT assumes that the folks ascribe mental states to other people by observing 
external events (i.e. inputs and outputs) and inferring the relevant mental states by 
reference to the causal relations postulated by the ToM that they possess.
ST offers an alternative account of mental ascription. First of all, let us distinguish 
two different kinds of simulation, namely, simulation in reality and simulation in 
imagination. In the former case, simulation involves replicating the behaviour of an 
object in specific circumstances by using an object of the same kind in similar 
circumstances. By contrast, in the latter case, simulation takes place in imagination and 
involves replicating the behaviour of an object in specific circumstances by imagining 
how the object would behave in similar circumstances. Mental simulation is an instance 
of simulation in imagination, since it involves replicating another individual’s mental 
life in specific circumstances by imagining being subject to the same or relevantly 
similar circumstances.
The basic idea is that the folks ascribe mental states to other people by taking their 
own information-processing mechanisms ‘off-line’ and feeding them with pretend 
inputs, which correspond to the other people’s initial mental states. The relevant 
mechanisms run ‘off-line’ and produce pretend outputs, which correspond to the other 
people’s targeted mental states. For instance, when the goal is to predict another 
individual’s behaviour, the relevant information-processing mechanism is the practical 
reasoning system and the pretend inputs are pretend beliefs and desires. Under the ST 
hypothesis, each agent’s mental system can be represented boxologically in the 
following way21.
20 However, functionalism is compatible with two different accounts of third-person mental ascriptions. 
On the one hand, it is compatible with the theory-theory approach under discussion. On the other hand, it 
is compatible with a theory-driven simulation approach. In both approaches, the interpreter employs 
mental concepts that are defined with respect to the role that they have in the underlying theory.
21 This figure is borrowed from STICH, S. and S., NICHOLS [1997].
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The main proponent of a simulationist approach at the sub-personal level of 
description is Alvin Goldman22. According to Goldman, the folks simulate other 
people’s mental life by using themselves as “analogue models”. The simulator, first, 
asks himself what mental states he would have if he were subject to the initial mental 
states of the simulated agent; then, he introspects his own mental states and ascribes 
them -  by analogy -  to the simulated agent23.
We can characterize Goldman’s account with respect to three dimensions:
(1) the level of information;
(2) the direction of gaze;
(3) the epistemological status.
22 See, in particular, Goldman, A. [1989], [1992], [2002], [2006].
23 See Goldman, A. [1989].
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With respect to the first dimension, Goldman’s account conceives mental simulation 
as characteristically “process-driven”. This means that mental simulation does not rely 
upon any body of knowledge (or, at most, it relies upon a very minimal body of 
knowledge), but simply uses the same processes of the targeted object24. This view 
contrasts with the view of simulation as “theory-driven”, that is, as relying upon a body 
of knowledge, which may be either explicit or tacit and more or less rich.
With respect to the second dimension, Goldman’s view is, as Davies and Stone put it, 
that “the gaze of the simulator [is] first inward and then outward to the person being 
simulated and it [is] the inward gaze that distinguishes] simulation from the use of a 
third-personal empirical theory about psychological processes”25. This view contrasts 
with the one advanced by authors such as Gordon and Heal, according to whom, as 
Davies and Stone put it, “the simulator’s gaze is neither inward nor upon the person 
being simulated but, primarily, upon the (imagined) circumstances about which the
0f\person being simulated is thinking” .
Finally, with respect to the third dimension, Goldman presents ST as an empirical 
hypothesis within cognitive science. As such, it draws upon empirical research and can 
be either confirmed or discontinued by it. This view contrasts with aprioristic accounts, 
such as the one offered by Heal, according to which ST is an a priori hypothesis, which 
cannot be discontinued by empirical research.
Goldman’s account presupposes that the simulator is capable of introspecting his 
own mental states in order to ascribe mental states to another individual by analogy. 
One possibility is that the simulator recognises his own mental states with respect to the 
function that they occupy in his mind-system. However, this possibility is precluded, 
since it would precipitate mental ascription into a “theory-driven” simulation and 
collapse Goldman’s ST account into a TT account. As far as the meaning of mental 
states is concerned, Goldman adopts an experientialist view27. According to Goldman, 
“experientialism is “the traditional view that mental language gets its meaning, 
primarily and in the first instance, from episodes of conscious experience of which the
24 See Go ld m a n , A. [1989].
25 See Da v ies , M. and T., Ston e  [2000], p. 2 at http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/~mdavies/papers/simrep.pdf.
26 See D a vies , M. and T., Ston e  [2000], p. 2 at http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/~mdavies/papers/simrep.pdf.
27 See G o ld m a n , A. [1993]. It is worth noticing that Goldman has recently changed his mind about the 
meaning of mental states. At present, he defends the view that mental concepts pick out categorical 
properties of mental states that are nonetheless not phenomenal properties. See G o ld m a n , A. [2002] and 
[2006]. Here I shall still focus on the version of ST associated with experientialism for two reasons. The 
first is that this is the best developed version of ST. The second is that Goldman’s most recent account of 
the meaning of mental states is not yet elaborated in sufficient details to provide a basis for an accurate 
discussion of the problem of ICs of preference strength.
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agent is more or less directly aware”28. This means that the simulator recognises his 
own mental states on the basis of their phenomenology, that is, on the basis of ‘what it 
is like’ to have them in specific circumstances.
4. Mindreading and the problem of IUCs
Let us now examine more closely the relationship between the problem of 
mindreading and the problem of IUCs. The first question to ask is the following. In 
what way can TT and ST explain, at the sub-personal level of description, how the folks 
form their beliefs about how different people’s preferences compare in terms of 
strength?
Let us consider TT first. Suppose for simplicity that the judge is one of the two 
individuals whose preferences are to be compared in terms of strength. As seen above, 
TT is typically associated with a functionalist understanding of mental states. If we 
adopt such a view of preferences, TT may account for the judge’s beliefs in the 
following way. The first step concerns third-person mental ascription. The judge 
observes the relevant external events (i.e. instances of the input-types and output-types 
that are included in the definition of preferences) and infers both the other relevant 
mental states (i.e. tokens of the mental state-types that are included in the definition of 
preferences) and the relevant preferences, by reference to the causal relations postulated 
by the ToM that he -  more or less tacitly -  possesses.
The second step concerns first-person mental ascription. Orthodox TT suggests that 
first-person mental ascription entirely parallels third-person mental ascription. This 
means that self-ascription is based on inferences mediated by the ToM that the subject 
possesses. Less orthodox TT approaches relax this position by conjecturing that first- 
person mental ascription may involve the use of recognitional devices or mechanisms -  
which either make the use of the ToM invisible, but not completely irrelevant, or 
confine it to certain specific purposes -  and ends up with the self-ascription of both the 
relevant mental states and the relevant preferences. However the core idea of TT 
remains that the judge ascribes preferences with a specific content and strength both to 
himself and to the other individual on the basis of the ToM in his possession. Finally, in 
the last stage, he compares the intensity of his preferences with the intensity of the other 
individuals’ preferences.
28 See G old m a n , A. [1995a], p. 712.
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Let us now consider ST. As seen above, Goldman’s approach is associated with an 
experientialist understanding of mental states. If we adopt such an experientialist view, 
it is immediately clear that the comparison of two individuals’ preference strengths 
presents a serious problem. Each individual has introspective access to, and ability to 
discriminate, the intensity of his own preferences only. However, neither individual can 
introspect the other individual’s preference strengths. This seems to threaten the very 
possibility of making ICs of preference strength. The matter is even more complicated if 
the comparison is performed by a judge, since a third party cannot access either 
individual’s preference strengths.
The problem generalises. If the observer must be able to introspect another 
individual’s mind in order to ascribe mental states to him, then, since the observer has 
introspective access to his own mental states only, it follows that third-person ascription 
of mental states is impossible. The upshot is not only that ICs are impossible, and, a 
fortiori, cannot be scientifically justified; it is also a full-blown scepticism about the 
existence of other people’s minds. Nevertheless, this formulation of the problem 
suggests a possible way out. Since we do make both third-person mental ascriptions and 
ICs of the intensity of other individuals’ mental states, perhaps if we explain how we 
attribute mental states to other people, we may also explain how we make ICs of 
preference strength.
Goldman follows this strategy. According to him, the problem of ICs of preferences 
is a particular case of the more general problem of third-person mindreading. In general, 
ST holds that the folks ascribe mental states to other people by running their practical 
reasoning system ‘off-line’, after feeding it with pretend mental states corresponding to 
the other agent’s initial mental states. Once again, suppose for simplicity that the 
comparer is one of the two individuals whose preferences are to be compared in terms 
of strength. Goldman’s account explains how the simulator makes ICs of preference 
strength in the following way. The first step concerns third-person mental ascription. 
The simulator introspects what preferences he would have if he were to have the 
simulated agent’s initial mental states. By so doing, he recreates in imagination the 
same qualitative experiences of the individual whose preference strengths he wants to 
compare and discriminates them through introspection. Then, the simulator classifies 
these experiences as experiences of preferences with a specific intensity and ascribes 
such preference strengths to the other agent by analogy. The second step concerns first- 
person mental ascription. The simulator introspects his own preferences, discriminates 
their intensities and ascribes the detected preference strengths to himself. Finally, in the
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last step, the simulator compares the intensity of his own preferences with the intensity 
of the simulated agent’s preferences.
It is worth noticing that both TT and ST set only minimal conditions for the 
possibility of forming beliefs about how different people’s preferences compare in terms 
of strength. In both cases, the explanation of how ICs of preference strength are made is 
consistent with the possibility that different observers massively disagree about them. 
For instance, if different individuals possess different ‘theories of mind’, it is likely that 
they will form different ICs. By the same token, if different individuals’ practical 
reasoning systems work in a different way, it is likely that they will form different ICs. 
In the worst case scenario, different individuals might form different beliefs about how 
different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength even on the basis of the 
same external events or the same ‘pretend’ inputs. This is a problem for both 
justification of a garden-variety sort and scientific justification. If one adopts an 
evidentialist perspective, the same evidence may equally support incompatible ICs of 
preference strength. If one adopts a reliabilist perspective, the same type of cognitive 
process may lead to different ICs of preference strength. However, it is hard to see how 
two cognitive processes can both be reliable and deliver incompatible conclusions from 
the same initial data.
Two questions arise. First, what conditions should TT and ST satisfy in order to lead 
to scientifically justified ICs of preference strength? Second, what reason do we have to 
assume that those conditions can be satisfied? I shall try to answer these questions in the 
next sections.
5. The conditions for scientific justification
5.1 Simulation Theory
Goldman has done a lot of work to demonstrate that ICs of happiness can be 
scientifically justified. His analysis provides an excellent starting point for our 
discussion about ICs of preference strength. Therefore, in this section I shall reverse the 
order of exposition and start from ST.
According to the evidentialist version of scientific justification, a belief about how 
different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength is scientifically justified 
when it is inferred from evidence that is (a) public, (b) replicable; (c) such as to lead to 
accurate and precise measurements of the relevant variables. According to the reliabilist
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version, a belief about how different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength 
is scientifically justified when it is acquired through methods and techniques that are (a) 
reliable and known to be reliable on the basis of scientific evidence; (b) replicable; and 
(c) such as to lead to accurate and precise measurements of the relevant variables. 
Moreover, if belief formation involves the use of non-empirical principles, these 
principles must be justified by means of considerations that are acceptable for the 
scientific community.
Since both versions share the replicability and the measurement conditions, I shall 
start from these conditions. First, let us consider replicability. Goldman suggests that the 
fact that “well-informed, skilled deployers of the simulation heuristic”29 often reach 
intersubjective agreement about ICs is a proof that simulation is replicable. However, 
intersubjective agreement cannot, by itself, be the mark of replicability. Rather, the 
extent to which simulation is replicable depends on whether or not it is based on 
information-processing mechanisms that different simulators similarly possess. Perhaps, 
the fact that different simulators often reach intersubjective agreement in mental 
ascriptions offers a reason to think that they share relevantly similar information- 
processing mechanisms. Yet, this is a substantive (and crucial) issue. A specific position 
about it cannot be assumed without arguing for it. I shall consider the issue in more 
detail below.
Second, let us consider measurement. So far we have examined how ST may explain 
ICs of preference strength. However, ST seems to lead to purely ordinal comparisons 
and possibly imprecise or vague ones. By contrast, at least some kinds of IUCs require a 
cardinal representation of preferences and a great deal of accuracy and precision. Can 
ST satisfy such a condition? I think so. The starting point is the collection of 
information about the mental states that the individuals to be compared would have in 
hypothetical situations. Then, the simulator plugs such ‘pretend’ mental states into his 
practical reasoning system and, by means of repeated simulations, he derives an 
accurate set of preferences that he finally ascribes to the other individual. If these 
preferences satisfy the axioms of expected utility theory, they can be represented by a 
utility function, unique up to a positive affine transformation. In a nutshell, the 
reduction of inter-personal comparisons to intra-personal comparisons grounds as much 
precision and accuracy in the measurement of preference strength as in the individual 
case.
29 Goldman, A. [1995a], p. 722.
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Third, let us consider the other conditions for scientific justification. In the 
evidentialist framework, ICs of preference strength must be supported by public 
evidence. In Goldman’s account, the evidence is provided by the simulator’s beliefs 
about his own preference strengths and the simulated agent’s ones, which he can both 
access through introspection. Thus, introspection constitutes the main source of 
evidence. Does it count as publicly acquired evidence? Some authors are convinced that 
it does not. For instance, Robbins’ attack against the scientific legitimacy of IUCs stems
-1A
precisely from a rejection of introspection as admissible source of evidence . Although 
it is difficult to establish exactly what the requirements of publicity are, introspection 
seems to lack a public character at least in an intuitive sense. This is a problem for the 
scientific justification of simulation-based ICs of preference strength within an 
evidentialist framework.
The issue is different within the alternative reliabilist framework. In the reliabilist 
framework, beliefs about how different people’s preferences compare in terms of 
strength must be acquired through reliable processes. Summarising Goldman’s own 
position and a large literature on ST, we can distinguish three requirements that are 
thought to be jointly sufficient for the reliability of simulation, in general. First, 
simulation must be based on the ‘correct’ inputs. Second, the simulator’s relevant 
information-processing mechanisms must operate in the same way in imagination as in 
reality. Third, the simulator and the simulated agent must be similar at the level of the 
relevant information-processing mechanisms. I shall discuss these requirements in the 
next sub-section. For the present purpose, one crucial difference between evidentialism 
and reliabilism is that, in the former case, what needs to be public is the scientific 
evidence supporting ICs of preference strength, whereas, in the latter case, what needs 
to be public is the scientific evidence about the reliability of the processes determining 
ICs of preference strength.
5.2 ST and the reliability requirements
Consider the first reliability requirement. If the simulator feeds his information- 
processing mechanisms with incorrect inputs, then he is likely to reach wrong 
conclusions about the simulated agent’s mental states. The same is true if we move from 
the general case to the case of ICs of preference strength. In Goldman’s account, ICs of 
preference strength are formed on the basis of the inputs that are fed into the simulator’s
30 See Ro b b in s , L. [1932], specially pp. 139-142.
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practical reasoning system. These inputs are the simulator’s pretend mental states, 
which, on the one hand, the simulator has supposedly unproblematic access to and, on 
the other hand, supposedly correspond to the simulated agent’s actual mental states.
However, the orthodox ST account poses two problems. The first is that it is not 
entirely clear which pretend mental states the simulator should feed into his practical 
reasoning system. Under a functionalist understanding, preferences are defined in 
connection with other mental states. At the input level, in particular, preferences are 
causally connected to beliefs and desires. However, under an experientialist 
understanding, it is not immediately clear why the simulator should consider pretend 
desires and pretend beliefs. More generally, it is not clear how to individuate the types 
and the contents of the pretend attitudes that the simulator must feed into his ‘off-line’ 
practical reasoning system in order to derive pretend preferences. Many authors 
sympathetic to a simulationist approach recognise the need for a minimal body of 
knowledge to fill this gap. Although this is a move towards a more hybrid account, it 
may not be problematic for ST, in its general form. Indeed, the core idea that mental 
ascription is performed by replicating another individual’s mental life would remain 
intact31.
The second problem is that, even if the simulator can correctly individuate attitude- 
types and attitude-contents, he must still be able to correctly individuate also the 
intensity of the pretend mental states that should be used as inputs for the simulation. It 
is plausible to maintain that the interpersonal comparison of the simulator’s pretend 
mental states and the simulated agent’s actual mental states raises the same difficulties 
associated with the interpersonal comparison of two different individuals’ actual mental 
states. Thus, the assumption that the simulator can feed the ‘correct’ inputs into his ‘off­
line’ system simply begs the question.
In the light of both problems, it seems better to take the simulated agent’s 
environmental circumstances, rather than pretend mental states, as inputs of simulation. 
This suggestion brings ST closer to Harsanyi’s causal approach. In fact, the simulator 
does not begin by asking himself what preferences he would have if he were to have 
another individual’s initial mental states. Instead, he begins by asking himself what 
preferences he would have if he were in the other individual’s initial circumstances. 
This move shows that introspection is not the only source of evidence. The observation 
and collection of data concerning the simulated agent’s environmental circumstances 
and personal history is also necessary. ST must be complemented with causal
31 This is the approach pursued by Goldman himself in Go ld m a n , A. [2006].
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knowledge about the relations between environment and mental states such as beliefs 
and desires. Moreover, it must be complemented with knowledge about the history of 
the simulated agent, which should be used to identify which environmental 
circumstances constitute relevant inputs in specific situations, amongst the infinite ones 
that the mere observation of the simulated agent’s situation allows one to consider. 
Once again, this moves ST towards a more hybrid formulation.
Let us consider now the second requirement. We can alternatively characterise it by
saying that the ‘off-line’ simulation must approximate the ‘on-line’ working of the
relevant information-processing mechanisms32. Consider the distinction between
simulation in reality and simulation in imagination. In the former case, simulation is a
reliable guide to the behaviour of the targeted object, because, if the objects are of the
same kind, “the same processes occur in the simulation as would be operative in
generating the behaviour of the object being simulated”33. Thus, simulation in reality is
‘process-driven’. At first sight, instead, simply imagining the behaviour of an object in
specific circumstances does not warrant any conclusions concerning its actual
behaviour34. In order for simulation in imagination to be reliable, simulation must be
>
based on a body of knowledge about the simulated object, which guarantees that 
imagination correctly mimics the actual processes generating the object’s behaviour. 
Thus, typically simulation in imagination must be ‘theory-driven’. The problem is that, 
if mental simulation is ‘theory-driven’, then it collapses into the alternative explanation 
of third-person mental ascription that ST is supposed to challenge, namely, TT. Indeed, 
according to TT, the ability to ascribe mental states to other people stems precisely from 
our possession of a body of information that guides our folk psychological practice. One 
way to avoid the collapse is to claim that mental simulation can be ‘process-driven’, 
provided that “at least some mental processes operate in just the same way when we 
imagine being in a particular situation as they would if we were really in that 
situation”35.
What are the relevant information-processing mechanisms that must operate in the 
same way in imagination as in reality in the case of ICs? Goldman’s account focuses on 
the practical reasoning system only. However, if simulation starts from environmental
32 Goldman’s claim is that “psychological systems must operate on feigned pretend input states in the 
same way they operate on genuine states, at least to a close enough approximation”. See Gold m a n , A. 
[1995a], p. 722.
33 See DAVEES, M. and T., Sto n e  [2000], p. 1 at http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/~mdavies/papers/simrep.pdf.
34 This is the objection raised by MacKay against Harsanyi’s extended preference approach, which we 
discussed in chapter 2. See M acKa y , A. F. [1986], pp. 316-322.
35 See Da vies , M. and T., Ston e  [2000], p. 2 at http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/~mdavies/papers/simrep.pdf.
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circumstances, rather than pretend mental states, it is necessary to impose the 
requirement on other information-processing mechanisms as well. In particular, we 
must expect that the simulator’s response to pretend environmental inputs approximates 
his response to actual environmental inputs. If we consider Nichols’ and Stich’s 
boxological representation and if the relevant pretend mental states are pretend beliefs 
and pretend desires, the requirement is that the ‘off-line’ working of the perceptual 
system, the inference system and the body monitoring system approximates their ‘on­
line’ working.
Let us consider now the third requirement, according to which the simulator and the 
simulated agent must be similar at the level of the relevant information-processing 
mechanisms. Let us refer to it as the assumption of interpersonal psychological 
similarity. In order for the ascription of preference strength to be reliable on the basis of 
evidence about behavioural outputs, the assumption of interpersonal similarity must 
hold not only for the perceptual system, the inference system and the body monitoring 
system, but also for the action control system. In fact, a behavioural output is caused by 
a corresponding preference relation only if the latter produces the former in the 
appropriate way. The crucial question is how similar the simulator and the simulated 
agent must be in order for simulation to produce reliable ICs of preference strength. It is 
worth noticing at the outset that this is the dimension that distinguishes the problem of 
ICs from the more general problem of mental ascription. In fact, the similarity 
requirement in the case of a belief about ICs of preference strength is more stringent 
than the corresponding requirement in the case of a belief about another individual’s 
mental states. Let me explain why.
Consider a simulator i and a simulated agent j. Suppose i uses the ‘correct’ inputs for 
simulation and the ‘off-line’ working of the relevant information-processing 
mechanisms approximates their ‘on-line’ working. That is, suppose that the first two 
requirements for the reliability of simulation are satisfied. Typically, the simulator i 
ascribes preferences to the simulated agent j  with content and strength that best predict 
or explain f  s behaviour. For this purpose, however, individual f  s experiential scale 
must be similar to individual f s  experiential scale only up to the point of capturing the 
relevant facts about f s  behaviour. Yet, there is a variety of mental ascriptions that are 
consistent with such facts. In particular, there is a variety of mental ascriptions that, 
despite offering acceptable predictions or explanations of f s  behaviour, sanction 
alternative and incompatible ICs of preference strength. The upshot is the following. In 
order for simulation to be reliable for ICs, the psychological similarity between
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simulator and simulated agent must be particularly high. In the most favourable case, 
the simulator’s and simulated agent’s relevant information-processing mechanisms are 
perfectly identical. In a less than favourable, but yet acceptable, case, the simulator and 
the simulated agent are psychologically similar up to the point where the simulator’s 
ascription of preferences not only leads to adequate predictions or explanations of the 
simulated agent’s behaviour, but also to correct ICs of preference strength.
5.3 Theory Theory
Let us consider TT now. Once again, since both the evidentialist and the reliabilist 
version of scientific justification share the replicability and the measurement conditions, 
I shall start from these conditions. First, let us consider replicability. According to TT, 
mental ascription is based on the deployment of a ToM. Even if different individuals 
use different ‘theories of mind’, mental ascription may be replicable provided that such 
bodies of knowledge can be transferred from one individual to another. If this is the 
case, preference ascription is clearly replicable and, thereby, forming ICs on the basis of 
the previous ascription is replicable too.
Second, let us consider measurement. The starting point is the collection of 
information about the individuals to be compared, in hypothetical situations. In a TT 
framework, the judge uses the information in combination with the ToM in his 
possession to infer the preferences that the compared individuals might have in 
hypothetical situations. If these preferences satisfy the axioms of expected utility theory, 
they can be represented through a utility function, up to a positive affine transformation.
Third, let us consider the other condition for scientific justification. In the 
evidentialist framework, ICs of preference strength must be supported by public 
evidence. If we adopt a functionalist understanding of preferences, the relevant evidence 
is represented by the observation of external events. More precisely, the evidence is 
represented by both the input-types and the output-types that enter the functionalist 
definition of preferences. This evidence is public and clearly counts as scientific. 
Indeed, one of the virtues of a functionalist approach to mental states is that it offers a 
naturalistic and, thereby, ‘scientific’ account of the meaning of mental states.
In the reliabilist framework, beliefs about how different people’s preferences 
compare in terms of strength must be acquired through processes that are both reliable 
and known to be reliable. The requirements for reliability in the case of TT parallel, 
although do not entirely coincide with, the requirements seen in the case of ST. First,
94
the ToM used by the subject making ICs must be applied on the basis of ‘correct’ 
evidence. Second, the ToM must closely represent the working of the relevant 
information-processing mechanisms of the targeted agent.
5.4 TT and the reliability requirements
Consider the first requirement. If the evidence that the observer considers while 
applying the theory in his possession is not correct, then he is likely to reach wrong 
conclusions about the observed agent’s mental states. We have seen above that the 
relevant evidence is constituted by the elements that enter the functionalist definition of 
preferences. Choice behaviour is a natural candidate. Choice behaviour provides 
evidence for the ascription of individual preferences, because the ascription of 
preferences, with suitable content and strength, explains an individual’s choices. 
However, choice observation may not be the only relevant evidence. After all, choices 
may be only one of the behavioural outputs of preferences. For the sake of the 
argument, we can be very liberal in deciding what counts as relevant behavioural 
outputs for preference ascription and consider latency of choice (e.g. Waldner), verbal 
expressions (e.g. Harsanyi), expressive reactions (e.g. Weintraub), facial expressions, 
body temperature and other proxies (e.g. List)36. However, if we adopt a functionalist 
understanding of preferences, behavioural outputs do not exhaust the elements included 
in the set of relevant evidence. Indeed, preferences are determined with respect to both 
outputs and inputs. Therefore, information about the agent’s history and surrounding 
environment too should be included in the set of relevant evidence for the ascription of 
preferences.
Let us now consider the second requirement, according to which the ToM used by 
the observer for making ICs must closely represent the working of the relevant 
information-processing mechanisms of the targeted agent. Let us refer to it as the 
assumption of ToM-to-mind similarity. Two questions arise in the TT case as in the ST 
case. First, what are the relevant information-processing mechanisms? Second, how 
closely must the theory represent their workings? The answers are parallel. With respect 
to the first question, the ToM must closely represent both the agent’s response to the 
environmental inputs and the interaction between the agent’s different mental states. If 
we consider Nichols’ and Stich’s boxological characterisation, this means considering 
the following requirements. First, if the mental states that are functionally connected to
36 See H a rs a n y i ,  J. [1955] and [1977], W a ld n e r ,  I. [1972], W e in tr a u b ,  R. [1998], L is t ,  C. [2003].
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preferences at the input-level are beliefs and desires, the theory must closely represent 
the working of the perceptual system, the inference system and the body monitoring 
system. Second, the theory must closely represent the interaction between beliefs and 
desires, on the one hand, and preferences, on the other; that is, it must closely represent 
the agent’s practical reasoning system. Finally, in order for the ascription of preference 
strength to be reliable on the basis of evidence about behavioural outputs, the theory 
must closely represent the working of the action control system.
With respect to the second question, once again, we must posit a more stringent 
similarity requirement than in the case of mental ascription. The argument is analogous 
to the one seen in the case of ST. The main idea is that there is a variety of mental 
ascriptions that offer both empirically adequate predictions and explanations of different 
individuals’ behaviour and incompatible ICs of their preference strengths. The upshot is 
the following. In order for the observer’s ToM to be a reliable instrument for forming a 
belief about ICs of preference strength, the similarity between the theory representation 
and the observed agent’s relevant information-processing mechanisms must be 
particularly high. In the most favourable case, the observer’s ToM perfectly represents 
the observed agent’s information-processing mechanisms. In a less than favourable, but 
yet acceptable, case, the observer’s ToM represents the observed agent’s information- 
processing mechanisms up to the point where the ascription of preferences not only 
leads to adequate predictions or explanations of the agent’s behaviour, but also to 
correct ICs of preference strength.
5.5 ST and TT compared
As we have seen, there is an asymmetry in the reliability requirements in the case of 
ST and in the case of TT. Simulation reliability depends on the satisfaction of three 
requirements, whereas the ToM reliability depends on the satisfaction of two 
requirements only. More precisely, unlike ST, TT does not presuppose interpersonal 
psychological similarity between all individuals. Let us see why. Consider two 
mindreaders k and h and two agents i and j. In accordance with the requirements seen 
above, k and h form reliable beliefs about how Vs and f s  preferences compare in terms 
of strength if they consider the correct inputs and if the ‘theories of mind’ that they 
apply for mental ascription closely represent Vs and f s  relevant information-processing 
systems. The satisfaction of the latter requirement is possible provided that both k and h 
possess the same (or very similar) ToM about each of the agents under consideration.
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However, this does not imply that k and h must possess the same (or very similar) ToM 
about all the other agents. The assumption that mental ascription requires the subject to 
apply the same (or very similar) ToM to all individuals is not needed in order for a 
belief about ICs of preference strength to be reliably acquired. Indeed, mental ascription 
may be reliably performed even if the targeted agents are different, provided that the 
subject uses the correct ToM for each of them. Therefore, TT does not need the 
assumption of psychological similarity across all individuals.
At worst, the previous point presents a scenario where there are as many ‘theories of 
mind’ as there are agents to mindread. This may suggest that each agent is treated as 
different, in kind, from all the other agents37. Although this should be conceptually 
granted, there are reasons to think that a less than radical TT account may be more 
plausible and more symmetrically in line with a ST account. Quite independently of 
how each subject acquires the body of knowledge on which his mindreading capacity is 
based, it may be plausible to assume that, if  the second reliability requirements is met, 
that is, if  the subject’s ToM very closely represents the working of the relevant 
information-processing mechanisms of another individual, then the subject uses the 
same theory for ascribing mental states to all other individuals. The assumption of 
interpersonal psychological similarity would follow thereby. The reason why this 
assumption is reasonable is that the possibility that a subject acquires such highly 
specific knowledge representing the working of another individual’s information- 
processing mechanisms is more plausible if it applies to all other individuals. In fact, the 
cost of acquiring different, but deeply specific, nomological knowledge about each 
targeted agent would be intolerably high to constitute a real possibility. Therefore, the 
assumption of interpersonal psychological similarity may still follow i f  the assumption 
of ToM-to-mind similarity holds.
6. Discussion
6.1 Preliminaries
37 Incidentally, this possibility motivates some of the criticisms raised against the TT approach. 
Accordingly, as Heal puts it, TT asks us “to view other people as we view stars, clouds or geological 
formations. People are just complex objects in our environment whose behaviour we wish to anticipate 
but whose causal innards we cannot perceive. We therefore proceed by observing the intricacies of their 
external behaviour and formulating some hypotheses about how the insides are structured”. See H ea l , J. 
[1986], p. 135. The worst case scenario is even more radical, since each person is represented as a 
different kind of object. According to Heal, this is an unacceptable consequence of the TT approach.
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The previous section raises some preliminary issues. The first concerns the meaning 
of preferences. Shall we opt for an experientialist or a functionalist account of the 
meaning of mental states? The second concerns the choice between alternative accounts 
of mental ascription. Shall we opt for a ST or a TT account of the folks’ mindreading 
capacity, at the sub-personal level of description? Within the former field, does 
Goldman’s version represent the best simulationist account or is there a better 
alternative? I shall set these issues aside. Instead, I shall focus on the question of 
whether or nor these accounts show, in their own terms, that the folks’ beliefs about 
how different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength can be scientifically 
justified.
In the reliabilist framework, if the conditions of reliability, replicability and 
measurement are satisfied, then ICs of preference strength can be scientifically justified. 
In the context of ST, even if ICs are underdetermined by empirical evidence concerning 
environmental inputs and behavioural outputs, they can indeed be determined if they are 
formed on the basis of both empirical evidence and cognitive processes that are highly 
similar across individuals. In the context of TT, even if ICs are underdetermined by 
empirical evidence concerning environmental inputs and behavioural outputs, they can 
indeed be determined if they are formed on the basis of both empirical evidence and a 
ToM that represents the interpreted agent’s information-processing mechanisms with a 
high degree of similarity.
At first sight, the situation is complicated within an evidentialist framework, even in 
the case where the conditions of publicity, replicability and measurement are satisfied. 
After all, the evidence concerning environmental inputs and behavioural outputs is not 
sufficient to determine ICs and, clearly, the evidential situation is unaltered both in the 
ST context and in the TT context. However, the asymmetry is just apparent. If it is 
possible to show that ICs are formed on the basis of, respectively, interpersonally 
similar cognitive processes or representationally adequate ‘theories of mind’, then ICs 
can indeed be determined and, thereby, scientifically justified.
The result is the following. Both within the reliabilist framework and within the 
evidentialist one, the crucial question is whether or not there is scientific evidence 
vindicating either the assumption of interpersonal psychological similarity, in the case 
of ST, or the assumption of ToM-to-mind similarity, in the case of TT.
Before proceeding, it is worth noticing one thing. One of the attacks raised by 
Goldman against functionalism was that functionalism does not have the resources to 
capture the meaning, and to offer an explanation, of ICs of preference strength. If the
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previous analysis is correct, the opposite is true. Functionalism, in its TT version, has 
the same resources as, or at least similar resources to, experientialism.
6.2 A nativist solution ?
Goldman considers four arguments in support of the assumption of interpersonal 
psychological similarity. I shall extend these arguments to the assumption of ToM-to- 
mind similarity. I shall call them, respectively, the argument from mindreading 
predictive success, the argument from evolution, the argument from scientific practice 
and the argument from the analogy with linguistics. The former two are based on 
empirical considerations only, whereas the latter two include also non-empirical 
considerations.
The argument from mindreading predictive success claims that the fact that 
mindreading is reliable for predictive purposes provides prima facie evidence that 
mindreading is reliable also for the purpose of making IC judgments. The reason is that 
IC judgments are based on the same mental ascriptions that lead to reliable predictions. 
As illustrated in section 5, the objection against this argument is that success at 
predicting an agent’s behaviour requires a looser degree of similarity than the one 
required in order to have scientifically justified ICs. For instance, in the case of ST, 
although it may be true that “empirically observed success at empathy-based predictions 
of behaviour does go some distance toward supporting psychological isomorphism”38, it 
is not true that predictive success goes far enough in showing that such a psychological 
isomorphism leads to correct ICs of preference strength. The reason is that reliable 
predictions are consistent with different and incompatible IC judgments. At best, 
predictive success shows that simulation is reliable for predictive purposes. However, it 
does not offer a reason to think that simulation is reliable also for making ICs of 
preference strength. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, in the case of TT.
The argument from evolution claims that evolutionary pressure might have favoured 
the development of a close match between the simulator’s and the simulated agent’s 
information-processing mechanisms, in the case of ST, or between the observer’s theory 
and the target’s information-processing mechanisms, in the case of TT. The reason is 
that this would have maximised the expected fitness of the members of a relevant group 
by endowing them with competitively advantageous features for the typical 
environment encountered by the group. The crucial variable in the argument is expected
38 Goldman, A. [1995a], p. 724.
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fitness. What contributes to fitness? When would fitness be maximised? If each 
individual’s fitness is assessed with respect to the capacity to predict or to explain 
another group member’s behaviour, then fitness would be maximised -  or, perhaps, 
optimised -  if all members were endowed with a looser degree of similarity than the one 
necessary in the case of ICs. In fact, the expected fitness would be equally maximised if 
the match were sufficiently high to guarantee the agreement between the members of 
the group. As we shall see in more detail below, intersubjective agreement presupposes 
a less demanding degree of similarity than the one required for having reliable IUC 
judgments. As a consequence, a higher degree of similarity would be unnecessarily 
costly. In the light of evolution’s traditional ‘economy’, the upshot is that this argument 
does not support either the assumption of interpersonal psychological similarity or the 
assumption of ToM-to-mind similarity.
The failure of arguments based only on empirical considerations is not surprising. In 
the wake of the analysis of chapter 2, it should be clear that the assumptions of 
interpersonal psychological similarity and ToM-to-mind similarity are non-empirical. 
This means that ICs of preference strength can be scientifically justified provided that 
the use of non-empirical considerations can be vindicated in a way that is acceptable for 
the scientific community. Goldman explores two arguments based on non-empirical 
considerations. The first is the argument from scientific practice. According to it, the 
hypothesis of a high match between the simulator’s and the simulated agent’s 
information-processing mechanisms, in the case of ST, or between the observer’s theory 
and the target’s information-processing mechanisms, in the case of TT, is the simplest 
and most parsimonious hypothesis and, thereby, the most likely to be true. This is a 
variant of the argument that we have considered and rejected in the previous chapter39. 
Goldman himself is sceptical and prefers to pursue a more interesting nativist approach, 
which explores the analogy with Chomsky’s nativist approach in linguistics
The starting point is Chomsky’s influential “poverty of the stimulus argument” in 
support of nativist theories of language acquisition. Chomsky’s analysis starts from the 
observation that children belonging to the same community end up acquiring the same 
grammar. This fact is particularly striking because grammar acquisition is radically
39 There is indeed an important difference between the two arguments. The argument in chapter 2 is that 
we are justified in assuming that different people’s utilities are co-scaled because this assumption is part 
of the best explanation of their behaviour. By contrast, the argument in this chapter holds that we are 
justified in assuming that different people’s utilities are co-scaled because the assumption of  
interpersonal similarity of different people’s mind-systems (either in the ST or in the TT form) is part of 
the best explanation of their behaviour. Despite this difference, the same objections made against the first 
argument apply to the second as well.
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underdetermined by the empirical evidence. According to Chomsky, it is not plausible 
to assume that children use purely pragmatic criteria, such as simplicity and parsimony, 
in order to learn a specific and common grammar amongst the infinitely many possible 
ones that are consistent with the available empirical evidence. Instead, Chomsky 
suggests that children possess an innate and universal body of knowledge, which guides 
them in the process of language learning40. Such an innate and universal body of 
knowledge is not only important during the acquisition process. Indeed, it is the very 
body of knowledge on which the grammaticality judgments of adult competent speakers 
are based.
Goldman invites us to conceive the problem of IUCs in analogy with linguistics. The 
starting point is the observation that different observers reach frequent intersubjective 
agreement about ICs of preference strength. Their intersubjective agreement seems to 
suggest that they form the same beliefs about how different people’s preferences 
compare in terms of strength. This fact is particularly striking because ICs are radically 
underdetermined by the empirical evidence. As the analogy with linguistics suggests, it 
is not plausible to assume that different observers form the same beliefs, amongst the 
infinite ones licensed by the empirical evidence, on the basis of purely pragmatic 
considerations41. Rather, it is more plausible to hold that they form the same beliefs on 
the basis of the possession of either innate and highly similar information-processing 
mechanisms, in the case of ST; or an innate and highly representative ToM, in the case 
of TT42. According to Goldman, if the nativist hypothesis gives linguistics “epistemic 
respectability”, so does it with ICs of preference strength43. Since the nativist hypothesis 
is non-empirical, this means that both ST and TT may solve the epistemological 
problem of IUCs provided that we accept a non-empirical postulate, whose acceptance 
is supported by the same considerations that warrant postulating the existence of an 
innate and universal grammar in linguistics.
6.3 Three questions about innateness
The nativist account postulates the existence of innate cognitive mechanisms (an 
innate body of knowledge), with certain specific properties, in order to explain people’s
40 See C h o m sk y , N. [1980].
41 This is equivalent to rejecting Harsanyi’s assumption that considerations of arbitrariness regulate our 
practice of third-person mental state ascription.
2 In the light of the remarks made in section 5.5, we might add ‘universal’ to the attributes of the 
individuals’ ToM.
43 See G o ld m a n , A. [1995a], pp. 725-726.
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capacity to make comparative judgments concerning preference strengths. The crucial 
concept is that of ‘innateness’. Three questions arise. First, what is innateness? Second, 
what epistemological implications does nativism have? Third, what reasons -  if any -  
support the nativist hypothesis in the case of IUCs?
Let us consider the first question. The answer is particularly controversial and has 
generated, in the past few years, a particularly intense philosophical debate44. Although 
the literature presents an evident lack of agreement, the most recent positions suggest 
taking ‘nativism’ as equivalent to ‘psychological primitivism’45. Accordingly, innate 
cognitive capacities are psychological primitives. In turn, psychological primitives are 
entities or processes that, on the one hand, are mentioned in the correct -  or, perhaps, in 
the best - psychological explanations of human behaviour; and whose acquisition cannot 
be explained by any psychological theories, but only by a theory at a lower level, on the 
other hand.
With this definition at hand, we can move to the second question. It is worth noticing 
that nativism is not a theory of justification and, therefore, it has no epistemological 
implications by itself. However, nativism has epistemological implications when 
combined with either an evidentialist or a reliabilist theory of justification. In both 
cases, ICs of preference strength can be scientifically justified if there is scientific 
evidence showing that ordinary people make them on the basis of innate information 
processing-mechanisms that are highly similar across individuals, in the case of ST; or 
on the basis of an innate ToM that is highly representative of the other individuals’ 
mind system, in the case of TT46.
The most important issue is the one posed by the third question, i.e. the question of 
whether or not there is scientific evidence supporting the nativist hypothesis in the case 
of ICs of preference strength. It is worth noticing here that I am interpreting the nativist 
hypothesis in a broad way. In fact, in the case of ST, the issue of whether or not the 
information processing-mechanisms that the subjects use to make ICs of preference 
strength are innate is distinct from the issue of whether or not the information
44 See Co w ie , F. [1999], G r iffith s , P. [2002], Sa m u els , R. [2002], Kha lid i, M. A. [2007].
45 See specially C o w ie , F. [1999] and Sa m u els , R. [2002].
46 Suppose that the non-empirical postulate of innate similarity can be vindicated. Suppose also that 
simulation (the individual’s ToM) is generally reliable for the purpose of making ICs. The question still 
remains of whether or not each particular interpersonal comparison of preference strengths is 
scientifically justified. After all, a typically reliable mechanism such as vision may produce false beliefs 
under certain unfavourable circumstances, e.g. when the individual is drunk or is hallucinating. An 
alternative consists in qualifying the original reliability condition by saying that actual scientific 
justification requires that a belief about how different people’s preferences compare in terms o f strength is 
acquired through properly working cognitive mechanisms. This move brings scientific justification closer 
to a specific version of reliabilism, namely, proper functionalism. See P la n tin g a , A. [1993].
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processing-mechanisms that the subjects use to make ICs of preference strength are 
highly similar across individuals. Goldman’s argument may work only provided that we 
take interpersonal psychological similarity itself to be an innate feature of the mind. 
Thus, the nativist hypothesis can be reformulated as the assumption of innate 
interpersonal psychological similarity. Likewise, in the case of TT, the issue of whether 
or not the ToM that the subjects use to make ICs of preference strength is innate is 
distinct from the issue of whether or not the ToM that the subjects use to make ICs of 
preference strength is highly representative of the other individuals’ mind-system. 
Goldman’s argument may work only provided that we take ToM-to-mind similarity 
itself to be an innate feature of the mind. Thus, the nativist hypothesis can be 
reformulated as the assumption of innate ToM-to-mind similarity.
In order to assess the nativist hypothesis so conceived, we need to consider the 
elements defining the notion of innateness. With respect to the first element, the 
assumption that a cognitive capacity is innate is justified provided that it is part of the 
correct -  or part of the best -  psychological explanation of human behaviour. In the case 
under consideration, the assumption of innate interpersonal psychological similarity 
(innate ToM-to-mind-similarity) is justified provided that it is part of the best 
explanation of why the folks reach frequent intersubjective agreement about ICs of 
preference strength. With respect to the second element, the assumption that a cognitive 
capacity is innate is justified provided that its acquisition cannot be explained by any 
psychological theories, but only by a theory at a lower level. In the case under 
consideration, the assumption of innate interpersonal psychological similarity (innate 
ToM-to-mind-similarity) is justified provided that its acquisition cannot be explained in 
terms of the interpersonal similarity of other psychological processes (bodies of 
information).
6.4 Objections
Let us consider the first claim. The first question to ask is whether it is really the case 
that the folks reach frequent intersubjective agreement about ICs of preference strength. 
This is an empirical question. Therefore, the answer to this question requires at least 
some empirical data. However, for the present purpose, I am prepared to grant that the 
assumption of frequent intersubjective agreement is likely to be corroborated by the 
empirical evidence.
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The second and most important question to ask is whether the assumption of innate 
interpersonal psychological similarity (innate ToM-to-mind-similarity) is really part of 
the best explanation of people’s intersubjective agreement. Notice that this argument is 
nothing but an inference to the best explanation argument, of the same kind of those that 
we have examined in chapter 2. Thus, if the previous analysis is correct, Goldman’s 
argument from nativism is bound to fail. Some doubts about it come directly from the 
analysis conducted in the previous chapter. There, we saw that a decision-theoretic 
explanation of human behaviour does not require any assumption concerning the 
comparability of preferences. The scope of the explanation remains the same without 
any such assumption. Shall we, thereby, reject the nativist hypothesis from the start?
One might think that the matter is more complex. Decision theory offers an 
explanation of human behaviour in terms of the content and strength of each 
individual’s desires and beliefs. For instance, decision theory explains how a judge 
makes ICs of preference strength in terms of the content and strength of his desires and 
beliefs. However, one can pose the question of why the judge has those specific beliefs 
about how different individuals’ preference strengths compare. Typically, decision 
theory remains neutral about the cognitive mechanisms that lie behind the judge’s 
process of belief formation. Thus, a different, but in no way incompatible, explanation 
of how the judge makes ICs of preference strength may start precisely from an 
assumption concerning his cognitive architecture. Such an explanation would strengthen 
the decision-theoretic approach by showing how the evidence possessed by the judge 
generates specific comparative beliefs through the workings of certain cognitive 
mechanisms.
Although this strategy offers a more favourable prospect, there are at least three other 
objections that can be raised against the nativist hypothesis. The first objection 
challenges nativism. The charge is that the interpersonal psychological similarity (ToM- 
to-mind-similarity) across individuals is not an innate feature of the mind. One may 
explain the folks’ intersubjective agreement by reference to a capacity that they learn 
either by theorising or by enculturation, rather than possess innately. For instance, one 
may conjecture that the folks are taught how to compare the intensity of other people’s 
preferences in certain token circumstances and, then, generalise such ICs to 
circumstances of the same type47. However, this objection is not particularly damaging.
47 Notice that this objection is open only to a TT approach to mental ascription. In fact, ST always -  at 
least to my knowledge -  relies on nativist accounts concerning the acquisition of the mindreading 
capacity.
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What matters is whether the assumption of interpersonal psychological similarity (ToM- 
to-mind-similarity) holds, independently of whether similarity is innate or not.
The second objection questions the location of similarity between individuals. The 
charge is that we can explain the folks’ intersubjective agreement about ICs of 
preference strength without postulating highly similar information-processing 
mechanisms (a highly representative ToM). For instance, one idea is that intersubjective 
agreement is due to the recognition of certain facts as particularly salient. This account 
presupposes a certain degree of interpersonal isomorphy in belief formation. However, 
it does not imply that isomorphy concerns the information-processing mechanisms (the 
body of causal knowledge) used to form beliefs about how different people’s 
preferences compare in terms of strength.
The third and most powerful objection is that, even if we locate similarity between 
individuals where the nativist hypothesis suggests, the assumption of interpersonal 
psychological similarity (ToM-to-mind-similarity) is not part of the best explanation of 
people’s intersubjective agreement. On the contrary, at best, the assumption of 
interpersonal similarity (ToM-to-mind-similarity) is explanatorily on a par with the 
assumption that the folks take each other to be similar at the level of the relevant 
information-processing mechanisms (the ToM) used to make ICs of preference strength. 
At worst, it is explanatorily inferior. Let me illustrate why with an example.
Consider Goldman’s ST account. Suppose there are two individuals, i and y, 
simulating each other’s mental life. Suppose there is evidence that the first and the 
second reliability requirements are satisfied. Suppose also that both individuals are 
completely identical at the level of their practical reasoning systems. Finally, suppose 
that they are completely identical at the level of their response mechanisms, except for 
the fact that the individual i forms desires with intensity ten times greater than the 
individual f  s, when responding to the same environmental stimuli. Will the two 
individuals reach intersubjective agreement about ICs of preference strength? The 
answer is affirmative. Under Goldman’s ST account, both individuals ascribe 
preferences to each other and to themselves on the basis of their own cognitive 
machinery. This means that each subject takes the target individual to be just like him. 
In other words, each subject takes the assumption of interpersonal psychological 
similarity to be satisfied. On the basis of this assumption, individual i ascribes the same 
preference strengths both to himself and to individual j, when they are subject to the 
same environmental circumstances; and so does individual j. By so doing, both 
individuals conclude that they have the same preference strengths, despite the fact that,
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by stipulation, the intensity of /  s desires is ten times greater than the intensity of f  s 
desires.
The point of the exercise is the following. The folks’ intersubjective agreement about 
ICs of preference strength can be equally explained by two different accounts. The first 
assumes that the folks are psychologically similar at the level of the relevant 
information-processing mechanisms. The second assumes that they merely take each 
other to be psychologically similar at the level of the relevant information-processing 
mechanisms. However, simulation is reliable for the purpose of making ICs of 
preference strength only if the former account is true, whereas it is unreliable if the 
latter account is true. In the former case, ICs of preference strength can be scientifically 
justified; in the latter case they cannot.
So far we have shown that the assumption that the folks take each other to be highly 
similar at the level of information-processing mechanisms is explanatorily on a par with 
the assumption of interpersonal psychological similarity. This is enough to show that 
the nativist project fails to offer a conclusive solution to the problem of IUCs, because, 
as we have seen in the previous chapter, no additional non-empirical considerations can 
help us adjudicate between the two assumptions. However, it may be tempting to argue 
that the former assumption is also explanatorily better than the latter. This can be done 
by resorting to the evolutionary argument discussed in section 5.2. As we have seen 
above, evolution might favour a degree of interpersonal psychological similarity that 
optimises, rather than maximises, the individuals’ expected fitness. In turn, if expected 
fitness is assessed with respect to the benefits coming from intersubjective agreement, 
on the one hand, and the costs coming from the development of highly specific 
information-processing mechanisms, it follows that evolution might have favoured the 
development of both a less stringent degree of similarity than the one required in order 
to have reliable ICs of preference strength and the folks’ attitude of taking each other to 
be alike, or highly similar, in certain relevant respects.
The same objection applies to the TT case. The folks’ intersubjective agreement 
about ICs of preference strength can be equally explained by two different accounts. 
The first assumes that the ToM that the folks use is highly representative of the other 
individuals’ mind. The second assumes that the folks merely take the ToM that they use 
to be highly representative of the other individuals’ mind. However, TT is reliable for 
the purpose of making ICs of preference strength only if the former account is true, 
whereas it is unreliable if the latter account is true. If there is no reason to favour the 
former over the latter, the nativist project fails to offer a conclusive solution to the
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epistemological problem of IUCs. Furthermore, it is possible to argue in evolutionary 
terms that the assumption that the folks take the ToM to be highly representative of the 
other individuals’ mind is explanatorily better than the assumption of ToM-to-mind 
similarity.
If the previous point is not sufficient to discard nativism as a solution to the problem 
of IUCs, the sceptic might get further support by considering the second condition 
required to justify the assumption of innateness. According to it, the assumption that a 
cognitive capacity is innate is sound provided that its acquisition cannot be explained by 
any psychological theories, but only by a theory at a lower level. If we read this 
condition in a weak sense, this means only that it must be possible to offer an 
explanation of how certain psychological mechanisms are realised at the physical level. 
If we read the condition in a stronger sense, this means that the account at the physical 
level must be able to vindicate the nativist assumption at the psychological level.
As far as the problem of ICs is concerned, it is certainly possible to explain the 
acquisition of highly similar information-processing mechanisms (a highly 
representative ToM) at the neurophysiological level. However, even if we grant the 
claim that we are somehow made of the same neurophysiological ‘s tu ff’, this is not 
sufficient to vindicate the nativist hypothesis at the psychological level. To begin with, 
although there is evidence that some mental states, e.g. disgust, are located in specific 
brain regions and, thereby, that different individuals undergoing those states share 
common neural properties, the same is not true for other mental states, like preferences. 
In other words, there is yet no evidence that undergoing a preference state activates the 
same neural region in different individuals. However, this may simply be a problem of 
limited empirical evidence. It is possible that one day scientific research will discover 
the neural correlates of preferences.
Even if we grant this possibility, the prospects for ICs are dim. The existence of a 
common neural dedicated to preference formation does not show, per se, that 
preferences are formed by means of highly similar information-processing mechanisms. 
The reason is that, even if different individuals’ neurons fire with the same intensity, it 
does not follow that their preference strengths are identical. Consider ST first. Under the 
experientialist conception of preferences, it is possible that identical neuronal activation 
across individuals corresponds to preference experiences that are very different at the 
level of strength, at least if we grant the possibility that the qualitative character of 
experiences is not fully accounted in terms of their neurophysiological character. This
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is the same as admitting that interpersonal isomorphy at the physical level does not 
necessarily imply interpersonal isomorphy at the subjective level.
Consider TT now. Since preferences are now given a functionalist understanding, the 
argument must be different, as reference to alleged interpersonal differences at the 
experiential level are excluded by definition. Nevertheless, we can equally argue that, 
even if different individuals’ neurons fire with the same intensity, it does not follow that 
their preference strengths are identical. The reason is the following. Preference strengths 
are individuated not only with respect to external inputs and outputs, but also with 
respect to other preferences and mental states. Crucially, these mental states can be both 
occurrent and non-occurrent. The problem is that neural activation registers only 
occurrent preferences and mental states. Thus, in order to conclude that different 
individuals’ preference strengths are the same when their neurons fire with the same 
intensity, we need to assume that they are identical with respect to all the other non- 
occurrent preferences and mental states, which might impact on their preference 
strengths. However, it seems to be epistemically impossible to verify whether or not this 
assumption holds. The result is that, once again, interpersonal isomorphy at the physical 
level does not imply interpersonal isomorphy at the functional level.
To conclude, even if it is possible to account for the acquisition of each individual’s 
mindreading capacity at a lower level, no empirical support can be offered for the 
assumption of innate interpersonal psychological similarity (innate ToM-to-mind 
similarity) at such level.
7. Conclusion
In this chapter, I considered the question of whether or not a nativist argument shows 
that ICs of preference strength can be scientifically justified. The argument is made in 
the context of current debates in philosophy of mind concerning the explanation of 
mental ascription and the meaning of mental states. I considered both ST and TT 
accounts of mindreading at the sub-personal level of description, together with the 
associated experientialist and functionalist accounts of the meaning of preferences.
Within the ST framework, the nativist argument holds that we are justified in 
assuming that different people’s utilities are co-scaled if it is an innate feature of the 
mind that the information-processing mechanisms that people use to make ICs of 
preference strength are highly similar to the information-processing mechanisms that
108
other individuals use to form their preferences. I referred to it as the assumption of 
innate interpersonal psychological similarity.
Within the TT framework, the nativist argument holds that we are justified in 
assuming that different people’s utilities are co-scaled if it is an innate feature of the 
mind that the ToM that the subject uses to ascribe preferences is highly representative of 
the information-processing mechanisms through which different people form their 
preferences. I referred to it as the assumption of innate ToM-to-mind similarity.
In this chapter I rejected the nativist argument in both forms. I argued that the 
reasons offered in support of the nativist hypothesis do not establish the soundness of 
either the assumption of innate interpersonal psychological similarity or the assumption 
of innate ToM-to-mind similarity. The conclusion is that we still lack a reason to think 
that our beliefs about how different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength 
can be scientifically justified.
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CHAPTER 4 
Three ‘possibility’ arguments
1. Introduction
The arguments examined in the previous chapters fail to show that we can have 
scientific knowledge of, or, at least, scientifically justified, ICs of preference strength. 
Neither the appeal to an inference to the best explanation type of argument nor the appeal 
to a nativist argument offers a positive solution to the problem. These results increase the 
pressure brought by the sceptical challenge. One issue concerns the assessment of when a 
belief about how different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength can be said to 
be true. Consider the contrast between predictions about an agent’s behaviour and IUCs. In 
the former case, it is relatively easy to assess whether or not a prediction is correct. We 
simply have to look at the agent’s behaviour and see if it corresponds to the predicted one. 
By contrast, unlike behaviour, mental states are unobservable. We cannot simply observe 
whether or not different people display the attributed mental states. As a consequence, we 
cannot simply observe whether or not the comparison of different people’s preference 
strength is correct.
This issue, combined with the difficulties in finding a solution to the epistemological 
problem of IUCs, raises the doubt that there may be no fact of the matter about IUCs. In 
other words, the radical thought is that the alleged impossibility of solving the 
epistemological problem of IUCs does not stem only from epistemological limitations but, 
more radically, from the ontological incomparability of preferences with respect to the 
dimension of strength. In order to address this challenge, some authors have elaborated ‘in 
principle’ solutions to the problem of IUCs. These solutions are based on ‘possibility’ 
arguments. Their primary goal is to show that different people’s preference strengths are 
indeed comparable. Their secondary goal is to show that it is possible, in principle but not 
by means of empirical or pragmatic considerations only, to have scientific knowledge of, or 
scientifically justified beliefs about, how different people’s preferences compare in terms of 
strength.
In this chapter I want to examine three arguments of this sort. Broome offers the first 
argument that I shall consider. Although Broome takes the bettemess relation as his object 
of interest, his argument can be extended, with few modifications, to the preference
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relation. In section 2 ,1 shall illustrate the main features of Broome’s strategy and discuss 
some objections against it. The second argument that I will consider is based on a 
functionalist understanding of the nature of preferences. I shall illustrate this argument and 
present some objections against it in section 3. Bradley offers the third argument. It moves 
from an analogous understanding of the nature of preferences but argues for the 
interpersonal comparability of preferences in a different way. I shall illustrate this argument 
and discuss some objections against it in section 4. Finally, I shall summarise my results 
and conclude in section 5.
2. Broome’s strategy
2.1 Broome’s argument
In this section I shall illustrate the approach that Broome has put forward in his recent 
book Weighing Lives1. Broome is not explicitly concerned with preferences, but with well­
being. According to him, “wellbeing is not an empirical concept”2. Although “economists 
generally hope to measure wellbeing by means of people’s preferences”, so to make 
preferences “the basis for measuring wellbeing empirically”, Broome thinks that individual 
well-being should be founded on the non empirical notion of a person’s bettemess relation. 
Broome assumes that the bettemess relation satisfies the expected utility axioms and, 
thereby, can be represented by an interval utility function, unique up to a positive affine 
transformation. Thus, in his approach, utility defines the value of a function that measures 
degrees of personal goodness.
Broome’s argument is based on four assumptions. The first is that a person’s goodness is 
supervenient upon “how things are for that person”. These are features of the world that 
appear from that person’s perspective and that affect that person’s goodness. Broome calls 
the set of such features a person’s ‘life’. Thus, his first assumption is that personal 
goodness supervenes upon a person’s life. What features of the world can figure as 
component of one’s person’s life is an open question, which depends on the substantive 
theory of personal goodness that one embraces. Nevertheless, according to Broome, there is 
at least one point on which most accounts of well-being can plausibly be expected to agree: 
a person’s bare identity does not figure amongst the features of the world on which 
personal goodness supervenes. This means that personal goodness is independent from
1 Broome, J. [2004].
2 See Broome, J. [2004], pp. 78-79.
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personal identity, or, which is the same, that “the goodness of a life is independent of who 
lives it”3. This is indeed Broome’s second assumption.
This assumption implies the conceptual, or metaphysical, possibility that the same life 
can be lived by two different persons. In other words, it implies the existence of a possible 
world where the life that an individual j  lives in the actual world is lived by another 
individual /. The underlying idea is that, once we exclude bare identity from an individual 
i ’s life, it may be possible for another individual j  to occupy f  s position with respect to all 
the features that figure from i ’s perspective. This is particularly important, because it 
provides the basis for a metaphysical reduction of the intra-personal case to the intra­
personal case. In turn, this metaphysical reduction provides the grounds for the conceptual 
possibility of having meaningful ICs of different individuals’ lives. The central idea is that 
if  the same person can live other persons’ lives, those lives become comparable in terms of 
personal goodness4. Being lives that i can live, they can be compared in terms of how good 
they are for i. In other words, a bettemess relation exists amongst all the lives that i can 
possibly live. Moreover, this relation holds independently of whether or not these lives are 
actually lived by other persons. Indeed, all the lives that i can possibly live remain 
comparable even when they are actually lived by individuals different from /.
A caveat. Broome’s second assumption does not imply that each individual can live any 
other individual’s life. Nor does it imply that, for any individual j, there is at least one 
possible world where another individual i lives individual/  s life. Thus, the argument in the 
previous paragraph shows only that it is possible to compare some individuals’ lives, i.e. 
those lives that can be equally lived by different individuals. In order for the comparisons 
of all individuals’ lives to be possible, Broome needs to make further assumptions. In order 
to highlight what these are, let us consider Broome’s argument in more detail.
Recall that, as we have seen in chapter 1, in order to fix an interval scale of 
measurement, we need to fix two points, corresponding to the (arbitrary) zero and the 
(arbitrary) unit. Suppose that an individual i can live another individual/  s life. If personal 
goodness is independent from personal identity, it follows that the value of that life is 
identical for both i and j. This fixes a common point in their utility scales. In order to claim 
that their utility scales are the same, we need to find another point in common. This is 
possible if there is another life that both individuals can possibly live. Given that personal 
goodness is independent from personal identity, the value of this life is identical for both i 
and j. Once these two points are fixed, we can conclude that individual f  s and /  s utility
3 Broome, J. [2004], p. 94.
4 See Broome, J. [2007].
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functions are co-scaled. If two persons share at least two possible lives, they form an 
“overlapping pair”5. Being an overlapping pair is a necessary condition for two persons’ 
personal goodness to be comparable. Broome’s third assumption is thus that every 
individual belongs to at least one overlapping pair.
This is yet not enough to guarantee that all individuals’ lives are comparable. It is easy 
to understand why. Suppose, as before, that i and j  form an overlapping pair. It follows that 
their utilities are co-scaled. Suppose now that there are two other individuals k and ht who 
form another overlapping pair. Their utilities are also co-scaled. However, suppose that 
there are no possible lives that the first overlapping pair, i.e. i andy, have in common with 
the second overlapping pair, i.e. k and h. If this is the case, although it is possible to make 
ICs of personal goodness within each overlapping pair, it is not possible to make ICs of 
personal goodness across different overlapping pairs. Given that there is no common point 
between, say, f  s and Jc’s utility scales, it is not possible to claim that they are co-scaled. On 
the other hand, if i and k also form an overlapping pair, then their utilities are co-scaled and 
their personal goodness is comparable. Moreover, it also follows by transitivity that f  s 
personal goodness is comparable with K  s, on the one hand, and that fc’s personal goodness 
is comparable with f  s, on the other hand. The idea is that it is possible to compare all 
individuals’ personal goodness if everyone is suitable related to everyone else by means of 
a “chain of overlapping pairs”. This is indeed Broome’s fourth and last assumption. 
Together, these assumptions imply that personal goodness can be measured on a universal 
scale and compared across all individuals and states of the world.
2.2 Objections
Broome’s argument is based on four assumptions, which we can summarise as follows:
(Bl) Personal goodness supervenes on a person’s life;
(B2) Personal goodness is independent from personal identity;
(B3) Every person belongs to at least one overlapping pair;
(B4) Every person is related to everyone else by a chain of overlapping pairs.
In what follows, I will focus in particular on the implications that (B1) and (B2) have for 
the problem of IUCs. Before proceeding further, it is worth noticing one point. The goal of 
this section is to discuss whether or not Broome’s approach shows that preferences are
5 B ro o m e , J. [2004], p. 96.
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interpersonally comparable in terms of strength. However, Broome does not consider the 
preference relation as his object of interest. Rather, he focuses on the bettemess relation, 
which he explicitly characterises as a non-empirical relation. What is then the relevance of 
Broome’s argument for the issue at stake? We can answer in two ways. The first is more 
indirect. It consists in claiming that, as a matter of fact, Broome’s argument is compatible 
with a preference satisfaction view of personal goodness and that, in turn, the degree to 
which preferences are satisfied is given by the intensity with which the individual prefers 
the option that the world realises. Thus, we can apply Broome’s argument to preference 
satisfaction and see whether or not it helps us addressing the problem of the interpersonal 
comparability of different people’s preferences.
The second answer is more direct. The idea is that Broome’s argument not only is, but 
also must be, compatible with a preference satisfaction view of personal goodness. One of 
the underlying preoccupations in Broome’s work concerning the structure of personal 
goodness is to remain neutral between alternative substantive conceptions of it. Hence, his 
solution to the problem of IUCs must be applicable to various, and possibly very different, 
specification of what constitutes personal goodness. Although Broome has argued 
elsewhere against a preference-based theory of well-being6, his solution to the problem of 
IUCs must be independent from the soundness of that criticism. That is, it must be able to 
accommodate the case where the preference satisfaction theory of well-being is indeed the 
correct theory. At the very least, it must be able to accommodate the case where 
preferences are a component of well-being7.
For simplicity, in what follows, I shall assume that personal goodness is entirely 
supervenient on facts about individual preferences. More specifically, I shall assume that 
there is a direct relation between personal goodness and preference satisfaction. Moreover, 
I shall assume that the degree to which preferences are satisfied is given by the intensity of 
people’s preferences. From these assumptions, it follows that a person’s life is constituted 
entirely by that person’s (realised) preferences. We can thus rewrite Broome’s first 
assumption in the following way
6 See B ro o m e , J. [forthcoming].
7 In a recent article, Broome has explicitly withdrawn his subscription to this neutrality requirement. More 
precisely, Broome now argues that his account about the structure of personal goodness is not compatible 
with preference satisfaction accounts of personal goodness. See Br o o m e , J. [2007]. Broome’s latest position 
marks a significant change from the earlier position expressed in Weighing Lives. Most importantly, it has two 
important implications. On the one hand, it significantly weakens the strength of his project. Indeed, if  
personal goodness turns out to be of the substantive kind that Broome rejects, his work is not really about the 
structure of personal goodness. On the other hand, his new position seems irremediably ad hoc. Indeed, as we 
shall see below, Broome’s approach is problematic for all accounts of personal goodness which include some 
mental states, e.g. preferences, desires, emotions, as features of a person’s life
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(Bl*) Personal goodness supervenes on a person’s (realised) preferences.
Let us now consider Broome’s assumptions in more detail. According to the standard 
definition of supervenience, a set of properties supervenes on another set of properties if 
two things cannot differ with respect to the former set without differing also with respect to 
the latter. In the case under consideration, this definition admits of two readings. According 
to a weak reading, personal goodness supervenes on a person’s life if, fo r the same person, 
two possible lives of his cannot differ in terms of their goodness without differing also at 
the level of his realised preferences. However, Broome favours a stronger reading, 
according to which personal goodness supervenes on a person’s life if, fo r  any two 
individuals, two possible lives of theirs cannot differ in terms of their goodness without 
differing also at the level of their realised preferences. Clearly, the difference is that the 
latter reading includes an interpersonal element, whereas the former reading does not. Thus, 
Broome’s reading implicitly assumes that the supervenience relation is the same for 
different individuals, whereas the weaker reading allows for the possibility that the 
supervenience relation is different for different individuals.
It is worth noticing that Broome’s approach does not need the stronger reading. His 
argument requires only that there be at least some pair of individuals such that one can live 
the other’s life. In other words, his argument requires that, for at least some pairs of 
individuals i andy, i can live y’ s life. Indeed, if i can occupy/  s position, then i has the same 
personal goodness as y. The reason is that, by occupying y’s position, i acquires also the 
same supervenience relation occurring between/ s life andy’s personal goodness. Whether 
this relation is the same as the one between i’s life and i’s personal goodness is not 
relevant. The two may as well be different. Indeed, once it is established that i’s personal 
goodness is the same as y’s, it is also established that it is possible to compare i’s and y’s 
well-being with respect to that life. For this purpose, it only necessary to assume that the 
possibility of living someone else’s life entails the acquisition of the very same 
supervenience relation occurring between that individual’s life and his personal goodness. 
If this is granted, the weaker reading of the supervenience relation is sufficient for 
Broome’s argument.
The main question is thus whether or not it is indeed possible for one individual to live 
another individual’s life, as (B2) seems to imply. The first objection is that, if we embrace 
(B1 *), Broome’s argument is question-begging. In order for individual i and individual j  to 
have the same personal goodness, it must be the case that, once individual i is endowed 
with individual y’s own life, we can say that individual i has the same preferences as y.
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Amongst other things, this means that it must be possible for individual i to have the same 
preference strengths as j. However, this presupposes what needs to be proven, namely, that 
different people’s preference strengths are interpersonally comparable. If we cannot 
meaningfully assume that i has the same preference strengths as j, then we cannot conclude 
that i has the same personal goodness as j. It thus appears that we should reject (B2), at 
least when it is combined with an account of a person’s life that makes references to 
preferences, like (Bl*).
There is one possibility to avoid the objection. One may claim that it is possible to retain 
(B2) by arguing that, contrary to what one may think, (B2) does not imply the question- 
begging assumption that preferences are interpersonally comparable in terms of strength. 
The idea is that (B2) simply implies the possibility that individual i can occupy individual 
/  s mental location. At such location, individual i has individual f s  very own mental states 
and, in particular, the content and structural properties of f s  very own preferences. As a 
matter of metaphysical possibility, this can happen independently of whether preferences 
are interpersonally comparable in terms of strength. Thus, it may be true that, if personal 
goodness is independent from personal identity, then individual i can live individual f s  life 
and assume f s  individual preferences. However, endowing individual i with f s  preferences 
does not presuppose that f s  preferences are interpersonally comparable in terms of strength 
with individual i’s own preferences.
This move comes at a cost. The result is that Broome’s argument does not prove that 
different people’s preferences are comparable in terms of strength, but rather presupposes 
that in fact they may not be. The reason is that this reply allows for the possibility that 
individual i has individual f s  own preference strengths and, at the same time, that their 
preferences are not comparable in terms of strength. More generally, this move allows for 
the possibility that individual i can live individual f s  life, without sanctioning the 
conclusion that individual i’s life is comparable with individual f s  life in terms of personal 
goodness.
There is another possibility to deal with the initial objection. It consists in modifying 
(Bl*) in the following way.
(Bl**) Personal goodness supervenes on the relevant facts about a person’s 
(realised) preferences.
This move suggests a more indirect, non question-begging, way to argue for the 
interpersonal comparability of preferences. More specifically, the assumption is that
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individual i can be endowed with those facts about individual y’s preference strengths that 
figure in y’s life. Possibly, these facts refer both to the behavioural outputs of f s  
preferences and to the causal variables determining f s  preferences, along the lines 
suggested by Harsanyi’s approach. The difference with Harsanyi’s approach is that these 
are the very facts belonging to y’s life and not facts of the same type. The idea is that, once 
endowed with these facts, necessarily, individual i maps them into preference strengths that 
are identical to y’s. If the facts determining those preferences are interpersonally 
comparable, the conclusion is that individual i forms exactly the same -  interpersonally 
comparable -  preferences as individual j .
Two further objections can be raised. First of all, the success of Broome’s strategy 
depends on whether all the facts about y’s preference strengths are interpersonally 
comparable. In fact, if the inputs of preferences include other mental states with a specific 
intensity, we encounter the same problem as in the case of preferences. Endowing 
individual i with individual y’s mental states presupposes that these mental states are 
interpersonally comparable in terms of strength. Once again, this is question-begging.
Second, the move under consideration presupposes either that the relations connecting 
causal variables to preference strengths, on the one hand, and preference strengths to 
behavioural outputs, on the other hand, are the same for all individuals, or, at least, that it is 
possible to account for potential differences across individuals. Indeed, even if we assume 
that individual i can be endowed with facts about individual y’s preference strengths and 
that all these facts are objective, the conclusion that individual i has preference strengths 
identical to individual y’s follows only if the previous assumption holds. The problem is 
that we cannot take the assumption concerning the interpersonal sameness of the relevant 
causal relations for granted and, as we have seen in the previous chapters, showing that 
such an assumption is sound is not a trivial matter at all.
To conclude, Broome’s thought experiment shows, at best, that, once endowed with all 
the facts about individual y’s preference strengths, individual i has y’s very own utility 
function. However, it does not show that it is possible to compare individual f  s and 
individual y’s preferences in terms of strength. Thereby, it does not show that individual i’s 
and individual y’s utilities are commensurate. Therefore, Broome’s approach is 
unsuccessful.
3. Can functionalism rescue IUCs?
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An alternative strategy consists in exploring the possibilities offered by the adoption of a 
functionalist understanding of preferences. Unlike the previous chapter, this chapter 
focuses on functionalism as a theory about the nature of mental states. Thus, the relevant 
version is psycho-functionalism, not analytic functionalism. According to psycho­
functionalism, preferences are mental states individuated in terms of their causal relations 
with certain inputs, other mental states, and certain behavioural responses8 . 1  shall consider 
two solutions. In common they have the idea that functionalism sanctions the assignment of 
identical preference strengths to different individuals if it is possible to individuate cases 
where their preferences play the same causal role. On the other hand, they differ with 
respect to the cases that are supposed to be relevant for the comparability of different 
people’s preferences. In this section, I shall start by reviewing some of the reasons to think 
that preference strengths are interpersonally incomparable. I shall then proceed by 
illustrating and discussing the first functionalist solution.
3.1 Reasons fo r  incomparability
In general, one of the conditions for the interpersonal comparability of mental states is 
that such mental states have properties in common across individuals. More specifically, if 
one adopts a functionalist understanding of the nature of mental states, sameness of 
properties across individuals is identified by cases where the same type of mental state 
plays the same causal role in different individuals’ minds. In the case of preferences, the 
problem is that it appears to be impossible to identify cases where different people’s 
preferences have the same causal role.
We need to distinguish two types of impossibility and, correspondingly, two types of 
argument that can be made in support of the thesis that preferences are interpersonally 
incomparable in terms of strength. The first is an epistemological argument for 
incomparability. It starts by observing that it is epistemically impossible to identify cases 
where different people’s preferences play the same causal role and argues that the best 
explanation for this impossibility is the ontological incomparability of different people’s 
preference strengths. The second is a conceptual argument for incomparability. It starts by 
observing that it is conceptually impossible to identify cases where different people’s 
preferences play the same causal role and argues that the reason for this impossibility is the 
ontological incomparability of different people’s preference strengths. Both arguments can
8 The relation that preferences have with both inputs and outputs may turn out to be indirect, that is, mediated 
by other mental states that are connected to preferences.
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be made with respect to three cases. The first is the case where different individuals are 
isomorphic at the level of both inputs and outputs. The second is the case where different 
individuals are isomorphic at the level of the relevant functional relations. The third is the 
case where different individuals are isomorphic at he level of both inputs and outputs and at 
the level of the relevant functional relations.
Let us consider the first case. Suppose there are two individuals, i and j. Suppose also 
that the empirical evidence available at time t is the same for both individuals. Under a 
functionalist understanding of the nature of preferences, the admissible empirical evidence 
is constituted by both behavioural outputs and environmental inputs. Suppose that U i(y) =  
uj(y) = 0.6. Can we conclude that their preferences are interpersonally comparable and that 
individual i prefers option y  with the same strength as individual p. Since functionalism 
conceives mental states in terms of causal relations between inputs, other mental states and 
behavioural outputs, identical empirical evidence determines IUCs only if the relevant 
causal relations are the same for all individuals. For instance, suppose that the requirement 
that different individuals respond to the same environmental inputs in the same way is 
violated. It is conceptually possible to imagine a situation where the same environmental 
inputs lead two different individuals to form preferences leading to the same behavioural 
outputs on the basis of different initial mental states. However, if the individuals’ initial 
mental states are different, the intensity of their preferences may also be different, even 
though both the environmental inputs and the behavioural outputs are identical. Suppose 
now that the requirement that different individuals’ mental states interact in the same way 
is violated. It is conceptually possible to imagine a situation where identical initial mental 
states determine preferences with different intensity and yet, ultimately, lead to the same 
behavioural outputs. This result may be due to a double difference somewhere in their 
mind-systems: for instance, the first fault may occur in the conversion of beliefs and desires 
with identical strengths into preferences with identical strengths; the second fault may 
occur in the conversion of preferences with different strengths into intentions leading to 
choices with identical strengths. Coming back to our problem, the epistemological 
argument claims that it is epistemically impossible to identify cases where the relevant 
causal relations are the same for different individuals. By contrast, the conceptual argument 
claims that this impossibility is conceptual. Both arguments conclude that preferences are 
interpersonally incomparable in terms of strength.
Let us consider the third case, from which the second can be derived as an application. 
Suppose there are two individuals, i and j . Suppose that the empirical evidence available at 
time t is the same for both individuals. Suppose also that i and j  respond to the same
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environmental inputs and form their mental states in the same way. If uj(y) = uj(y) = 0.6, 
can we conclude that their preferences are interpersonally comparable and that individual i 
prefers option y with the same strength as individual p. One objection is the following. 
Each individual’s preference domain may include infinite options. Preferences for specific 
options become manifest in certain choice situations and, ceteris paribus, are revealed by 
the behavioural outputs included in the set of admissible empirical evidence. However, 
other preferences do not become manifest because no corresponding choice or behavioural 
opportunity is presented to the individual. Since the intensity of manifest preferences is 
relative to the intensity of all the options in the preference domain, including those that are 
not manifest in observable behaviour, it is conceptually possible to imagine a situation 
where two individuals have different preference strengths even though they are identical 
with respect to the admissible empirical evidence and the relevant causal relations. More 
generally, the epistemological argument claims that it is epistemically impossible to 
identify cases where different individual’s preference strengths are the same, even when 
both the empirical evidence and the relevant functional relations are supposed to be 
identical. By contrast, the conceptual argument claims that this impossibility is conceptual. 
Both arguments conclude that preferences are interpersonally incomparable in terms of 
strength.
3.2 Are preferences unbounded?
The first functionalist argument is concerned with the conceptual argument for 
incomparability and with the second case of conceptual impossibility. More precisely, its 
goal is to show that different people’s preferences are conceptually comparable when the 
individuals are assumed to be isomorphic at the level of the relevant causal relations.
The starting point is the idea is that a functionalist view of preferences leaves room for 
the existence of both a most preferred and a least preferred option, relative to a specific 
preference domain. Once an individual’s preference domain is fixed, so are the top and the 
bottom options in his preference ranking. Since the preferences for the top and bottom 
options play the same causal role for different individuals, in relation to their respective 
preference domain, it follows that preferences are interpersonally comparable in terms of 
strength.
The main objection against this argument is that the existence of a most preferred and a 
least preferred option is conceptually impossible, even when they are relative to a specific 
preference domain, because the number of options included in the preference domain may
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be infinite. The idea is that infinity precludes the existence of both an upper and a lower 
bound in an individual’s preference ranking.
There are at least two ways to counter this objection. The first consists in denying that 
infinity is sufficient to preclude the existence of a most preferred and a least preferred 
option in an individual’s preference ranking. In a nutshell, the thesis is that, even if the 
number of items in the preference domain tends to infinity, this may not,per se, prevent the 
existence of both a best and a worst option in an individual’s preference ranking. In other 
words, infinity alone cannot be the source of conceptual impossibility.
The second consists in arguing that an individuals’ preference domain never includes an 
infinite number of options. This reply invites to consider an individual’s preference domain 
across his entire life. The idea is that, although an individual can potentially consider all 
sorts of options as objects of preferences, at the end of his life he will have considered only 
a certain number of options. This means that, although his lifetime preference domain may 
contain an uncountable number of options, it does not contain an infinite number of 
options. This is enough to make the existence of a most preferred and a least preferred 
option conceptually possible9.
If either one of these replies works, the result is that it is possible to provide a solution to 
the metaphysical problem of IUCs. How about the epistemological problem of IUCs? 
Recall the two goals of a ‘possibility’ argument. The primary goal is to show that it is 
conceptually possible to compare different people’s preferences in terms of strength. The 
secondary goal is to show that this result can be used to defend the epistemic possibility of 
meaningful ICs of preference strength. One objection is that, even if  the first functionalist 
argument can provide a solution to the conceptual problem concerning the interpersonal 
comparability of preference strengths, it does not provide a solution to the epistemological 
problem of IUCs. The main charge is that, although it might be conceptually possible to 
defend the existence of a best and a worst option in each individual’s preference ranking, it 
is not epistemically possible to identify these options. Both when the preference domain 
contains an infinite number of items and when it contains a finite number, the empirical 
evidence leaves the identification of the top and the bottom options in each individual’s 
preference ranking underdetermined. The reason is that, in both cases, the individual may 
form preferences that never become manifest in behavioural outputs, so that no amount of 
empirical evidence is sufficient to detect what the upper and lower bound in the 
individual’s preference ranking really is. The conclusion is that the first functionalist
9 There is at least another way to counter this objection. It consists in arguing that it is conceptually possible 
to reduce an infinite preference domain to a finite one. This is an approach that invites further investigation. 
In what follows, however, I shall ignore this possibility.
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solution does not show that we can have epistemic access to cases where different 
individual’s preferences play the same causal role.
There is a stronger version of this objection. Recall that the first functionalist argument 
assumes that different individuals are isomorphic at the level of the relevant causal 
relations. The argument under consideration does not offer any reason to think that it is 
conceptually possible to compare different people’s preferences in terms of strength when 
this assumption is relaxed. A fortiori, the argument under consideration does not offer any 
reason to think that it is possible to have epistemic access to the facts about the relevant 
causal relations. Indeed, as we have seen in the previous chapters, both empirical and non- 
empirical strategies fail to vindicate the assumption that different individuals both respond 
to the same environmental inputs and form their mental states in the same way. The 
conclusion is that the first functionalist solution fails to solve the epistemological problem 
of IUCs.
4. Bradley’s strategy
4.1 Bradley’s argument
Bradley offers the second functionalist solution that I consider in this chapter10. 
Bradley’s analysis too is concerned with the conceptual argument for incomparability and 
with the second case of conceptual impossibility. More precisely, Bradley’s goal is to show 
that different people’s preferences are conceptually comparable when the individuals are 
assumed to be isomorphic at the level of the relevant causal relations. Bradley confronts the 
problem of ICs of degrees of preference with the problem of ICs of degrees of belief. 
Amongst other things, beliefs differ from preferences because they are supposed to be 
interpersonally comparable. Indeed, the mainstream view holds that there are cases where 
different people’s beliefs play the same causal role, whereas there are no cases where 
different people’s preferences play the same causal role.
Bradley thinks that this conclusion is unwarranted. As shown by Ramsey’s method -  the 
locus classicus of the literature concerning the measurement of degrees of belief -  degrees 
of belief are derived from a preference ordering and a background theory of action. 
Bradley’s suggestion is that, if degrees of belief are interpersonally comparable, relative to 
the background theory o f action used to measure them, there is no conceptual or technical 
reason to hold that degrees of preference are not interpersonally comparable, relative to the
10 See B r a d le y ,  R. [2007b].
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same background theory o f action. The idea is that, relative to the same theory of action, it 
is possible to conceptually identify both cases where different people’s beliefs play the 
same causal role and cases where different people’s preferences play the same causal role. 
To see how, let us examine Ramsey’s method in more detail11.
Ramsey’s problem is that of determining a measure of both degrees of belief and 
degrees of preference from evidence about an agent’s observable (either verbal or non­
verbal) behaviour. The problem lies in the difficulty of measuring two unknown variables 
(i.e. degrees of belief and degrees of preference) while disposing of only one known 
variable (i.e. observable behaviour). Ramsey makes three assumptions. First, he assumes 
that preferences range over a particularly rich set of prospects, which includes conditional 
prospects, that is, prospects that can be expressed with (indicative) conditionals of the form 
x  —► y. Second, he assumes that, for an arbitrary individual i, the empirical evidence, in the 
form of observable behaviour, is sufficient to determine a preference ordering amongst 
prospects. Third, he adopts the expected utility theory as his background theory of action.
In order to measure the intensity of the individual’s attitudes over prospects, Ramsey 
introduces the notion of an ethically neutral proposition. According to Ramsey, “an atomic 
proposition p  is called ethically neutral if two possible worlds differing only in regard to the 
truth of p  are always of equal value”12, or, as Bradley puts it, “a proposition whose truth or 
falsity is a matter of indifference to the agent irrespective of what else is the case”13. 
Ramsey uses the notion of ethically neutral proposition as his Archimedean point. In fact, if 
one assumes the expected utility theory as one’s background theory of action, an ethically 
neutral proposition p  turns out to be believed with degree 0.5 if, for any simple prospects x 
and y such that x  P y, the agent is indifferent between the pairs of more complex prospects 
(p —► jc)  ( - 1  p —> y) and ( p p —* x ) (p —> y). Indeed, this is the only way in which an agent 
preferring jc to y can be indifferent to prospects (p —> x) (-»p  —* y) and ( i  p  —► jc)  (p —► y) if 
he is an expected utility maximizer.
Once the degrees of belief for the ethically neutral proposition p  have been fixed, it is 
possible to assign utility values, that is, numerical values representing degrees of 
preference, to all the prospects in the preference domain. Suppose jc and y are prospects 
such that jc P y. Suppose also that we arbitrarily fix u ( jc)  = 1 and u(y) = 0. Finally, suppose 
that p  is an ethically neutral proposition of degree of belief 0.5. Then, we can find a 
prospect z, such that z is mid-way between jc and y, if the agent is indifferent between the 
pairs of complex prospects (p —> x) (-• p —> y) and ( -•p —*z)(p-+  z). Given that u ( jc)  = 1
11 See Ram sey , F. P. [1990].
12 See R am sey , F. P. [1990], p. 73.
13 See B r a d le y ,  R. [2007b], p. 6.
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and u(y) = 0, we can assign the utility value 0.5 to z, so that u(z) = 0.5. By reiterating this 
procedure, we can assign a measure of preference strength to all the prospects in the 
preference domain. The utility scale so defined is unique up to a positive affine 
transformation.
Once the utility values are fixed, it is possible to assign a probability value to all 
propositions, including those that are not ethically neutral. The task is easier. Given 
Ramsey’s adoption of the expected utility theory as background theory of action, degrees of 
belief are determined accordingly. For instance, the degree of belief on the proposition z 
seen above is given by the following formula:
u(z) -  u (y)
Pr(z) = --------------
u(x) -  u(y)
From this, we can get that the degree of belief on the necessary propositions is equal to 1 
and the degree of belief on the impossible propositions in equal to 0. Thus, Ramsey’s 
method shows that the probability scale so defined is absolutely unique.
As we have seen above, degrees of belief are supposed to be comparable across people, 
whereas degrees of preference are not. According to Bradley, in the former case 
comparability is assured by the fact that it is possible to conceptually identify two points 
with respect to which different people’s beliefs play the same causal role. These are the 
necessary proposition and the impossible proposition. Ultimately, then, different people’s 
degrees of belief are comparable for two reasons: the first is that “it belongs to the concept 
of partial belief’ that there is a maximum and a minimum; the second is that such a 
maximum and minimum are common for different individuals14. By contrast, according to 
Bradley, it does not belong to the concept of degrees of preference that a maximum and a 
minimum exist. Moreover, it does not belong to the concept of degrees of preference that 
the items that occupy the top (the bottom) position in different individuals’ preference 
rankings are preferred with the same strength, for the reasons that we have seen in chapter 
1.
However, Bradley holds that Ramsey’s method has the resources for the conceptual 
identification of at least one point with respect to which different people’s preferences play 
the same causal role. The use of Ramsey’s method is partly complicated by his vague 
characterisation of the relationship occurring between the objects of beliefs, i.e.
14 See Bradley, R. [2007b], p. 8.
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propositions, and the objects of preferences, i.e. prospects. However, as Bradley shows, it is 
possible to avoid inconsistencies by simply postulating that both beliefs and preferences 
range over prospects. According to Bradley, then, in the case of preferences, it is a mistake 
to look for interpersonally common points by trying to find an absolute maximum and an 
absolute minimum. Rather, one of the relevant points is given by the ethically neutral 
prospect, i.e. the prospect with formal properties analogous to the ethically neutral 
proposition. Bradley’s main idea is that different people’s preferences for ethically neutral 
prospects are comparable in terms of strength because they have the same causal force, or 
better, because they manifest “absence of force”15. Although what counts as an ethically 
neutral prospect may differ for different individuals, it nonetheless is the object of zero 
strength preferences, for all individuals. If this is true, the ethically neutral prospect 
identifies the ‘natural’ zero in the utility scale. Moreover, this ‘natural’ zero is common for 
different individuals. This means that, for any two individuals i and j, with ethically neutral 
prospects p  and q, respectively, it is the case that Uiip) = Uj{q) = 0 .
Bradley’s proposal is completed by a suggestion as to how to fix a common unity of the 
scale used to measure preferences. The idea is that the total desirability of all the prospects 
in the preference domain provides a common point for different individuals. Once we 
assume a functionalist understanding of the nature of preferences and identical causal 
relations across individuals, the total available preferential strength is supposed to be the 
same for different individuals. If we understand preferences in terms of their role in the 
individual’s mind, then we may think that their role is fixed by the set of alternatives that 
the individual considers. Thus, everything else being equal, once the set of alternatives is 
fixed, the total available preferential strength is also fixed and is the same for different 
individuals. If this is the case, Bradley’s account shows that “given our background theory 
of action, comparisons of relative strengths of preference are meaningful”16. More 
formally, Bradley’s suggestion is to co-scale different people’s utilities through the 
application of the following formula:
Ui(*)
-------------------------  , for all individuals i
2  for all x  Ui (x)
15 See B r a d le y ,  R. [2007b], p. 9.
16 See Bradley, R. [2007b], p. 9.
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This formula effectively assigns a constant utility value equal to 1 to the total 
desirability of the prospects. Moreover, it preserves the assignment of a utility value equal 
to 0 to the ethically neutral prospect. The result is that it is possible to obtain a zero-one 
utility representation that is comparable across individuals. In other words, Bradley’s 
proposal shows that it is conceptually possible to compare different people’s preferences 
with respect to strength.
4.2 Objections
Bradley’s proposal allows us to measure degrees of preference on a ratio scale on the 
grounds that the ethically neutral prospect identifies a ‘natural’ zero in the preference scale. 
One may ask whether or not this is really the case. Recall that, according to Ramsey, “an 
atomic proposition p  is called ethically neutral if two possible worlds differing only in 
regard to the truth of p  are always of equal value”17. At first sight, it does not follow from 
this quote that p  and ->p bring no value to both possible worlds, but only that they bring 
equal value to them. In this sense, the ethically neutral prospect is not a prospect that the 
agent does not value, but a prospect that the agent values as much as its negation. In terms 
of preferences, this means that, although the intensity of the agent’s preference for the 
ethically neutral prospect p  is equal to the intensity of the agent’s preference for its 
negation -■p, it does not follow that they have null intensity. If this is correct, it is a mistake 
to say that an ethically neutral prospect is a prospect such that the agent is “disposed neither 
to make it or its contrary true”18. Likewise, it is a mistake to say that the utility measure of 
an ethically neutral prospect picks out “absence of force”19. Rather the ethically neutral 
prospect is a prospect such that the agent is equally disposed to make it or its contrary true. 
Likewise, the utility measure of an ethically neutral prospect p  picks out the same force as 
the utility measure of its contrary ip , but not absence of force. In this sense, neutrality is 
not absence of force, but equal force between one prospect and its negation.
This is only a preliminary point. It has no bearing on the issue of comparability. In fact, 
even if the ethically neutral prospect does not identify a ‘natural’ zero in the preference 
scale, comparability can still be proven provided that preferences for ethically neutral 
prospects play the same causal role in different people’s minds. In other words, even if the 
utility measure of an ethically neutral prospect does not pick out “absence of force”, IUCs
17 See R am sey , F. P. [1990], p. 73
18 See Bradley, R. [2007b], p. 9.
19 See Bradley, R. [2007b], p. 9.
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can be meaningful provided that the utility measure of an ethically neutral prospect picks 
out the same causal force across individuals.
As we have seen, the ethically neutral prospect may be different for different 
individuals. Moreover, each individual can have several ethically neutral prospects. If they 
have to have the same causal force inter-personally, such prospects must also have the same 
causal force intra-personally. Minimally, this means that the agent must be indifferent 
between different ethically neutral prospects. If, for each individual, different ethically 
neutral prospects are preferred with different strength, that is, if each individual sets 
neutrality at different levels, then it follows that ethically neutral prospects do not pick out 
the same causal force across individuals. At the very least, it appears that we need to 
impose a requirement of rationality in order to constraint the agent’s preferences over 
ethically neutral prospect. According to it, rationality requires an agent to be indifferent 
between ethically neutral prospects.
However, it is possible to show that this is not an additional constraint on the agent’s 
preferences, but rather a mathematical implication of the definition of ethically neutral 
prospect20. Indeed, for p  to be an ethically neutral prospect, it is not sufficient that the agent 
be indifferent between the prospect p  and its opposite ~>p. Instead, p  is ethically neutral if 
and only if the agent is indifferent between the prospect (p& q ) and the prospect (~>p & q), 
for any q . If p  is ethically neutral in this sense, then it is the case that, for all q, u(p &q) = 
u (ip  & q). Moreover, the following identities hold:
u(q) = Prip | q) u(p & q) + Pr(->p \ q) u(-</? & q)
= Pr(p | q) uip &q) + Pr(->p \ q) u(p & q), since u(p & q) = u(-ip & q)
= u(p&  q).
Now, if we suppose that q is also an ethically neutral prospect, it follows by the same 
token that uip) = u(p & q). Therefore, by transitivity of identities, it is the case that u(p) = 
u(p & q) = u(q). This shows that, if two prospects are ethically neutral, necessarily, the 
individual prefers them with equal strength and is, thereby, indifferent between them. In 
turn, this implies that we do not need to impose any requirement of rationality as the 
possibility that the agent is not indifferent between ethically neutral prospects is simply 
excluded by the definition of ethical neutrality.
The previous argument takes care of the worry that preferences for ethically neutral 
prospects may not play the same causal role in the intra-personal case. At the same time,
201 owe this point and its mathematical proof to my examiners Christian List and Wlodek Rabinowicz.
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the argument provides further indirect support for the claim that preferences for ethically 
neutral prospects play the same causal role in the inter-personal case as well. After all, 
these preferences are identified in terms of functional relations that are common across 
individuals. Bradley’s proposal may work. What about his other suggestion that different 
individuals possess identical total preferential strength? Bradley invites us to conceive the 
problem of forming preference strengths as the problem of allocating the total preferential 
strength available amongst the options in the preference domain. Thus, if the functional 
relations characterising preferences are the same across individuals and if the set of 
prospects under consideration is fixed, Bradley argues that the total strength available to 
each individual is the same.
We can raise the following objection. It is perhaps true, as Bradley suggests, that once 
the set of alternatives is fixed, the total preferential strength available to each individual is 
also fixed. However, it is tempting to resist Bradley’s further claim that, if everything else 
is equal, i.e. if the causal relations are the same across individuals, necessarily, the total 
available preferential strength is the same for all individuals. After all, the preference 
domain may not be the same for different individuals and it may include a different number 
of options. Even if the underlying processing mechanisms are the same across individuals, 
it may be the case that the preference strength assigned to each option is simply added, in 
one way or another, rather than being divided between these options. According to Bradley, 
from a functionalist point of view, the possibility of a difference in total strength is simply 
an illusion. However, as the previous remarks suggest, it is not clear why we should think 
that this is really the case.
Once again, however, here I am more interested in a different kind of objection, 
concerning the implications that Bradley’s argument has for the epistemological problem of 
IUCs. At first sight, Bradley’s solution is more promising than the first functionalist 
solution. If the ethically neutral prospect is the object with respect to which different 
people’s preferences play the same causal role, then there are no conceptual obstacles 
preventing us to have epistemic access to this kind of object. In the same way in which we 
can epistemically identify both the necessary proposition and the impossible proposition in 
the case of degrees of belief, so we can epistemically identify the ethically neutral prospect 
in the case of degrees of preference.
The matter is more complicated when we consider the other point that different 
individuals are supposed to have in common. Identifying the total desirability available to 
an individual seems to demand the identification of all the prospects in his preference 
domain. However, this task runs into problems similar to those that we have seen in the
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context of the first functionalist solution. In fact, both when the preference domain contains 
an infinite number of items and when it contains a finite number of items, the empirical 
evidence leaves the identification of all the options underdetermined because some 
preferences may never become manifest. On the other hand, if identifying the total 
available preference strength does not require us to identify all the other prospects in an 
individual’s preference domain, then we need a principled explanation of how we can have 
epistemic access to total desirability. The problem is that not only an explanation of this 
kind is not currently available but that no such explanation seems to exist.
Nevertheless, it is worth noticing one point. If it is possible to epistemically individuate 
different people’s preferences for ethically neutral prospects, then Bradley’s proposal 
achieves at least one interesting result. Indeed, ethically neutral prospects define a zero-line 
that is common across individuals. Moreover, this is independent from whether ethically 
neutral prospects define a ‘natural’ zero or whether they simply define an ‘arbitrary’ zero. 
Hence, Bradley shows that we can have scientific knowledge of at least one kind of ICs of 
preference strength, namely, ICs with respect to an interpersonally significant zero-line, of 
the kind proposed by List21. As we have seen in chapter 1, this means that we can make 
meaningful ICs of utility levels between individuals with utility, respectively, greater than / 
equal to / less than the utility value associated to their ethically neutral prospects.
Before concluding, I want to point out that there is yet a stronger objection that one can 
present against Bradley. As a matter of fact, Bradley’s proposal is relative to a background 
theory of action, namely, the expected utility theory. Under a realist interpretation, such a 
theory is supposed to represent the relevant causal relations underlying the formation of 
different individuals’ preferences. Thus, the second functionalist argument is based on the 
assumption that different individuals are isomorphic at the level of the relevant functional 
relations. Once again, the argument under consideration does not offer any reason to think 
that it is conceptually possible to compare different people’s preferences in terms of 
strength when this assumption is relaxed. Most importantly, the argument under 
consideration does not offer any reason to think that it is possible to have epistemic access 
to the facts about the relevant causal relations. Since both empirical and non-empirical 
strategies fail to vindicate the assumption that different individuals both respond to the 
same environmental inputs and form their mental states in the same way, the conclusion is 
that the second functionalist solution fails to solve the epistemological problem of IUCs.
5. Conclusion
21 See List, C. [2003].
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In this chapter, I considered three ‘possibility’ arguments attempting to solve the 
problem of IUCs. Their primary goal is to show that different people’s preferences are 
comparable in terms of strength. Their secondary goal is to show that it is possible to have 
scientific knowledge of, or, at least, scientifically justified beliefs about how different 
people’s preferences compare in terms of strength.
The first argument is based on Broome’s work on personal goodness. It claims that, if 
individual preferences are independent from personal identity, then different people’s 
preferences are interpersonally comparable in terms of strength, provided that each person 
belongs to at least one overlapping pair and that everyone is connected to everyone else by 
a chain of overlapping pairs. If this is the case, each person’s utility scale is universal and it 
is thereby possible to have commensurable interpersonal utilities. In this chapter I rejected 
this argument on the grounds that it is either question-begging or not sufficient to show that 
preference strengths are interpersonally comparable.
The second and the third argument are based on a functionalist understanding of the 
nature of preferences. Both arguments claim that it is conceptually possible to identify two 
points with respect to which different people’s preferences play the same causal role. If this 
is the case, then functionalism allows us to conclude that preferences are interpersonally 
comparable in terms of strength. The former argument claims that these points are given by 
the most preferred and by the least preferred option, respectively. The latter argument -  
offered by Bradley -  claims that one point is given by the ethically neutral prospect, while 
the other is given by the total desirability of all prospects.
If either one of these solutions works, it provides a solution to the metaphysical problem 
of IUCs. This notwithstanding, I argued that both solutions fail to solve the epistemological 
problem of IUCs. On the one hand, it is epistemically impossible to identify those cases 
where different people’s preferences play the same causal role. On the other hand, neither 
solution shows that the relevant causal relations are really the same across individuals.
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CHAPTER 5 
Transcendental arguments
1. Introduction
The solutions to the problem of IUCs based on an inference to the best explanation 
type of argument and on a nativist argument fail to show that we can have scientific 
knowledge of, or, at least, scientifically justified, ICs of preference strength. This raises 
the suspicion that the difficulty in solving the problem of IUCs stems from the 
incomparability of preferences with respect to the dimension of strength and not just 
from epistemological limitations. As a consequence, some authors elaborate ‘in 
principle’ solutions to the problem of IUCs. These solutions are based on ‘possibility’ 
arguments. Their primary goal is to show that different people’s preference strengths are 
comparable. Their secondary goal is to show that it is possible, in principle but not by 
means of empirical or pragmatic considerations only, to have scientific knowledge of, or 
scientifically justified beliefs about, how different people’s preferences compare in 
terms of strength.
In chapter 4, we have examined three ‘possibility’ arguments. Interestingly, the 
previous analysis emphasises that, although these arguments differ with respect to their 
capacity to solve the conceptual problem concerning the interpersonal comparability of 
preference strengths, they all fail to solve the epistemological problem of IUCs on the 
same ground, i.e. they do not prove that different individuals respond to the 
environment and form mental states in the same way. In this chapter, I want to examine 
another ‘possibility’ argument, whose goal is precisely to argue in favour of the 
interpersonal comparability of preference strengths by defending the assumption that the 
causal relations determining preferences are the same across individuals.
Typically, this argument is formulated in the context of the explanation of the 
ordinary people’s mindreading capacity at the personal level of description, that is, at 
the level at which persons, as such, think about or interpret other people’s mental and 
overt behaviour. More specifically, it is formulated in the context of mindreading 
accounts that are based on an a priori assumption of rationality. According to these 
accounts, a necessary and a priori condition for ascribing mental states to another agent 
or system is that such an agent or system be rational, at least to a large extent. This
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assumption is the basis for a transcendental solution to the problem of IUCs. In general, 
the first step consists in anchoring mental state comparability to rationality. The 
assumption that different individuals are commonly rational -  it is argued -  implies the 
assumption that their mental states are interpersonally comparable. The second step 
consists in defending the necessary role of the background assumption of rationality for 
the possibility of correctly interpreting other people’s behaviour, by means of a 
transcendental argument. If this defence is successful, it follows that different people’s 
mental states are indeed comparable.
In this chapter I shall pursue two goals. The first is to show that this strategy is 
unsuccessful. The main objection against it is that it is based on a ‘strong’ 
transcendental argument, which invalidly infers a conclusion about the world -  i.e. the 
interpersonal comparability of preferences in terms of strength -  from a fact about our 
psychological reality -  the fact that we take correct interpretation to be possible. The 
second goal is to show that a strategy of the same kind can nonetheless achieve results 
of anti-sceptical significance on the basis of a more ‘modest’ transcendental argument. 
Crucially, this argument avoids inferring a conclusion about the world and validly infers 
a conclusion about our psychological reality -  i.e. that we take preference strengths to 
be comparable in terms of strength. I shall argue that, if we combine such a ‘modest’ 
transcendental argument with coherentism about justification, it is possible to show, at 
least, that ICs of preference strength can be (scientifically) justified.
I shall proceed as follows. In section 2 ,1 shall offer some very general remarks about 
the role of the background assumption of rationality for mindreading and ICs of 
preference strength. In section 3, I shall illustrate Davidson’s argument in favour of 
comparability, which allegedly provides the paradigm of a transcendental strategy to 
solve the problem of IUCs. In section 4, I shall reconstruct the general form of his 
‘strong’ transcendental argument. In Davidson’s framework, the background 
assumption of rationality is part of a broader set of conditions, which are claimed to be 
necessary for the possibility of correct interpretation. I shall try to characterise these 
conditions in more detail in section 5. In section 6 , I shall present some objections 
against transcendental arguments of a strong form. These objections cast more than one 
doubt on the transcendental strategy for solving the problem of IUCs. In section 7, I 
shall present and try to defend a more ‘modest’ transcendental argument. I shall discuss 
its implications for the problem of IUCs in section 8 . Finally, I shall summarise my 
findings in the conclusion.
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2. The background assumption of rationality
In chapter 3, we have considered two explanations of the ordinary people’s 
mindreading capacity, i.e. Simulation Theory (ST) and Theory Theory (TT), at the sub­
personal level of description. However, according to some authors, ST and TT should 
be conceived as hypotheses formulated at the personal level of description, that is, at the 
level at which persons, as such, think about or interpret other people’s mental and overt 
behaviour1. The move from the sub-personal to the personal level of analysis is not 
particularly helpful for the purpose of finding a positive solution to the problem of IUCs 
if one assumes that the epistemological status of both ST and TT is empirical. Yet, this 
is not the only possibility. The move to the personal level is often associated with an 
understanding of the epistemological status of both ST and TT as a priori. This stance is 
typically adopted by versions of both ST and TT that are based on a background 
assumption of rationality. Let us consider these accounts in more detail.
Jean Heal is the main exponent of a ST account of mindreading based on a 
background assumption of rationality2. As we have seen in chapter 3, mental simulation 
involves replicating another individual’s mental life in specific circumstances by 
imagining being subject to the same, or relevantly similar, circumstances. At the sub­
personal level of description, simulation is conceived in terms of information- 
processing mechanisms. By contrast, at the personal level of description, simulation is 
conceived as the activity of “thinking about the same subject matter”. According to 
Heal, in order to replicate another agent’s mental life, the simulator must be capable of 
thinking about the same content of the simulated agent’s mental states, on the one hand; 
and of having the same attitudes as the simulated agent, on the other hand. As such, 
simulation is a form of “co-cognition”3. According to Heal, simulation so conceived 
involves construing the interaction between the agent’s mental states as rational, at least 
when simulation concerns certain subject matters. This means that the replication of 
another individual’s mental life is based on the assumption that his mind’s working 
satisfies certain criteria of rationality. In the same vein, TT accounts of mental 
ascription that are based on a background assumption of rationality suggest that the 
folks’ mindreading capacity is based on the possession of a ‘theory of mind’ that 
represents other people’s mental life as rational.
1 See H ea l , J. [1994], [1998a,b], [2000] and Go r d o n , R. [1992].
2 See, in particular, Heal, J. [1998a,b].
3 See H ea l , J. [1998a], pp. 483-484.
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It is controversial whether the background assumption of rationality turns these 
mindreading accounts into rationality theory (RT) accounts or whether it is compatible 
with the key features of TT and ST. The basic idea underlying RT is that mental 
ascription consists in rationalising an agent’s behaviour, that is, in ascribing to him the 
mental states that it would be rational for him to have. The main exponents of a RT 
approach are Davidson and Dennett4. RT accounts seem to contrast with, rather than 
instantiate, both ST and TT accounts for at least two reasons. The first is that rationality 
is usually construed as a normative notion and its normative character does not fit well 
with the causal approaches advocated by ST and TT. The second is that RT seems to 
imply that the meaning of mental terms is given by the set of normative requirements 
that the criteria of rationality set on mental states. This contrasts with both analytic 
functionalism, according to which the meaning of mental states is given by the set of 
causal laws in which those mental states are embedded5; and with experientialism, 
according to which the meaning of mental states is given by the more or less conscious 
experience that the subject has of them.
Although these reasons are often thought to be sufficient to discard both RT accounts 
and the background assumption of rationality, recent works on rationality suggest the 
possibility of a reconciliation between RT, on the one hand, and TT and ST, on the 
other hand. Many authors have suggested that we should not understand rationality as a 
normative notion, but rather as a quasi-normative notion. Rationality establishes the 
standards for the proper working of the mind-system6. This means that an individual is 
rational to the extent that his mind-system works properly. This is not equivalent to 
saying that he is rational if he does what he ought to do, from a normative point of view. 
Any system -  even a causal one -  works properly with respect to certain specific 
criteria. The fact that proper working is assessed with respect to these standards is 
compatible with the fact that the elements constituting the system interact in a causal 
way. If we understand rationality in this way, then rationality-based accounts suggest 
that an individual’s mind works properly if and only if the interaction between his 
mental states conforms to certain standards, or requirements, of rationality. In this 
sense, RT accounts may as well be instances of both ST and TT accounts.
How can ST and TT explain the folks’ ICs of preference strength, at the personal 
level of description, under a background assumption of rationality? Let us consider TT 
first. The first step concerns third-person mental ascription. The judge observes the
4 See Davidson, D. [1984] and Dennett, D. [1987].
5 See Goldman, A. [2002] and [2006], chapter 3.
6 See Scanlon, T. [1998] and [forthcoming], Kolodny, N. [2005], Yasgur, S. [2008]
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relevant external events (i.e. instances of the input-types and output-types that are 
included in the definition of preferences) and infers both the other relevant mental states 
(i.e. tokens of the mental state-types that are included in the definition of preferences) 
and the relevant preferences, by reference to the causal relations postulated by the ToM 
that he -  more or less tacitly -  possesses. The background assumption of rationality 
constraints the subject’s inferences by assuming that the interaction of people’s mental 
states obeys, ceteris paribus, certain standards of rationality.
The second step concerns first-person mental ascription. It is unclear whether or not, 
and how, the background assumption of rationality operates in the first-person case. 
According to the orthodox view, it constraints the subject’s inferences by postulating 
that the interaction of his own mental states obeys, ceteris paribus, certain standards of 
rationality, in exactly the same way as it does in third-personal mental ascription. On 
the basis of the ToM in his possession, the subject ascribes preferences with a specific 
content and strength both to himself and to the other individual. Finally, in the last 
stage, the subject compares the intensity of his preferences with the intensity of the 
other individuals’ preferences.
Let us now consider ST. Third-person mental ascription involves, first, observing the 
external events that are relevant for the individuation of the simulated agent’s initial 
mental states and, then, replicating the interaction of the simulated agent’s mental states. 
Once again, the background assumption of rationality constrains simulation by holding 
that the interaction of people’s mental states obeys, ceteris paribus, certain standards of 
rationality. On the basis of simulation, the interpreter ascribes preferences with a 
specific content and strength both to himself and to the other individual. In the last step, 
he compares the intensity of his own preferences with the intensity of the simulated 
agent’s preferences.
3. Davidson’s strategy
In this section I shall illustrate Davidson’s position. The analysis of his argument is 
particularly instructive in order to highlight some of the features of a transcendental 
solution to the problem of IUCs. Indeed, Davidson is one of the leading figures 
defending the thesis that the very possibility of correctly interpreting other people’s 
behaviour implies that preferences are interpersonally comparable in terms of strength. 
Although his overall project is a paradigm of a RT approach to mindreading, his
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argument can be applied, with few modifications, both to TT and ST rationality-based 
accounts.
The starting point of Davidson’s investigation is the characterisation of the 
theoretical framework in which the problem of IUCs arises as a sequence of three steps, 
dealing with7:
( 1 ) the determination of individual preferences and their representation through a 
(family of) utility function(s);
(2 ) the interpersonal comparison of utilities;
(3) the formulation of the judgment of interest.
In this framework, the problem of IUCs arises at the second stage. However, 
according to Davidson, the difficulties in finding a positive solution suggest that this 
theoretical framework is the source of the problem and should be rejected. There are at 
least two possibilities. The first consists in denying that IUCs are factual statements and 
maintaining that they are (part of) either normative or evaluative judgments. This means 
that the second and the third step are much more interdependent and difficult to 
distinguish than suggested by the ‘standard picture’, up to the point where they mesh 
together8. By contrast, Davidson emphasises the interdependence existing between the 
first and the second stage in the ‘standard picture’. Without rejecting the connection 
between IUCs and normative judgments, Davidson claims that the very attribution of 
preferences to another individual involves an interpersonal comparison between the 
interpreter’s and the agent’s preferences. As a consequence, according to Davidson, the 
basis for IUCs is provided by the principle that guides the ascription of preferences and 
other mental states to other individuals, namely, the Principle of Charity (PoC, for 
short). This is how Davidson expresses the point: “I think interpersonal comparisons 
have a basis in the following sense: in the process of attributing propositional attitudes 
like beliefs, desires, and preferences to others, interpersonal comparisons are necessarily 
made”. In the case of evaluative attitudes like preferences, this does not mean that “the 
attributer consciously or unconsciously makes a comparison, but that in the process of 
attribution the attributer necessarily uses his own values in a way that provides a basis 
for comparison; a comparison is implied in the attribution”9.
7 See D a v idson , D. [1986], reprinted in D a v id so n , D. [2004].
8 Cfr. Ro b b in s , L. [1932], Jeffrey , R. [1971], Sch ic k , F. [1971], and H a m m o n d , P. [1991].
9 Davidson, D. [2004], p. 67.
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Let us try to be more specific about the nature of this comparison. In a Davidsonian 
framework, interpretation has two features. Like scientific inquiries in other domains, it 
starts by characterising the object to be explained as a system, where theoretical entities 
interact within a certain structure. Unlike scientific inquiries in other domains, it 
proceeds by assuming that both the explaining agent and the system to be explained, i.e. 
the interpreter and the interpreted agent, are systems of the same kind. This second 
feature has two crucial implications for interpretation. On the one hand, it implies that 
the interpreter’s and the interpreted agent’s mind-systems share the same theoretical 
entities, i.e. the same mental state-types, and the same structure, i.e. the way mental 
states interact. On the other hand, it suggests that the default interpretive procedure 
consists in projecting the interpreter’s standards for individuating the content, the type, 
the properties and the structure of mental states into the interpreted agent. In particular, 
as far as the issue of content individuation is concerned, the interpreter projects his own 
standards of truth, in the case of doxastic attitudes, and his own standards of value, in 
the case of evaluative attitudes. On the other hand, as far as the issue of structure is 
concerned, the interpreter projects his standards of rationality in order to establish a 
relation between different mental states.
In the light of these features, interpretation involves a comparison between the 
interpreter’s and the interpreted agent’s mental states, in certain relevant dimensions, 
from the start. First, the interpreter assumes that the observed agent’s mental states play 
a role similar to the role played by his own mental states. This implies that the 
interpreter assumes that the agent’s preferences, desires and beliefs possess a dimension 
of strength. Second, the interpreter assumes that, ceteris paribus, the observed agent 
believes, values, desires p  if and only if he believes, values, desires p. This means that 
the interpreter assumes that the agent has, ceteris paribus, the same beliefs, values, 
desires, etc. that he has. Third, the interpreter assumes that the agent’s mental states 
obey standards of rationality similar to his. According to Davidson, this means 
assuming that the agent’s preferences are consistent in a specified way.
The projection establishes a comparison in the sense that it sanctions the ascription of 
similarities and differences between the interpreter’s and the agent’s mental states 
across the relevant dimensions. For instance, in the case of preferences, the interpreter 
can attribute irrational preferences to the agent, when they do not satisfy the standards 
of rationality recognised by the interpreter. Moreover, the interpreter can relate the 
agent’s preferences to objects different from those that provide the content of his 
preferences. Finally he can ascribe preferences to the agent towards the same objects but
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with different intensity. According to Davidson, differences can be tolerated up to a 
certain extent, that is, up to the point where the agent’s behaviour remains intelligible. 
However, this is enough to establish an interpersonal comparison between the 
interpreter’s and the agent’s mental states.
It is worth emphasising that, although the interpreter’s projection implies a 
comparison, “[it] does not amount to a comparative judgment”, but rather “[i]t 
establishes a basis for comparative judgments”10. In other words, the ascription of 
mental states to another agent does not involve making ICs. That is, it does not end up 
with a conscious or unconscious comparative judgment. Instead, by establishing a 
comparison between the interpreter’s and the agent’s mental states, it provides the 
ground for the explicit comparative judgment, which is made on the basis of such an 
ascription at a later stage.
According to Davidson, the PoC is the principle recommending the interpreter’s 
projection as the starting point for the interpretation of other people’s behaviour. 
Davidson argues that the PoC is required in order to optimize agreement between the 
interpreter and the agent and, thereby, to make understanding possible. According to 
him, this is not “an empirical claim or an assumption for the sake of science”. The PoC 
is neither discovered, nor normatively chosen, but it is an a priori principle11 and “a 
necessary condition of correct interpretation”12.
We may read Davidson as offering an a priori argument for thinking that preferences 
are interpersonally comparable in terms of strength13. The interpreter’s projection 
establishes a comparison between the interpreter’s and the agent’s preferences in certain 
relevant dimensions. Since such a projection endows the agent’s preferences with a 
dimension of strength, it crucially establishes a comparison between the interpreter’s 
and the agent’s preference strengths. The projection is required by the PoC. Crucially, it 
is not just the case that the interpreter takes the agent’s preferences to be interpersonally 
comparable in terms of strength, as a result of the projection. Rather, as the PoC is an a 
priori principle, which is necessary for the correct interpretation of other people’s 
behaviour, Davidson offers an a priori reason to conclude that it is also the case that the 
interpreter’s and the agent’s preferences really are interpersonally comparable in terms 
of strength.
10 D a v id so n , D. [2004], p. 71.
11 D a v id so n , D. [2004], p. 73.
12 D a v idson , D. [2004], p. 72.
13 For instance, W ein tra u b , R. [1998] reads Davidson as offering an argument of this kind and rejects it.
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4. A ‘strong’ transcendental argument
The success of Davidson’s strategy crucially depends on the soundness of two 
assumptions. The first is that correct interpretation of other people’s behaviour is 
possible. The second is that the PoC is necessary for correct interpretation to be 
possible. Thus, the argument takes the form of a ‘strong’ transcendental argument. The 
general idea behind a ‘strong’ transcendental argument is that we can reason from the 
fact that we possess a cognitive ability, first, to the individuation of the conditions that 
support our ability and, second, to the truth of those conditions. The argument goes as 
follows:
(1) We posses the ability to 0;
(2) We could not 0  without X ;
(3) Hence, X  is true.
In the case under consideration, X  is the ‘PoC’ while 0  is not just ‘interpreting each 
other, but, more strongly, ‘correctly interpreting each other’. The argument becomes:
(1) We posses the ability to correctly interpret each other;
(2) We could not interpret each other correctly without the PoC;
(3) Hence, the PoC is true.
This argument can be used to defend the thesis that preference strengths are 
interpersonally comparable in virtue of the following additional assumption:
(3.1) The PoC implies that the interpreter’s and the interpreted agent’s preferences 
are comparable in terms of strength;
If (3) is sound, that is, if the PoC is true, the conclusion is that the interpreter’s and 
the interpreted agent’s preferences are indeed comparable in terms of strength.
This conclusion completes the first part of a ‘possibility’ argument. What about the 
second part, that is, the part aimed at showing that it is possible to have scientific 
knowledge of, or scientifically justified beliefs about, how different people’s 
preferences compare in terms of strength? Indeed, the ‘strong’ transcendental argument 
can offer an indirect solution also to the epistemological problem of IUCs. Recall that
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the arguments examined in the previous chapter are subject to two objections. The main 
objection is that they do not prove that the relevant causal relations are the same across 
individuals. The second objection is that they require an epistemically impossible 
individuation of all the prospects in each individual’s preference domain. The ‘strong’ 
transcendental argument is invulnerable to either objection.
Let us consider the first. The ‘strong’ transcendental argument grounds the 
interpersonal comparability of different people’s preferences on the fact that they 
possess both mental states with identical properties and mind-systems with identical 
structure. In other words, on the one hand, the ‘strong’ transcendental argument grounds 
interpersonal comparability on the assumption that different people respond to the 
environmental inputs and form their preferences in the same way and, on the other hand, 
it shows that this assumption is sound. This refuses the first objection.
Let us consider the second. As seen above, although interpretation does not involve 
making any explicit or implicit IC judgments, it establishes a basis for the IC judgments 
made at a later stage. Such judgments are based on the ascription of preferences with a 
specific content and strength. In turn, the content of preferences is individuated on the 
basis of the evidence available in specific circumstances. However, this does not 
presuppose individuating all the prospects included in the individual’s preference 
domain. Therefore, the ‘strong’ transcendental argument is not subject to the second 
objection either.
If preference strengths are interpersonally comparable from the start, we can argue 
that, for any two individuals, if all the relevant evidence is the same, we are justified in 
assuming that their preference strengths are also the same. Within an evidentialist 
framework, justification comes from the fact that ICs of preference strength are 
determined on the basis of both non-empirical evidence concerning the relevant causal 
relations and empirical evidence concerning the object and the properties of the 
individual’s preferences. Within a reliabilist framework, justification comes from the 
fact that ICs of preference strength are reliably determined on the basis of a non- 
empirical principle, i.e. the PoC, in combination with the relevant empirical evidence14. 
Finally, if their preference strengths are the same, the individuals have the same utility 
functions. For any two individuals, such an isomorphic situation provides the 
benchmark for the ascription of justifiable differences in their utility values, when the
14 On the one hand, being a necessary condition for correct interpretation, the PoC is reliable for the 
purpose of interpreting other people’s behaviour. On the other hand, the PoC is also reliable for the 
purpose of making ICs of preference strength, because correct interpretation is necessarily achieved by 
establishing a comparison between the interpreter’s and the interpreted agent’s mental states,.
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relevant empirical evidence is not the same. The conclusion is that, if sound, the 
‘strong’ transcendental argument shows that it is possible to have scientifically justified 
IUCs.
5. The Principle of Charity and The Principle of Similarity
Given the centrality of the PoC, the first step for assessing the transcendental strategy 
consists in providing a more precise definition of the principle itself. This task is 
surprisingly difficult. To begin with, none of the authors that rely on the PoC has 
offered any explicit formulation of it. Moreover, given that the PoC is a set of different 
conditions, there may be competing definitions depending both on what conditions are 
included and on how they are defined. Here I shall consider some alternative 
characterisations.
A caveat is in order. In order to keep my analysis applicable to both TT and ST 
accounts, I shall conceive rationality as the proper working of an individual’s mind. 
Thus, the conditions more directly connected to rationality, in each of the following 
characterisations, should be read as specifying what it means for an individual’s mind to 
work properly. Broadly speaking, there are two competing approaches to rationality. 
The classic approach develops the idea of rationality as consistency. Accordingly, an 
individual’s mind works properly if and only if the interaction between his mental states 
obeys the requirements of logic. A more recent approach connects rationality to reasons. 
Accordingly, an individual’s mind works properly if and only if the interaction between 
his mental states constitutes an appropriate response to reasons15.
Let us start by characterising the PoC in accordance with the first approach to 
rationality. From his overall work on radical interpretation, we can formulate 
Davidson’s version of the PoC as the combination of the following principles.
P0 C1
1. The principle o f correspondence: for any interpreter i and agent j , ceteris 
paribus, if i and j  were to be subject to the same environmental causes, they 
would have the same beliefs, values, desires, etc.
2. The principle o f coherence: for any agent j , ceteris paribus, j  has, for the most 
part, logically consistent mental states.
15 See Y A SG U R , S. [2008]. On rationality as appropriate response to reasons, see also Raz, J. [1999].
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3. The principle o f truth: for any agent j , ceteris paribus, f s  beliefs are, for the 
most part, true.
4. The principle o f good: for any agent j, ceteris paribus, j, for the most part, 
desires, values, prefers what is desirable, valuable, preferable16.
The principle of correspondence is very close to Harsanyi’s ‘similarity postulate’ 
Like Harsanyi, Davidson believes that “similar causes beget similar evaluations in 
interpreter and interpreted”17. The first difference is that Davidson extends this idea to 
doxastic attitudes as well. The second difference concerns the justificatory strategy. 
Harsanyi attempts to justify his ‘similarity postulate’ by appealing to pragmatic 
considerations. Instead, Davidson argues a priori that the principle of correspondence, 
as part of the PoC, is necessary for correct interpretation18.
The principle of coherence claims that the agent’s attitudes are, for the most part, 
logically consistent. According to Davidson, this is a requirement of minimal 
rationality. Since the principle of correspondence specifically applies to particular 
beliefs and evaluations, that is, to beliefs and evaluations prompted by the surrounding 
environment, the principle of coherence provides a bridge between particular mental 
states and more abstract and theoretical ones. More precisely, it allows the interpreter to 
tentatively infer the latter from the former on the basis of the rules of inference of logic.
Finally, the principle of truth claims that most of the agent’s beliefs are true. 
Similarly, the principle of good claims that most of the agent’s evaluations are correct. 
Davidson insists particularly on the principle of truth, whereas he never explicitly 
mentions the principle of good as part of the PoC. However, such a principle is the 
counterpart of the principle of truth for evaluative attitudes. Therefore, as a matter of 
internal consistency, it seems to be a crucial part of the PoC19.
16 The ceteris paribus clause takes into account contingent errors made by either the interpreter or the 
interpreted agent. The ‘for the most part’ clause takes into account errors due to the state o f knowledge of 
the communities of which the interpreter and the interpreted agent are part.
17 See D a v idson , D. [2004], p. 72.
18 Perhaps, there is another difference. For the success of his overall project, Davidson may need a 
stronger formulation of the principle of correspondence, according to which, for any interpreter i and 
agent j , ceteris paribus, i and j  believe, value, desire p  if  and only if they are subject to the same 
environmental causes. This is because the role of the Principle o f Correspondence consists in improving a 
weaker Principle of Agreement, according to which, for any interpreter i and agent j ,  ceteris paribus, j  
believes, values, desires p  if and only if i believes, values, desires p. For the success of Davidson’s overall 
theory of radical interpretation, Agreement is not enough because the interpreter may come to agree with 
the agent in a spurious way, that is, on the basis of either completely different reasons or mistakes or 
deviant causal chains, etc. By contrast, the stronger version of the principle of correspondence would 
guarantee that exposure to the same environmental conditions is, ceteris paribus, a necessary and 
sufficient condition for agreement. Cff. Lepo r e , E. and K., Lu d w ig  [2005], chapter 12.
19 Dennett’s version of the PoC differs only slightly from Davidson’s and includes the following 
principles:
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Let us consider now how the PoC can be characterised when rationality is defined in 
terms of the individual’s appropriate response to reasons. Clearly, the definition of 
rationality depends both on how the notion of reasons is conceived and on how the idea 
of ‘appropriate response’ is spelt out. As far as the former issue is concerned, I shall
adopt, without arguing for it, an externalist understanding of reasons, according to
00which reasons are facts . If we adopt such a view of reasons, we may understand 
external inputs as providing an individual with reasons for specific mental states and/or 
behaviours.
As far as the latter issue is concerned, I shall maintain, without arguing for it, that an 
individual responds appropriately to reasons if and only if he recognises the relevant 
reasons and forms his mental states in accordance with the reasons that he recognises. 
Following Yasgur, we can characterise the notion of appropriate response to reasons in 
terms of the notions of reasonableness and rationality21. The problem consists in 
specifying these notions more precisely. We can say that an individual is reasonable if 
and only if, ceteris paribus, he recognises (at least) a reason for believing, valuing, 
desiring p  (and only provided that such a reason exists)22. Moreover, we can say that an 
individual is rational if and only if he forms his mental states in accordance with the 
reasons that he recognises.
With these notions in mind, we can try to formulate an alternative version of the 
PoC.
PoC?
1. The principle o f reasonableness: for any interpreter i and agent j ,  ceteris 
paribus, if i and j  were to be subject to the same environmental circumstances,
1. The principle o f  coherence: for any agent j ,  ceteris paribus, j  has, for the most part, logically 
consistent mental states.
2. The principle o f  closure: for any agent j , ceteris paribus,/ s  belief-set is closed under entailment.
3. The principle o f  truth: for any agent j ,  ceteris paribus, j ’s beliefs are mostly true.
4. The principle o f  good: for any agent j ,  ceteris paribus, j ,  for the most part, desires, values, 
prefers what is desirable, valuable, preferable.
This characterisation follows closely, although it is not identical to, Fodor’s and Lepore’s analysis. See 
F o d o r , J. and E., Lepo r e  [1992].
20 See Ra z , J. [1975] and [1999]. The externalist view contrasts with an internalist understanding of 
reasons, according to which reasons are mental states. See W illia m s , B. [1981].
21 This way of defining ‘rationality’, ‘reasonableness’ and the corresponding principles is adapted from 
Yasgur analysis of reasons and rationality, in Y asgur , S. [2008].
22 Reasonableness comes in degrees. Thus, in order to be reasonable, it is not necessary that the individual 
recognises all the reasons that there are for believing, valuing, desiring p.
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then they would recognise the same reason(s) for believing, valuing, desiring
2. The principle o f rationality: for any interpreter i and agent j, ceteris paribus, if i
and j  were to recognise the same facts as reasons for beliefs, values, desires, 
etc, then they would form the same beliefs, values, desires, etc24.
The formulation of the principle of reasonableness is too strong. In particular, it 
leaves unexplained the case in which the interpreter ascribes mental states to a mistaken 
agent. Indeed, in some cases, the interpreted agent recognises as reasons facts that are 
not truly reasons. His mistakes may refer to either non-evaluative or to evaluative 
properties of the world. The interpreted agent’s mental states operate as if they were 
based on truly reason-giving facts, although they are not. The relevant distinction is the 
one between operative reasons and normative reasons. Operative reasons are constituted 
by facts that the agent recognises as reason-giving, although they are not. By contrast, 
normative reasons are constituted by facts that are truly reason-giving25. For the purpose 
of interpretation, the interpreter must be able to identify the reasons that the agent 
recognises, whether or not they are truly reasons (i.e. normative reasons) or simply facts 
that the agent mistakenly recognises as reasons (i.e. operative reasons).
It is questionable whether or not the PoC, with its strong emphasis on the principle of 
truth and the principle of good, is suitable to capture this feature of interpretation. As a 
consequence, several authors have suggested grounding interpretation on a different 
principle, namely, the Principle of Similarity (PoS)26. The PoS does not imply either the 
principle of truth or the principle of good. Rather, it greatly emphasises the similarity 
between interpreter and interpreted agent, both with respect to their response to external 
inputs and with respect to the interaction between their mental states. One way to 
formulate the PoS, with respect to reasons and rationality, is the following27.
23 It is worth noticing that the principle of reasonableness implies both the principle of truth and the 
principle of good, if combined with the assumption that the agent recognises most o f  the reasons that there 
are for believing, valuing, desiring p. Indeed, if, ceteris paribus, an agent recognises a fact as a reason 
only if that fact is reason-giving, then, if he recognises most reasons, it follows that he has, ceteris 
paribus, mostly true beliefs about, and mostly correct evaluations of, the surrounding environment. In 
turn, this means that a particularly high reasonableness degree entails both the principle of truth and the 
principle of good.
4 It is worth noticing that the principle of rationality does not imply the principle of coherence. The 
exclusion of coherence is due to the fact that, according to reason-based accounts of rationality, coherence 
is thought to be simply a by-product of the recognition o f reasons, rather than a requirement o f rationality 
itself (see, for instance, Kolodny, N. [2005]).
25 See Raz, J. [1975] and [1999].
26 The proposal to substitute the Principle of Charity with the Principle of Similarity originally comes 
from Grandy, R. [1973],
27 Notice that the Principle of Similarity arises as an attempt to block the objections raised against the
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1. The principle o f recognition: for any interpreter i and agent j, ceteris paribus, if i 
and j  were to be subject to the same circumstances, they would recognise the 
same facts as providing (either believed or normative) reasons for beliefs, values, 
desires, etc.
2. The principle o f rationality: for any interpreter i and agent 7 , ceteris paribus, if i 
and 7  were to recognise the same facts as (either believed or normative) reasons 
for beliefs, values, desires, etc, then they would form the same beliefs, values, 
desires, etc.
6. Objections
The next step in our assessment consists in examining whether or not the premises of 
the transcendental argument are sound. Let us consider the first premise, which states 
that we posses the ability to correctly interpret each other. An interpretation is correct if 
and only if the explanation of the interpreted agent’s (mental or overt) behaviour in 
terms of his mental states is correct. Presumably, this means that an interpretation is 
correct if and only if it is true both that the agent had those mental states and that they 
led him to the targeted behaviour. There is no doubt that we possess the ability of 
engaging in an activity that falls within the concept of interpretation. However, the 
soundness of the first premise presupposes the possibility to assess whether or not the 
interpretation is correct independently from the appreciation of the conditions that are 
supposedly necessary for its correctness, that is, independently from the second 
premise. This is problematic. One of the salient features of transcendental arguments is 
that the first premise states certain facts that even the sceptic ought to accept. Typically, 
these are facts about thought or experience, whose truth the sceptic too may grant. 
However, in the current case, the soundness of the first premise is not immediately 
acceptable by, or obvious to, the sceptic. Perhaps, the sceptic might concede that the 
first premise is sound if we conceive correctness in the weaker sense of intersubjective 
agreement. In this sense, an interpretation is correct if and only if it is intersubjectively 
agreed upon by, or if it optimises agreement between, interpreter and interpreted agent. 
However, even if we grant the empirical point that people very often reach
Principle of Charity. It is possible to do this by marginally modifying the previous formulation of the 
latter principle as shown below.
intersubjective agreement in interpretation, this is no proof of the fact that the 
intersubjectively agreed interpretation is correct in the stronger sense seen above. In 
other words, the fact that people agree that an interpretation is true is no proof that such 
an interpretation is really true. As we shall see below, this poses an insurmountable 
threat to the transcendental strategy under consideration.
Let us consider the second premise. According to it, we could not interpret each 
other correctly without the PoC. Since Davison’s argument offers a paradigmatic case 
of transcendental analysis applied to interpretation, the literature devotes large attention 
both to his overall framework and to his version of the PoC, i.e. P0 C1, in order to assess 
the second premise. One objection concerns the relationship between radical 
interpretation and the actual practice of interpretation. Davidson explicitly claims that 
he is not concerned with how people actually interpret each other, but only with a 
highly idealised procedure, which is supposed to uncover certain key facts about 
meaning. Arguably, the PoC is true in the context of radical interpretation. However, if 
radical interpretation bears only little resemblance to actual interpretation, the 
transcendental strategy may not work when applied to the actual case. This objection is 
not too damaging. The only consequence is that we cannot show that the second 
premise is sound by appealing to Davidson’s idealised framework. The question of 
whether or not the PoC is required for the correctness of actual interpretation remains 
open.
Yet, most of the literature remains sceptical. The main target of criticism is 
Davidson’s principle of truth28. For instance, McGinn defends the conceptual possibility 
that correct interpretation may involve ascribing mostly false beliefs to an agent. 
McGinn’s motivation takes the form of a reductio, based on the idea that “if Davidson 
were right about the inherently charitable nature of interpretation, then we could dismiss 
certain kinds of traditional scepticism; but it is absurd to suppose that scepticism could 
be dismissed in this oblique and roundabout way”29. On a similar vein, Stroud argues 
that, if the principle of truth were true, we could dismiss scepticism as a logical 
impossibility. However, scepticism is a logical possibility. Therefore, the principle of 
truth must be false30. Instead, Lepore and Ludwig contend that Davidson’s defence of 
the principle of truth can, at best, show that, necessarily, most of our general beliefs are 
true. However, it does not show that any of our particular beliefs, that is, those beliefs
28 Clearly, similar attacks could be raised against the principle of good. The only reason why they are not 
made is that Davidson never mentions such a principle explicitly.
29 See McGinn, C. [2002], p 183.
30 See Stroud, B. [2000], pp 177-202.
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prompted by the surrounding environment, are true. As a consequence, pace Davidson, 
correct interpretation may as well end up with the ascription of mostly false particular 
beliefs to the interpreted agent31.
These objections apply to all the versions of the PoC that include, or imply, the 
principle of truth, namely, P0 C1 and P0 C232. However, they do not affect the PoS. 
According to the PoS, both the interpreter and the interpreted agent respond to the 
environment and form mental states in the same way, when subject to the same 
circumstances. The PoS does not exclude the possibility that the interpreter’s and the 
interpreted agent’s responses may lead them to having mostly false beliefs about the 
surrounding environment. That is, it does not exclude the possibility that the interpreter 
and the interpreted agent are brains-in-a-vat. Their first-order beliefs may as well be 
mostly false. However, if the interpreter and the interpreted agent respond to the 
environment and form mental states in the same way, then P0 S1 may nonetheless lead to 
true second-order beliefs, that is, true beliefs about (another individual’s) beliefs, and, 
more generally, true beliefs about (another individual’s) mental states. In other words, 
PoSj may nonetheless sanction correct interpretations.
Quite independently from whether or not the second premise is defensible, however, 
there is a decisive reason to hold that the transcendental strategy is not capable of 
delivering the wanted result. The objection was firstly presented by Stroud and 
decisively challenges the possibility that any ‘strong’ transcendental argument can 
achieve radical anti-sceptical results. Recall the general structure of transcendental 
arguments. The first premise claims that we possess the ability to 0 , where 0  is 
typically a fact about thought or experience. However, the sceptic may object that, since 
0  is a fact about psychological reality, it remains within the realm of things that we 
take, or believe, to be the case. Thereby, the sceptic may resist the conclusion that X  is 
true and, instead, simply accept the conclusion that we take, or believe, X  to be true. 
Stroud’s main idea is that one cannot start from a fact about psychological reality and 
arrive at a conclusion about how the world is, independently of our mind. More 
precisely, it is possible to reach a conclusion about how the world is from a premise 
about psychological reality only if one is willing to embrace a controversial idealist 
position, according to which how the world is depends on certain features of our mind. 
Otherwise, the conclusion must be another claim about psychological reality, namely,
31 See Lepore, E. and K. Ludwig, [2005], pp. 200-202.
32 These objections apply, mutatis mutandis, to the principle o f good.
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that we take, or believe, certain things to be true or that certain things seem to us to be 
true. The upshot is that no ‘strong’ transcendental argument can be successful.
Stroud’s objection is particularly clear when applied to the case under consideration. 
The difficulty in finding an independent proof that correct interpretation is possible 
suggests interpreting the first premise of the transcendental argument as saying only that 
we take, or believe, correct interpretation to be possible, on the grounds that we 
frequently reach intersubjective agreement about the interpretation of people’s 
behaviour. However, once we adopt this reading, the only conclusion that we can draw 
is a conclusion about our psychological reality. For instance, consider the principle of 
truth. Suppose Davidson is correct insofar as he maintains that optimal agreement 
requires the interpreter to assume that most of the agent’s beliefs are true. This shows 
that, for any interpreter i and interpreted agent y, intersubjectively agreed interpretation 
requires i to represent f  s beliefs as mostly true. As Stroud claims, however, “the 
admitted necessity of finding largely true beliefs among the beliefs one attributes does 
not imply that the beliefs one attributes are in fact largely true”33. That is, even if the 
interpreter is bound to take, or believe, that the agent has mostly true beliefs in order to 
ascribe mental states to him, it does not follow that most of the agent’s beliefs are really 
true. More generally, a ‘strong’ transcendental argument can show only that we take, or 
believe, either the PoC or the PoS to be true; not that either the PoC or the PoS is true.
7. A ‘modest’ transcendental argument
Although ‘strong’ transcendental arguments fail, Stroud argues, in general, that a 
more ‘modest’ transcendental argument may still help us reaching conclusions of anti- 
sceptical significance. For the purpose of this thesis, it is worth considering two 
questions. First, is a ‘modest’ transcendental argument sound, when applied to the case 
under consideration? Second, what are the implications for the problem of IUCs? I shall 
attempt to answer the first question in this section and the second question in the next 
section.
In general, a modest transcendental argument has the following form.
(1') We take, or believe, ourselves to posses the ability to 0 \
(2') We could not take, or believe, ourselves to posses the ability to 0 ,  without 
taking, or believing, X  to be true
33 See Stroud, B. [2000], p. 186.
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(31) Hence, we take, or believe, X  to be true.
In the case under consideration, the argument becomes:
(l')W e take, or believe, ourselves to posses the ability to correctly interpret each 
other;
(2') We could not take, or believe, ourselves to posses the ability to interpret each 
other correctly, without taking, or believing, either the PoC or the PoS to be true;
(3') Hence, we take, or believe, that either the PoC or the PoS is true.
Typically, we take, or believe, ourselves to posses the ability to correctly interpret 
each other on the ground that we frequently reach intersubjective agreement o f the right 
kind in the interpretation of other people’s behaviour. The qualification is necessary, 
because what makes us believe that correct interpretation is possible is not just any sort 
of intersubjective agreement, but justifiable intersubjective agreement, that is, one 
reached on the basis of appropriate evidence or methods. If this is the case, premise (2’) 
can be understood as saying that we could not reach valid intersubjective agreement in 
interpretation without taking either the PoC or the PoS to be true. In other words, since 
what we take, or believe, to be correct interpretation is interpretation that is validly 
intersubjectively agreed upon, we can say that our taking either the PoC or the PoS to be 
true is necessary for such an intersubjective agreement to be possible. By substituting 
appropriately, this argument has the following implication for the problem of IUCs:
(3.1') If we take, or believe, either the PoC or the PoS to be true, then we take, or 
believe, the interpreter’s and the interpreted agent’s preferences to be 
comparable in terms of strength.
I shall take for granted the first premise by conceding that valid intersubjective 
agreement in interpretation is frequent, as I have done in chapter 3. The interesting 
premise is the second. Clearly, its assessment depends on whether one adopts the PoC 
or the PoS as the central interpretive principle. In a recent paper, Stroud has tried to 
defend premise (2’) by considering PoCi and, essentially, by rehearsing Davidson’s 
position in the modified context of a ‘modest’ transcendental argument. However, we 
have seen above that there are independent reasons to prefer the PoS to the PoC. 
Therefore, in this section, I shall examine premise (2’) by considering PoSi.
149
It is tempting to argue for (3’) by means of an inference to the best explanation type 
of argument. Accordingly, the fact that we take, or believe, P0 S1 to be true is what best 
explains why we reach valid intersubjective agreement in interpretation. However, an 
inference to the best explanation argument allows for the possibility that, although we 
actually take, or believe, P0 S1 to be true, we could nonetheless reach valid 
intersubjective agreement in a different way. By contrast, (2’) claims that taking, or 
believing, P0 S1 to be true is the only way to reach intersubjective agreement. This 
means denying that the conjunction of the following claims can be true: (i) for any three 
individuals k, h and i, k and h reach valid intersubjective agreement about the 
interpretation of V s behaviour; (ii) for any three individuals k, h and i, it is not the case 
that k and h take, or believe, that, were they subject to the same circumstances as /, they 
would recognise the same facts as providing (either believed or normative) reasons and 
would accordingly form the same attitudes as /.
Let us see whether or not a possible world where both (i) and (ii) are true is 
conceivable. Suppose that both k  and h takes i to be similar to them qua being with a 
mind and mental states. Furthermore, suppose that both k and h takes / to be radically 
different from them as far as his response to the environment and his mental state 
formation are concerned. For instance, i is such that, everything else being the same, he 
recognises the fact that it is raining outside to be a reason to go to Paris during 
Christmas, he forms the intention of playing football on the basis of such a reason and 
reads a book about IUCs on the basis of such an intention. Finally, suppose that k and h 
can validly reach intersubjective agreement about the interpretation of f  s behaviour 
because they possess a manual, or a ‘theory of mind’, about /, which describes the 
infinite reason-relations that i may recognise and the infinite types of mental 
interactions that his mental states may instantiate so as to produce observable behaviour. 
Thus, both k and h can infer f s  mental states and interpret his behaviour on the basis of 
the relevant evidence, through the use of this book.
In order to defend the thesis that (2’) is true, one needs to deny that this example 
constitute a genuine possibility. The most likely candidate for rejection is the 
assumption that k and h can reach valid intersubjective agreement about the 
interpretation of Fs behaviour. In turn, the most likely explanation of why this is 
impossible is based on the unintelligible character of such an interpretation. The idea is 
that k and h cannot take the interpretation of Vs behaviour to be correct because, in 
some sense, it is unintelligible. In what sense exactly? After all, their interpretation is 
sanctioned by the available evidence and by knowledge of the relevant causal relations
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between the environment, f s  mental states and f s  behaviour. As such, their 
intersubjective agreement seems to be validly reached.
However, something more seems to be required for validity and, thereby, for taking 
an interpretation to be correct. An additional requirement is that the concepts in terms of 
which the interpretation is formulated are applied appropriately. For instance, in the 
previous example, k and h interpret i as recognising the fact that it is raining outside to 
be a reason to go to Paris during Christmas. At first sight, however, the fact that it is 
raining outside can hardly count as a reason to go to Paris during Christmas, at least if 
we use the concept of ‘reason’ appropriately. The application of the concept of ‘reason’ 
to express the relation between the fact that it is raining outside and the action of going 
to Paris during Christmas would be appropriate only under the hypothesis that i were 
mistaken in several of his beliefs and/or evaluations. For instance, i may associate rain 
with Paris because he spent an amusing day in Paris under the rain, with his wife, few 
years before. The combination of his past experience and the fact that it is raining 
outside generates in i a desire to go to Paris and the mistaken beliefs that the fact that it 
is raining outside is a reason to go there. In turn, f s  mistaken belief would make the fact 
that it is raining outside an operative reason to go to Paris during Christmas. However, 
this case is excluded by stipulation. By assumption, k and h know all the circumstances 
to which i is subject, including his personal history. By assumption, i does not make any 
evaluative and/or non-evaluative mistake. Everything else is normal. Nothing else can 
explain why i recognises the fact that it is raining outside as a reason to go to Paris 
during Christmas, except, perhaps, that this is how i uses the concept of ‘reason’.
Such a radical diversity sets a limit to the intelligibility of interpretation. If no 
plausible explanation of why i recognises a reason-relation between two apparently 
unrelated facts is possible, f s  mental behaviour appears mysterious. Although the 
manual indicates that this is how f  s mind works, the intelligibility of the interpretation 
at the personal level remains seriously compromised. In the light of this feature, we may 
conjecture that k’s and K s most likely reaction is to judge both their interpretation and 
the book on which it is based to be mistaken. As a consequence, k's and K  s most likely 
reaction is to look for an alternative interpretation of f s  behaviour, where the concept of 
‘reason’ is used in accordance with their standards of appropriateness. The important 
point is that these standards seem to be fixed, ceteris paribus, by the conditions of 
application that they recognise. In turn, such conditions are determined by what they 
would recognise to be an (either believed or normative) reason in similar circumstances, 
that is, they are determined by the principle of recognition. Since embracing the
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principle of recognition is what guarantees the intelligibility of interpretation and, in 
turn, intelligibility is one of the necessary conditions for taking an interpretation to be 
correct, it follows that embracing the principle of recognition is necessarily required for 
taking an interpretation to be correct.
A similar idea can be expressed with respect to the principle of rationality. In the 
previous example, if no plausible explanation of why i forms the intention of playing 
football on the basis of the fact that rain outside is a reason to go to Paris during 
Christmas, the interpretation remains unintelligible. Once again, k's and h’s most likely 
reaction is to look for an alternative interpretation of V s behaviour, where mental state 
formation obeys the standards of appropriateness that they recognise. Yet, once they 
embrace their own concept of ‘reason’, it appears that, ceteris paribus, those standards 
are fixed by how their own mind would interact on the basis of the (either believed or 
normative) reasons that they recognise, that is, they are fixed by the principle of 
rationality. The result is that embracing the principle of rationality is necessarily 
required for the intelligibility of interpretation and, thereby, for taking an interpretation 
to be correct.
If the remarks in this section are correct, it follows that a ‘modest’ transcendental 
argument applied to the case of interpretation can be vindicated.
8. The epistemological problem of IUCs re-considered
The ‘modest’ transcendental argument that we have examined raises one important 
objection: the appeal to a vague notion like intelligibility cannot, by its very nature, 
provide a conclusive reason to accept the thesis that we take, or believe, preferences to 
be interpersonally comparable in terms of strength. I think that this point should be 
granted. Nevertheless, for the sake of the argument, I shall assume that the ‘modest’ 
transcendental argument is genuinely sound. In this section, I shall focus on the question 
of what implications this argument has for the problem of IUCs.
In the light of (3.1’), the ‘modest’ transcendental argument assures a transcendental 
invulnerability to the belief that preferences are interpersonally comparable. The 
invulnerability is due to the fact that we could not reach intersubjective agreement about 
the interpretation of other people’s behaviour without taking such a belief to be true. At 
first sight, however, the fact that we could not but assume comparability in order to 
reach intersubjective agreement does not have any interesting epistemological 
consequences. After all, what we are bound to do is a descriptive matter, while
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knowledge and justification are evaluative matters. On the one hand, the fact that we are 
bound to take, or believe, preferences to be interpersonally comparable from the start 
does not imply that preferences are really interpersonally comparable from the start. On 
the other hand, the fact that we are bound to take, or believe, preferences to be 
interpersonally comparable from the start does not imply that our beliefs about how 
different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength can be (scientifically) 
justified, even if the former belief provides the basis for the latter kind of belief. The 
upshot is that the ‘modest’ transcendental argument appears to have no implications for 
the epistemological problem of IUCs.
However, this conclusion is too quick. Indeed, several authors have argued, in 
general, that a ‘modest’ transcendental argument has interesting anti-sceptical 
implications. According to Stem, the crucial distinction to keep in mind is the one 
between the “epistemic sceptic” and the “justificatory sceptic” 34. The former is the 
fictitious individual who doubts whether we can have any knowledge at all. The latter is 
the fictitious individual who doubts whether we can have any justified beliefs at all. 
According to Stem, the ‘strong’ transcendental argument is directed towards the 
“epistemic sceptic”, while the ‘modest’ transcendental argument is directed towards the 
“justificatory sceptic”. Given that all ‘strong’ transcendental arguments fail, the doubt 
about whether we can have genuine (scientific) knowledge remains. Nevertheless, a 
‘modest’ transcendental argument can guarantee the possibility of having (scientifically) 
justified beliefs about certain subject matters. In the case under consideration, the doubt 
remains about whether or not preferences are interpersonally comparable in terms of 
strength and -  ultimately -  about whether or not we can have (scientific) knowledge of 
ICs of preference strength. However, if Stem is correct and if the ‘modest’ 
transcendental argument is successful, it is nonetheless possible to have (scientifically) 
justified ICs of preference strength. Let us examine how.
The ‘modest’ transcendental argument implies that, if different interpreters are bound 
to take, or believe, preferences to be comparable from the start, then, ceteris paribus, 
they form the same beliefs about how different individuals’ preferences compare in 
terms of strength. However, there are two things that the ‘modest’ transcendental 
argument cannot do. First, it cannot show that our belief that preferences are 
interpersonally comparable is evidence that they really are. Second, it cannot show that 
the PoS is reliable for making ICs of preference strength. Therefore, the problem is that 
a ‘modest’ transcendental argument cannot show, by itself, that it is possible to have
34 See Stern, R. [19991, P- 42.
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(scientifically) justified ICs of preference strength both within an evidentialist 
framework and within a reliabilist framework. However, a ‘modest’ transcendental 
argument can show that we can have (scientifically) justified ICs if it is combined with 
a coherentist theory of epistemic justification. As we have seen in chapter 1, this is a 
theory about the structure of justification. Its central tenet is that each belief is justified 
in terms of other beliefs, so that justification is simply a function of the relationship 
between various beliefs.
First, let us consider the evidentialist framework. Suppose that an individual k wants 
to compare the preference strengths of two individuals i and j. Suppose also that the 
evidence concerning their preferences is entirely identical. Finally, suppose that k  is an 
incurable sceptic about ICs of preference strength. As a consequence, k believes that: (i) 
the evidence concerning V s and f s  preferences is the same; (ii) for any two individuals i 
and 7 , if the evidence concerning their preferences is the same, they have the same 
preference strengths; (iii) i and j  do not have the same preference strengths. If 
consistency is the mark of justification, then at least one of k ’s beliefs is not justified, 
because (i), (ii) and (iii) do not form a consistent set. This does not tell us yet which of 
his beliefs k should revise. However, things change if the ‘modest’ transcendental 
argument seen above is brought into play. Necessarily, k takes, or believes, (ii) to be 
true in order to reach valid intersubjective agreement. Thus, a coherentist theory of 
epistemic justification requires k to revise either (i) or (iii). If, as it seems plausible, it is 
possible to justify (i) on independent grounds, (iii) remains the only unjustified belief. 
Thus, a coherentist theory of epistemic justification requires k to believe its opposite, 
i.e. (iii’), according to which i and j  have the same preference strengths. In other words, 
if (i) can be justified on independent grounds and if k is bound to believe (ii), (iii’) is the 
only justified ICs of preference strength that k can make. The result is that, when 
combined with a coherentist theory of epistemic justification, the ‘modest’ 
transcendental argument shows that ICs can be (scientifically) justified within an 
evidentialist framework35. Indeed, if the empirical evidence determines (i) and if the 
‘modest’ transcendental arguments assures invulnerability to (ii), then the coherentist 
theory of justification determines (iii’) in accordance with acceptable standards.
Second, let us consider a reliabilist framework. Consider the previous example. If we 
embrace a coherentist theory of epistemic justification, consistency becomes the mark
35 The same is true if one embrace a deontologist theory of justification. If one of k’s epistemic duties is to 
maximise the consistency of his beliefs, then, ceteris paribus, he is deontologically justified if he believes 
(iii’), but not if he believes (iii). From an epistemic point of view, given that he is bound to believe (ii), k  
cannot do any better, in terms of justification, than in the case expressed by (iii’).
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of justification. In particular, consistency shows that the individual’s doxastic attitudes 
are reliably acquired and, thereby, that they are justified. However, (i), (ii) and (iii) do 
not form a consistent set of beliefs. This suggests that at least one of these beliefs is not 
reliably acquired and, therefore, is unjustified. Once again, if the ‘modest’ 
transcendental argument is sound, necessarily, k takes, or believes, (ii) to be true in 
order to reach valid intersubjective agreement. As k cannot revise (ii), the only 
possibility to have consistent beliefs is by revising either (i) or (iii). Once again, if it is 
possible to show on independent ground that (i) is reliably acquired, justification 
requires k to believe (iii’), as (iii’) is the only belief that makes the set consistent. It 
follows that, when combined with a coherentist theory of justification, the ‘modest’ 
transcendental argument shows that ICs can be (scientifically) justified also within a 
reliabilist framework. Indeed, the evidence about the reliable acquisition of (i), the 
transcendental invulnerability of (ii) and a coherentist theory of justification jointly 
determines (iii’) in accordance with acceptable standards.
9. Conclusion
In this chapter, I considered whether or not we can solve the problem of IUCs by 
appealing to a transcendental argument. I examined two kinds of transcendental 
argument: a ‘strong’ and a ‘modest’ transcendental argument. The ‘strong’ 
transcendental argument attempts to show that different people’s preferences are 
interpersonally comparable. One of the consequences is that, if the relevant evidence is 
correct, it is possible to have (scientifically) justified ICs of preference strength. 
However, I argued that such an argument succumbs to the objection that is generally 
made against transcendental arguments of a ‘strong’ form, namely, that, ceteris paribus, 
it is not possible to infer a conclusion about how a mind-independent world is from a 
premise about our psychological reality.
The ‘modest’ transcendental argument attempts to show only that we take, or 
believe, different people’s preferences to be interpersonally comparable. At first sight, 
even if successful, this argument does not seem to bring any result of anti-sceptical 
significance. After all, even if we are bound to assume that different people’s 
preferences are interpersonally comparable from the start, we cannot assume either that 
different people’s preferences are really interpersonally comparable or that it is possible 
to have (scientifically) justified ICs of preference strength. However, I argued that the 
‘modest’ transcendental argument can offer a positive solution to the problem of IUCs if
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it is combined with a coherentist theory about the structure of justification, both within 
an evidentialist and within a reliabilist framework. Indeed, if, as it seems plausible, 
beliefs concerning the evidence about two individuals’ behaviour can be independently 
justified, then the ‘modest’ transcendental argument and a coherentist theory of 
justification uniquely determine ICs of preference strength.
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CONCLUSION
We started our analysis of the problem of IUCs by making two platitudinous 
observations. On the one hand, we noticed that, in everyday life, we not only ascribe 
preferences with a specific content to other people and to ourselves, but we also compare 
them in terms of strength. A remarkable fact is that we typically make ICs of preference 
strength with relatively little difficulty. In particular, we often do not find inter-personal 
comparisons of preferences more difficult than intra-personal comparisons, that is, of 
comparisons involving our own preferences.
On the other hand, we noticed that the ease with which we compare preferences in 
everyday life contrasts with the difficulties that ICs of preference strength pose at the 
theoretical level. In the framework provided by orthodox economics, the problem presents 
certain characteristic features. Typically, choice behaviour is considered the only 
admissible evidence for the ascription of preferences. Moreover, preferences are supposed 
to satisfy a relatively rich set of (both substantive and technical) conditions, which allows 
us to determine and represent them by means of numerical functions with different 
uniqueness features. In particular, when preferences satisfy the axioms of expected utility 
theory, they can be represented by a cardinal utility function, which assigns a measure of 
preferential strength to each of the options in the preference domain.
The problem of IUCs arises at this stage. Although choice behaviour is sufficient for 
measuring each individual’s preferences, it is not sufficient for determining ICs of different 
individuals’ utilities. For each individual, the measurement is relative to the best and the 
worst options in his preference ranking. However, choice behavioural evidence is not 
enough to tell whether or not different people hold the options at the top and at the bottom 
of their rankings with identical preferential strength. As a consequence, it is not possible to 
determine, on the basis of choice behaviour, whether or not different people’s preference 
strengths are really the same when they have the same numerical value. Equivalently, on 
the basis of choice behaviour, it is not possible to claim that different people’s utilities are 
co-scaled.
As IUCs appear to be underdetermined by choice behavioural evidence, the most natural 
reaction is to extend the set of admissible evidence beyond choice behaviour. In this thesis, 
we have seen various ways in which this can be done. For instance, one can gather 
information about latency or probability of choice (e.g. Waldner), verbal expressions (e.g. 
Harsanyi), expressive reactions (e.g. Weintraub), facial expressions, body temperature and
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other proxies (e.g. List) 1 and use them as additional evidence for preference ascription and 
IUCs. Unfortunately, as shown by various authors and, in particular, by List2, even such a 
broader set of empirical evidence is insufficient to determine IUCs. The upshot is that IUCs 
are empirically meaningless in a very robust sense. This result poses the following crucial 
epistemological challenge: can we have knowledge, and in particular, scientific knowledge, 
of how different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength? Or, at least, can we 
have scientifically justified beliefs about how different people’s preferences compare in 
terms of strength? In this thesis, I have tried to present and discuss alternative ways of 
addressing these issues. In this conclusion I shall pursue two goals. First, I want to 
summarise the results of the previous analysis. Second, I want to examine where these 
results leave us and, in particular, whether or not the epistemological problem of ICs of 
preference strength remains a serious challenge.
As we have seen, although the empirical meaninglessness threatens the possibility of 
having scientifically justified ICs of preference strength, it does not exclude it completely. 
Empirical meaningfulness is, at best, only a sufficient condition for scientific justification. 
Other non-empirical considerations may help break the underdetermination by the 
empirical evidence and potentially lead to scientifically justified beliefs about how different 
people’s preferences compare in terms of strength. Within an evidentialist framework, this 
means that other non-empirical considerations might be used as evidence to determine 
IUCs. By contrast, within a reliabilist framework, this means that other non-empirical 
considerations might be reliable guides for the determination of IUCs.
The first strategy that we have examined is based on an inference to the best explanation 
type of argument. In general, the idea is that a theory, or an assumption, is justified if it 
offers, or contributes to offering, the best explanation of a certain phenomenon. In turn, the 
criteria for individuating the best explanation typically include pragmatic considerations, 
such as explanatory power, simplicity, or parsimony. In the case of IUCs, the argument is 
that we are justified in assuming that different people’s utilities are co-scaled insofar as this 
provides the best explanation of their (comparative) behaviour. Different authors emphasise 
different pragmatic virtues as mostly relevant for the problem under consideration. For 
instance, Harsanyi claims that the assumption that different people’s utilities are on the 
same scale is “the least arbitrary hypothesis” , at least when all the empirical evidence is 
the same across individuals; whereas Waldner and List emphasise, respectively, the 
simplicity and parsimony of such an assumption. In this thesis, however, I argued that this
1 See Harsanyi, J. [1955] and [1977], L ist, C. [2003], W aldner, I. [1972], W eintraub, R. [1998].
2 See L ist, C. [2003].
3 See Harsanyi, J. [1955] and [1977],
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strategy fails. The assumption that different people’s utilities are co-scaled is not 
pragmatically advantageous in any of the senses listed above. Indeed, it does not add 
anything to the explanation of individual behaviour and it does not make a theory including 
it either more parsimonious or simpler than a theory that does not include it. Ultimately, 
this means that this strategy fails to demonstrate that IUCs can be scientifically justified.
The second strategy pursues a nativist approach. An argument of this kind was first 
offered by Goldman in the context of a sub-personal explanation of our mindreading 
capacity. Goldman argues that the problem of comparing the intensity of different people’s 
mental states is a particular case of the problem of ascribing mental states to other people. 
According to Goldman, mindreading consists in simulating, or replicating, the working of 
another individual’s mind. The simulator, first, asks himself what mental states he would 
have if he were subject to the initial mental states of the simulated agent; then, on the basis 
of the result of such an introspective exercise, he ascribes -  by analogy -  these mental 
states to the simulated agent4. Clearly, such a mental ascription is justified to the extent that 
the simulator’s and the simulated agent’s mind-systems are similar in certain relevant 
respects. Predictive success at mindreading offers some evidence that this is indeed the 
case. However, even if the belief about how different people’s preferences compare in 
terms of strength is formed by using the same information-processing mechanisms, 
predictive success offers only prima facie evidence that ICs of preference strength too are 
justified. In fact, the interpersonal similarity required in order to have meaningful ICs of 
preference strength is higher than the one required in order to have reliable behavioural 
predictions. Goldman fills this gap by arguing that the assumption of interpersonal 
psychological similarity should be considered an innate feature of the mind.
In chapter 3 ,1 extended this strategy to the other main approach to mindreading, namely, 
Theory-Theory. According to it, mindreading is performed by means of a ‘theory’ about 
other people’s mind, which the mindreader more or less tacitly possesses. Predictive 
success offers some evidence that this ‘theory’ represents very closely the working of other 
individuals’ mind systems. However, the closeness of the theory representation required in 
order to have meaningful ICs of preference strength is higher than the one required in order 
to have reliable behavioural predictions. Once again, one can fill the gap by arguing that 
this is an innate feature of the mind.
The nativist strategy then claims that the assumption that different people’s utilities are 
co-scaled is justified if ICs of preference strength are performed through innate 
mechanisms that are either hyper-similar across individuals or very closely representative
4 See Goldman, A. [1989].
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of the working of other individuals’ mind-systems. In this thesis, I argued that this strategy 
fails because it reduces to an inference to the best explanation kind of argument in certain 
crucial respects. The most recent literature interprets the claim that a cognitive capacity or 
mechanism is innate as the claim that such a capacity or mechanism is a psychological 
primitive. In turn, the literature suggests that we have a reason to take a cognitive capacity 
or mechanism to be a psychological primitive only if, on the one hand, it is part of a correct 
psychological explanation of human behaviour, and, on the other hand, its acquisition 
cannot be explained by any theory at the psychological level, but only by a theory at a 
lower level. Proponents of psychological primitivism suggest identifying ‘the correct 
explanation’ by reference to the ‘best explanation’ in our possession. It thus seems that the 
second strategy collapses into the first strategy examined in this thesis in at least one crucial 
respect. There is indeed an important difference between the two. The first strategy tries to 
solve the problem of IUCs by claiming that we are justified in assuming that different 
people’s utilities are co-scaled because this assumption is part of the best explanation of 
their behaviour. By contrast, the second strategy pursues a more indirect route and holds 
that we are justified in assuming that different people’s utilities are co-scaled because the 
assumption of innate interpersonal similarity of different people’s mind-systems (either in 
the Simulation Theory or in the Theory Theory form) is part of the best explanation of their 
behaviour. Despite this difference, the same objections made against the first strategy apply 
to the second as well. In this thesis, I argued that the best explanation of how people make 
ICs of preference strength merely requires that people take, or believe, the assumption of 
interpersonal similarity (either in the Simulation Theory or in the Theory Theory form) to 
be true, but not that the assumption is really true.
In the wake of the failure of these strategies, some authors attempt to contrast the 
sceptical challenge about IUCs by offering more radical ‘in principle’ solutions, which take 
the form of ‘possibility’ arguments. Their primary goal is to show that different people’s 
preference strengths are comparable. Their secondary goal is to show that it is possible, in 
principle but not by means of empirical or pragmatic considerations alone, to have 
(scientific) knowledge of, or, at least, (scientifically) justified beliefs about how different 
people’s preferences compare in terms of strength. In this thesis, I considered both 
‘possibility’ arguments made in the context of an economic-oriented analysis and one 
‘possibility’ argument made in the context of a more philosophy-oriented analysis. Within 
the former set, the first argument that I considered is based on Broome’s work on personal 
goodness. It claims that, if individual preferences are independent from personal identity, 
then it is conceptually possible to construe a universal preference scale, provided that each
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person shares two possible lives with at least another person, that is, each person belongs to 
at least one overlapping pair, and that everyone is connected to everyone else by a chain of 
overlapping pairs. If this is the case, different people’s preferences are interpersonally 
comparable in terms of strength. Within the same set, I considered two arguments that are 
based on a functionalist understanding of the nature of preferences. According to both of 
them, it is conceptually possible to identify two points that play the same causal role in 
different people’s minds. If this is the case, functionalism allows us to conclude that 
preferences are interpersonally comparable in terms of strength. The former argument 
claims that these points are given by the most preferred and by the least preferred option, 
respectively. The latter argument -  offered by Bradley -  claims that one point is given by 
the ethically neutral prospect, while the other is given by the total desirability of all 
prospects in the preference domain. Within the latter set of ‘possibility’ arguments, I 
considered a ‘strong’ transcendental argument. Its goal is to demonstrate that different 
people’s preferences are interpersonally comparable from the start on the grounds that, 
necessarily, correct interpretation requires interpersonal comparability.
These arguments face different challenges. However, the main objection that can be 
raised against them is a common one: they do not to show that different individuals respond 
to the environment and form mental states in the same way. This is a recurrent theme across 
this thesis. In fact, the nativist strategy too similarly fails to show that different people’s 
mind-systems are identical, in certain crucial respects. Therefore, this emerges as the main 
factor preventing the possibility of having scientific knowledge of, or, at least, scientifically 
justified beliefs about, how different people’s preferences compare in terms of strength.
The previous analysis suggests that, perhaps, we should stop wondering whether or not 
different people’s mind-systems are really identical, or hyper-similar, and rather starting 
from the claim that we do take them to be so. This remark is what motivates exploring a 
more ‘modest’ transcendental solution to the problem of IUCs. The objection that is 
generally made against ‘strong’ transcendental arguments is that it is not possible to infer a 
conclusion about a mind-independent world from a premise about our psychological 
reality. In the case under consideration, the objection is that it is not possible to infer a 
conclusion about the interpersonal comparability of preference strengths from a premise 
about the (supposed) correctness of interpretation. The goal of a ‘modest’ transcendental 
argument is precisely to demonstrate that, necessarily, interpretation requires the interpreter 
only to take, or believe that, different people’s preferences are interpersonally comparable 
from the start. In this thesis, I tried to defend a ‘modest’ transcendental argument by 
insisting that its acceptance is required by the very intelligibility of interpretation.
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Admittedly, the nature of this defence is such as to leave margin for vagueness and, 
thereby, disagreement. Moreover, the alleged fact that we are bound to take preferences to 
be interpersonally comparable from the start does not have, by itself, clear implications for 
the epistemic evaluation of ICs of preference strength. In other words, even if successful, a 
‘modest’ transcendental argument needs to be complemented by additional considerations. 
In this thesis, I suggested that the transcendental strategy shows that ICs of preference 
strength can, at least, be scientifically justified if it is combined with a coherentist theory 
about the structure of justification, both within an evidentialist and a reliabilist framework. 
If coherentism is defensible, it is possible to show that scepticism does not get off the 
ground, although it clearly remains a logical possibility. The main defect of this solution is 
that the acceptance of the coherentist assumption is very controversial and questionable. 
Therefore, one may read this thesis as achieving a disjunctive result: either it provides a 
positive argument for the possibility of having (scientifically) justified IUCs, if coherentism 
is true, or it provides an argument by elimination, to the effect that none of the existing 
solutions allow for the possibility of having (scientifically) justified IUCs.
At this stage, we are finally in a position to ask whether or not the epistemological 
problem of ICs of preference strength remains a pressing challenge. How threatening is this 
problem, if it is mainly due to the fact that it is not possible to show that the assumption of 
interpersonal similarity between people’s mind-systems is sound? After all, the problem 
seems to massively generalize. Let me explain why. Suppose we consider two material 
bodies belonging to the same natural kind. Their internal workings are as unobservable as 
the internal workings of different individuals’ mind-systems. Typically, in the former case, 
we assume that the internal structure is functionally identical when the empirical evidence 
is the same. However, one might argue that the empirical evidence is not really sufficient to 
justify this assumption and leaves room for the sceptical hypothesis that the two bodies’ 
internal structure may be different. If such scepticism is a serious possibility, it brings some 
interesting implications to the fore. For each item, we can identify the internal elements of 
their functionally defined structure on the basis of the causal role that they play. Notice that 
the very notion of causal role cannot but be defined with respect to a background theory 
about how the elements of the system causally interact. In order to compare the functional 
properties of the items, we must individuate cases where the properties under consideration 
play the same casual role. However, this requires us to make an assumption of internal 
similarity. If this assumption is not justified, the results of our comparison are not justified 
either. Let us consider an example. Suppose we want to measure the temperature of two 
objects, belonging to the same natural kind. Suppose that the empirical evidence about both
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of them is completely identical. Typically, we would be prepared to ascribe the same 
temperature to these objects. However, if we have no reason to assume that their internal 
structure is the same, this conclusion is unjustified. The problem is that this might be true 
for the measurement of all functionally defined properties!
If we want to preserve a certain significance to the problem of IUCs, we need to offer 
some reasons as to why the case concerning the mind invites a more serious scepticism than 
the case concerning material bodies. Here I shall simply sketch some of them. The first 
reason is that there is no ‘third’ object to which the measurement of preference strength can 
be related. The temperature of two objects belonging to the same natural kind is supposed 
to be comparable because it is possible to determine two points that these objects have in 
common, namely, the water’s freezing point and the water’s boiling point. These points 
provide a common reference with respect to which the temperature of the objects can be 
measured and co-scaled. Notice, however, that commonality is defined with respect to a 
third object, i.e. water, which belongs to a different natural kind. No analogue object exists 
for ICs of preference strength. Even when preferences are defined in functionalist terms, 
the parallel between the measurement of preference strength and temperature breaks down 
in some crucial respects. For instance, consider Bradley’s solution. Although the ethically 
neutral prospect is supposed to play the role of water, the two cases are not perfectly 
analogous. In fact, the ethically neutral prospect is one of the items included in the 
preference domain of each individual. By contrast, water is a different object altogether. 
Perhaps, this may not be a problem. After all, the comparability of beliefs is equally based 
on the individuation of two propositions, namely, the necessary and the impossible 
propositions, with respect to which different people’s beliefs are supposed to play the same 
causal role. If the reasoning is sound in the latter case, it must be sound also in the case of 
preferences.
The second reason is that, even if it is conceptually possible to identify cases with 
respect to which different people’s preferences play the same causal role, it is not possible 
to gain epistemic access to such cases. In other words, even if it is possible to solve the 
conceptual problem of whether or not preference strengths are interpersonally comparable, 
it is not possible to solve the epistemological problem of whether or not we can have 
(scientific) knowledge or (scientifically) justified beliefs about how different people’s 
preferences compare in terms of strength. If Bradley’s analysis is correct, we can have, at 
most, (scientifically) justified ICs of preference strength with respect to a significant zero- 
line, but not (scientifically) justified ICs of preference strength levels or differences.
163
The third reason has to due with the difficulty concerning the characterisation of the 
mind-body relation. Most of the methods used to measure temperature rely on measuring 
some physical property of a material body, which varies with temperature. The relation 
between physical properties and functionally defined properties here is straightforward. 
However, this is not the case for mental properties. Their relation with the underlying 
neurophysiological properties is a particularly controversial issue. As a consequence, 
inferences from the physical to the mental level are still regarded with suspicion.
Finally, and related to the previous, the fourth reason why the problem of IUCs remains 
an interesting challenge is given by the difficulty in addressing the question about the 
nature of mental states. In particular, the debate remains open about whether or not, and to 
what extent, we should embrace some sort of psychological realism about mental states or 
we should rather favour some anti-realist account.
As we have seen in various places, the problem of IUCs is not independent from the 
solutions given to these issues. This explains why the assumption of interpersonal similarity 
and, more generally, the comparison of different people’s preference strengths keep raising 
sceptical doubts. Nonetheless, I hope that this thesis may contribute to the debate by 
clarifying the nature of the problem, putting forward some new solutions and suggesting 
possible directions for future analysis.
164
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adam , M. “Two Notions of Scientific Justification”, Synthese, 158 (2007), pp. 93-108.
Arneson, R. J. “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare”, Philosophical Studies, 56 
(1989), pp. 77-93.
Arrow, K. J. Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed., New York: Wiley, 1963 (1951, 
1 st ed.).
“Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice”, The American Economic 
Review, 67 (1977), pp. 219-225.
Baron-Cohen, S. Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory o f Mind, Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1995.
Barry, B. Theories o f Justice, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
Block, N. “Troubles with Functionalism”, in Block, N. (ed.) Readings in Philosophy o f 
Psychology, Vol. 1, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Bradley, R. “Impartiality in Weighing Lives'1, Philosophical Books, 48 (2007a), pp. 292- 
302.
“Comparing Evaluations”, Unpublished Manuscript, 2007b.
Broome, J. “A cause of preference is not an object of preference”, Social Choice and 
Welfare, (10), 1993, pp. 57-68.
Ethics out o f Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Weighing Lives, Oxford: Blackwell, 2004.
“Reply to Bradley and McCarthy”, Philosophical Books, 48 (2007), pp. 320-328.
“Can There Be a Preference-Based Utilitarianism?” in M. Salles and J. Weymark 
(eds.), Justice, Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and 
Rawls, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
Carruthers, P, and P., Smith (eds.) Theories o f Theories o f Mind, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Chang, R. (ed.) Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1997a.
“Introduction”, in Chang, R. (ed.) Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical 
Reason, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1997b, pp. 1-34.
Chipman, J. S. and J. C.,Moore “The New Welfare Economics, 1939-1974, International 
Economic Review, 19 (1978), pp. 547-584.
Chomsky, N. Rules and representations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980.
165
Cooter, R. and P., Rappoport “Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare Economics?”, 
Journal o f Economic Literature, 22 (1984), pp. 507-530.
“Reply to I.M.D. Little’s Comment”, Journal o f Economic Literature, 23 (1985), pp. 
1189-1191.
COWIE, F. What’s Within? Nativism Reconsidered, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
D’Aspremont, C. and L., Gevers “Equity and Informational Basis of Collective Choice”, 
Review o f Economics Studies, 44 (1977), pp. 199-209.
DAVIDSON, D . Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984.
“Judging interpersonal interests”, in Elster, J. and A., Hylland (eds.), Foundations of 
social choice theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 195-211.
“Interpersonal Comparisons of Values”, in Davidson, D. Problems o f Rationality, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 59-74.
Davies, M. “Interaction without reduction: The relationship between personal and 
subpersonal levels of description” Mind and Society, 1 (2000), pp. 87-105.
Davies, M. and T., Stone (eds.) Folk Psychology: The Theory o f Mind Debate, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995a.
(eds.) Mental Simulation, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995b.
“The Mental Simulation Debate: A Progress Report”, in Carruthers, P, and P., Smith 
(eds.) Theories o f Theories o f Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 
pp. 119-137.
“Simulation Theory”, Entry for Routledge Encyclopedia o f Philosophy Online, 2000.
“Mental Simulation, Tacit Theory, and the Threat of Collapse”, Philosophical Topics, 
29 (2001), pp. 127-73.
Dennett, D. Content and Consciousness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987.
Dworkin, R. “What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare”, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 10 (1981a), pp. 185-246.
“What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10 
(1981b), pp. 283-345.
Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice o f Equality, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2000.
Elster, J. and J. E., Roemer (eds.), Interpersonal Comparisons o f Well-Being, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 1-16.
Feldman, R. and E., Conee “Evidentialism”, Philosophical Studies, 48 (1985), pp. 15-34.
166
Fleurbaey, M. and J., Hammond “Interpersonally Comparable Utility” in BarberA, S. 
Hammond, J. and C., Seidl (eds.), Handbook o f Utility Theory, Vol. II, Kluwer 
Academic, 2004.
Fodor, J. and E., Lepore “D.C. Dennett. Meaning Holism and the Normativity of 
Intentional Ascription (and a Little More about Davidson)”, in Fodor, J. and E., 
Lepore Holism: A Shopper’s Guide, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1992, pp. 137- 
162.
Gallese, V. and A. I., Goldman “Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of 
mindreading”, Trends in Cognitive Science, 2 (1998), pp. 493-501.
Gettier, E. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis, 23 (1963), pp. 121-123.
GffiBARD, A. “Interpersonal Comparisons: Preference, Good, and the Intrinsic Reward of a 
Life”, in Elster, J. and A., Hylland (eds.) The Foundations o f Social Choice 
Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 165-193.
Gibson, R. “Translation, Physics, and Facts of the Matter”, in Hahn, L. E. and P. A., 
Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy ofW. V. Quine, Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1986, pp. 
139-157.
Goldman, A. I. “What is Justified Belief?” in Pappas, G. S. (ed.), Justification and 
Knowledge, Reidel: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1979, pp. 1-23.
“Interpretation Psychologized”, Mind and Language, 4 (1989), pp. 161-185.
“In defense of the simulation theory”, Mind and Language, 7 (1992), pp. 104-119.
“The Psychology of Folk Psychology”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16 (1993), pp. 
15-28.
“Simulation and Interpersonal Utility”, Ethics, 4 (1995a), pp. 709-726.
“Empathy, mind, and morals”, in Davies, M. and T., Stone (eds.) Mental Simulation: 
Evaluations and Applications, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995b, pp. 185-208.
“The mentalizing folk”, in D. Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentations. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000.
“Simulation theory and mental concepts”, in Dokic, J. and J., Proust (eds.) Simulation 
and Knowledge o f Action, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2002, pp. 1-20.
Simulating Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Gopnik, J. and A. N., Meltzoff Words, Thoughts and Theories, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1997.
Gopnik, J. and H., Wellman “Why the child’s theory of mind really is a theory of mind”, 
Mind and Language, 1 (1992), pp. 145-171.
167
“The theory theory”, in Hirschfiled, L. and S., Gelman (eds.) Mapping the Mind: 
Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994.
Gordon, R. M. “Folk Psychology as Simulation”, Mind and Language, 1 (1986), pp. 158- 
171.
“The simulation theory: Objections and misconceptions”, Mind and Language, 7 
(1992), pp. 11-34.
Grandy, R. “Reference, meaning, and belief, Journal o f Philosophy. 70 (1973), pp. 439- 
452.
Griffin, J. Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986.
Griffiths, P. “What is innateness?”, Monist, 85 (2002), pp. 70 -  85.
Hammond, P. “Equity, Arrow’s Conditions and Rawls’ Difference Principle”, 
Econometrica, 44 (1976), pp. 793-804.
“Interpersonal comparisons of utility: Why and how they are and should be made”, in 
Elster, J. and J. E., Roemer (eds.), Interpersonal Comparisons o f Well-Being, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 200-254.
Harsanyi, J. C. “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons 
of Utility”, The Journal o f Political Economy, 63 (1955), pp. 309-321.
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
“Morality and the theory of rational behaviour”, in Sen, A. and B., Williams (eds.) 
Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 39- 
62.
Hausman, D. “The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons”, Mind, 415 (1995), 
pp. 473-490.
Heal, J. “Replication and Functionalism”, in Butterfield, J. (ed.) Language, Mind and 
Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
“Simulation vs. theory theory: What is at issue?”, in Peacocke, C. (ed.), Objectivity, 
Simulation and the Unity o f Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy o f Mind 
(Proceedings of the British Academy vol. 83), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994,pp. 129-44.
“Co-cognition and off-line simulation: Two ways of understanding the simulation 
approach”, Mind and Language, 14 (1998a), 477-98.
168
“Understanding other minds from the inside”, in O’Hear, A. (ed.), Contemporary 
Issues in Philosophy o f Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998b, 
pp.83-99.
“Other minds, rationality and analogy”, Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volume 74, 2000, pp. 1-19.
Hennipman, P. “A New Look at the Ordinalist Revolution: Comments on Cooter and 
Rappoport”, Journal o f Economic Literature, 26 (1988), pp. 80-85.
Jeffrey, R. C. “On Interpersonal Utility Theory”, The Journal o f Philosophy, 6 8  (1971), 
pp. 647-656.
“Remarks on Interpersonal Utility Theory”, in Stenlund, S. (ed.) Logical Theory and 
Semantic Analysis, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974, pp. 35-44.
The Logic o f Decision, 2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983 (1965,1st 
ed.).
Probability and the art o f judgment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
JEVONS, S. Theory o f Political Economy, 4th edition, London: Macmillan, 1911(1871,1st 
ed.).
Kagan, S. Normative Ethics, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998.
Khalidi, M. A. “Innate Cognitive Capacities”, Mind and Language, 22 (2007), pp. 92-115.
Krantz, D.H., Luce, R.D., Suppes, P. and Tversky, A. Foundations o f Measurement: 
Vol. 1. Additive and polynomial representations, New York: Academic, 1971.
Kolodny, N. “Why be rational?”, Mind, 114 (2005), pp. 509-563.
Lepore, E. and K. Ludwig, Donald Davidson. Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.
Leslie, A. “Pretence and representation: The origins of “theory of mind”.”, Psychological 
Review, 94 (1987), pp. 412-426.
“Some implications of pretense for mechanisms underlying the child’s theory of mind”, 
in Astington, J. Harris, P. and D., Olson (eds.), Developing Theories o f Minds, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 19-46.
“Pretending and Believing: Issues in the theory of ToMM.”, Cogniton, 50 (1994), pp. 
211-238.
“How to acquire a representational theory of mind”, in Sperber, D. (ed.), 
Metarepresentation: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000, pp. 197-223.
169
Leslie, A. and T., German “Knowledge and ability in “theory of mind”: One-eyed 
overview of a debate”, in Davies, M. and T., Stone (eds.) Mental Simulation, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, pp. 123-150.
Lewis, D. “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”, Australasian Journal o f 
Philosophy, 50 (1972), pp. 249-258.
Philosophical Papers. Vol. 7, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
List, C. “A Note on Introducing a ‘Zero-Line’ of Welfare as an Escape-Route from 
Arrow’s Theorem”, Pacific Economic Review, 6  (2001), pp. 223-238.
“Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate?”, Erkenntnis, 58 (2003), pp. 
229-260.
Little, I. D. M. A Critique o f Welfare Economics, 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957 
(1950, 1st ed.).
“Robert Cooter and Peter Rappoport, ‘Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare 
Economics?’: A Comment”, Journal o f Economic Literature, 23 (1985), pp. 1186- 
1188.
MacKa y , A. F. “Extended Sympathy and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, The Journal 
o f Philosophy, 83 (1986), pp. 305-322.
McGinn, C. Knowledge and Reality, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002 (1999 
1 st ed.).
Mishan, E. J. “A Survey of Welfare Economics, 1939-1959”, The Economic Journal, 70 
(1960), pp. 197-265.
Miskin, E. “A Theorem on Utilitarianism”, Review o f Economic Studies, 45 (1978), pp. 93- 
96.
Mongin, P. “The Impartial Observer Theorem of Social Ethics”, Economics and 
Philosophy, 17 (2001), pp. 147-179.
Ng, Y.-K. “Happiness Surveys: Some Comparability Issues and an Explanatory Survey 
Based on Just Perceivable Increments, Social Indicators Research, 38, 1996, pp. 1- 
27.
“A Case for Happiness, Cardinalism, and Interpersonal Comparability”, The Economic 
Journal, 107 (1997), pp. 1848-1858.
Nichols, S., Stich, S. Leslie, A. and D., Klein “Varieties of Off-Line Simulation” in 
Carruthers, P, and P., Smith (eds.) Theories o f Theories o f Mind, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 39-74.
Nichols, S. and, S., Stich, S. “Rethinking co-cognition: A reply to Heal”, Mind and 
Language, 13 (1998)pp. 499-512.
170
Mindreading: An Integrated Account o f Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding 
Other Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Nozick, R. Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York, Basic Books, 1974.
Parfit, D. Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
Peunenburg, J. and R., Hunneman, “Translations and Theories: On the Difference 
between Indeterminacy and Underdetermination”, Ratio, 14 (2001), pp. 18-32.
Perner, J. Understanding the Representational Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: MTT Press, 1991.
“Simulation as explicitation of predication-implicit knowledge about the mind: 
arguments for a simulation-theory mix”, in Carruthers, P, and P., Smith (eds.) 
Theories o f Theories o f Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 90- 
104.
Pettit, P. “Decision Theory and Folk Psychology”, in Bacharach, M. and S., Hurley 
(eds.), Foundations o f Decision Theory, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991, pp. 147-175.
Rules, Reasons, and Norms, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
“Preference, Deliberation and Satisfaction”, Royal Institute o f Philosophy Supplement, 
81 (2006), pp. 131-154.
Plantinga, A. Warrant and Proper Function, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Rabinowicz, W. and J., Osterberg “Value Based on Preferences”, Economics and 
Philosophy, 12(1996), pp. 1-27.
Rabinowicz, W. “Modelling parity and incomparability” in Rabinowicz W. and T., 
R0NNOW-RASMUSSEN (eds.) Patterns o f value: essays on formal axiology and value 
analysis, Vol. 2. Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Lund, 2004.
Ramsey, F. P. “Truth and Probability”, 1926, reprinted in Mellor, D. H. (ed.) 
Philosophical Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Rappoport, P. “Reply to Professor Hennipman”, Journal o f Economic Literature, 26 
(1988), pp. 86-91.
Rawls, J. A Theory o f Justice, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.
“Social unity and primary goods”, in Sen, A. and B., Williams (eds.) Utilitarianism 
and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 159-186.
Raz, J. Practical Reason and Norms, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
Engaging Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
“The role of well-being”, Philosophical Perspectives, 18 (2004), pp. 269-294.
Robbins, L. An Essay on the Nature and Significance o f Economic Science, London: 
Macmillan, 1932.
171
Roberts, F. S. Measurement theory with applications to decision-making, utility, and the 
social sciences, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Advanced Book Program, 1979.
Roberts, K. W. S. “Possibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Utility Levels”, 
Review o f Economic Studies, 47 (1980a), pp. 409-420.
“Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory”, Review o f Economic 
Studies”, 47 (1980b), pp. 421-439.
“Valued Opinions or Opinionized Values: the Double Aggregation Problem”, in Basu, 
K., Pattanaik, P. K. and K., Suzumura (eds.), Choice, Welfare and Development: A 
Festschrift in Honour ofAmartya Sen, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 141-185.
Roemer, J. E. Equality o f Opportunity, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Samuelson, P. A. Foundations o f Economic Analysis, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1947.
Samuels, R. “Nativism in cognitive science”, Mind & Language, 17 (2002), pp. 233 -  265.
Savage, L. J. The Foundations o f Statistics, New York: Wiley, 1954.
Scanlon, T. M. “The moral basis of interpersonal comparisons”, in Elster, J. and J. E., 
Roemer (eds.), Interpersonal Comparisons o f Well-Being, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991, pp. 17-44.
What We Owe To Each Other, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
“Structural Irrationality”, in Brennan, G. Goodin, R. Jackson, F. and M., Smith 
(eds.) Common Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
SCHICK, F. “Beyond Utilitarianism”, The Journal o f Philosophy, 68 (1971), pp. 657-666.
Sen, A. K. Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970.
On Economic Inequality, 1st ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
“On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis”, 
Econometrica, 45 (1977), pp. 53-89.
“Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare”, in Boskin, M. J. (ed.) Economics and Human 
Welfare: Essays in Honor ofTiborScitovsky, New York, Academic Press, 1979a, pp. 
183-201.
“Utilitarianism and Welfarism”, The Journal o f Philosophy, 76 (1979b), pp. 463-489.
Commodities and Capabilities, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1985.
“Capability and Well-being”, in Nussbaum, M. and A., Sen The Quality o f Life, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 30-53.
“The Possibility of Social Choice”, The American Economic Review, 89 (1999), pp. 
349-378.
172
Sober, E. “What is the Problem of Simplicity?” in Zellner, A., Keuzenkamp, H. and 
McAleer,M. (eds.) Simplicity, Inference and Modelling: Keeping It Sophisticatedly 
Simple, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp 13-31.
“Parsimony,” in Sarkar, S. and Pfeifer, J. (eds.) The Philosophy o f Science. An 
Encyclopedia, New York: Routledge, 2003.
Stern, R. “The Goal of Transcendental Arguments,” in Stern, R. (ed.), Transcendental 
Arguments: Problems and Prospects, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Stich, S. and S., Nichols “Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory?”, Mind and 
Language, 7 (1992), pp. 35-71.
“Second Thoughts on Simulation”, in Davies, M. and T., Stone (eds.) Folk 
Psychology: The Theory o f Mind Debate, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, pp. 87-108.
“How do minds understand minds? Mental simulation versus tacit theory”, in S t i c h , S .  
Deconstructing the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 136-167.
“Cognitive Penetrability, Rationality and Restricted Simulation”, Mind and Language, 
12 (1997), pp. 297-326.
Stigler, G. J. “The Development of Utility Theory. I”, The Journal o f Political Economy, 
58, (1950a), pp. 307-327.
“The Development of Utility Theory. II”, The Journal o f Political Economy, 58, 
(1950b), pp. 373-396.
Stroud, B. Understanding Human Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Suzumura, K. “Interpersonal Comparisons of the Extended Sympathy Type and the 
Possibility of Social Choice”, in Arrow, K. J., Sen, A. and K., Suzumura, Social 
Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2, London: Macmillan, 1996, pp. 202-209.
von Neumann, J. and O., Morgenstern, Theory o f Games and Economic Behavior 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.
Waldner, I. “The Empirical Meaningfulness of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons”, The 
Journal o f Philosophy, 4 (1972), pp. 87-103.
Weintraub, R. “Do Utility Comparisons Pose a Problem?”, Philosophical Studies, 92 
(1998), pp. 307-319.
Weirich, P. “Interpersonal Utility in Principles of Social Choice”, Erkenntnis, 21 (1984), 
pp. 295-317.
Wellman, H. The Child’s Theory o f Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990.
Weymark, T. “A reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen debate on utilitarianism”, in Elster, 
J & J., Roemer (eds.) Interpersonal Comparisons o f Well-Being, Cambridge: CUP, 
1991.
173
“Measurement theory and the foundations of utilitarianism”, Social Choice and 
Welfare, 25 (2005), pp. 527-555.
Wiggins, D. “Incommensurability: Four Proposals”, in Chang, R. (ed.)
Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1997, pp. 52-66.
Williams, B. “Internal and External Reasons”, in Williams, B. Moral Luck, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Yasgur, S. PhD Dissertation, [2008].
174
